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The deductive-nomological account, various causal accounts, and various unification-
ist accounts of explanation have all taken explanations such as the one of the motion
of the planets by Newton’s theory of gravity and mechanics to be a paradigmatic
example of explanation and of explanatory advancement within the sciences. New-
ton’s theory of gravity increased our understanding of a wide range of phenomena and
nonetheless many were troubled by the notion of action at a distance that the theory
postulates. Newton himself can be seen to take an ambivalent attitude towards the
explanatoriness of his theory. On the one hand, he claims to have explained a range
of phenomena from the law of gravity, but nonetheless he acknowledges the lack of a
causal explanation. I think that this kind of situation is neither incredibly rare nor
limited to peripheral cases in the history of science. In addition to the example from
Newtonian gravity we can find this attitude towards certain quantum mechanical ex-
planations that seem to require the acceptance of non-locality, and, in a somewhat
different way, towards the role of spacetime in the explanation of inertial motion in
general relativity.
I argue that these cases pose a serious difficulty for the unificationist account and,
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in particular, for the causal account. Moreover, I take these cases to be illuminating
as to the nature of explanation and I develop an account of explanation based on
a notion of dependence that is broader than causal dependence that allows us to
account for this attitude. Doing so opens up the possibility of rehabilitating the
explanatory status of laws by providing a way of addressing the counter-examples to
the deductive-nomological account that does not rely on replacing the role of laws as
providing a relation that does explanatory work with causal relations or a relation
of unification. Lastly, this allows us to understand the debates about explanatory
status in Newtonian gravity, in quantum mechanics over EPR style cases, and over
the role of spacetime in general relativity as arising from empirical issues rather than
from conceptual disagreements about the nature of explanation.
ix
CHAPTER I
Why a new account of explanation?
Those in the market for an explanation of explanation are spoilt for choice. There
is the deductive-nomological account, various causal accounts as well as various uni-
ficationist accounts. So why not be a happy shopper?
Each of the accounts that I have mentioned seem to touch upon an important
intuition behind explanation. In spite of this, every one of the accounts has cases
that it either cannot handle and/or cases where it seems to deliver the wrong verdict.
The discussion of the merits and problems facing these accounts has typically focused
on discussion of such cases. In this thesis I wish to discuss a problem that all the
accounts share and that takes a different form from the standard counter-examples.
The problem that will be my main concern here arises in some of the instances where
the accounts differ and where it is not clear which account delivers the right result,
since both verdicts has some intuitive pull. Most of these cases are not such that we
simply lack clear intuitions about whether or not they are instances of explanation
and are willing to let theory guide us, but rather these cases are such that we both,
in some sense, seem to have and seem to lack an explanation. Neither are these
cases rare. We find this ambivalent attitude towards the explanatoriness of Newton’s
theory of gravity, the ideal gas theory, certain quantum mechanical explanations,
the explanation of inertial motion in general relativity, etc. Though the accounts
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above disagree about the explanatoriness of these cases, they all judge them to be
either paradigmatically explanatory or paradigmatically non-explanatory. I would
like to provide a model of explanation that can account for an ambivalent attitude.
In doing so I will ultimately take a stance on whether these cases are instances of
explanations and I will argue that understanding these cases better is illuminating
for understanding explanation in general and in particular for capturing why the
standard accounts all seem to ring true.
1.1 An overview of accounts of explanation
Before introducing the novel problem that most of this thesis will be concerned
with resolving, let me say a little bit about how I see the state of the debate. This
review will be in the spirit of van Fraassen’s §2 [116, chapter 5, p 103 forward] and
could have shared its name ‘A Biased History’. Even though this will very much be
a presentation of the history of models of explanation constructed to focus on the
issues that I take to be the most pressing it is not mere bias that makes it so. There
are many great presentations of the history of models of scientific explanation (see
for example Salmon [98]) and here I am not trying to compete with these, but rather
to introduce the accounts of explanation that I will be discussing conceptualised in
the way that I approach the problem of giving an account of scientific explanation.
1.1.1 The deductive-nomological account
The main idea driving the deductive-nomological account is that to explain a
phenomenon is to subsume it under a law of nature. For many scientific explanations
this model of explanation seems prima facie compelling. When we open a physics
textbook we find derivations from laws when explaining everything from particular
particle motions to high-level generalisations. The deductive-nomological account
construes an explanation as a sound deductive argument that makes essential use of
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at least one law of nature.
. . . [E]xplanation . . . deductively subsumes the explanandum under gen-
eral laws and thus shows, to put it loosely, that according to those laws
the explanandum-phenomenon “had to occur” in virtue of the particular
circumstances . . . . Hempel [44, p 70]
Crucial to the deductive-nomological account is a close relationship between pre-
diction and explanation. In some writings Hempel takes prediction and explanation
to differ only in pragmatic features. Even though he alters his position on this issue
by saying that he would ‘. . . now want to weaken the thesis so as to assert only that
the two covering-law models represent the logical structure of two important types of
predictive inference in empirical science, but not that these are the only types’ [44, p
76], the condition of expectability still applies and the only case that Hempel claims
is decisively predictive but not explanatory comes from prediction based on simple
enumerative induction [44, p 76 – 77].1
Scheffler brings up cases of asymmetry of explanation that have often been taken
to be seriously problematic for the deductive-nomological account (and I also take
them to be so). Scheffler’s [101, p 300] particular example is concerned with a case
where we can both retrodict and predict — a case where we can both predict the
future location of a celestial body and retrodict its past location — and he notes
that not both of these types of inferences seem explanatory. I will not discuss these
examples in detail here since I will say much more about these kinds of cases and
other problem cases arising from situations where we can predict but do not seem to
be able to explain a phenomenon by subsuming it under a law in chapter III.
Here I just want to note that there is a host of problem cases that brought out the
difficulties facing the deductive-nomological account and that these cases also turned
out to be challenging for other accounts of explanation and, in particular, for any
1Hempel points out that Scriven [p 176 – 177][102] and that Scheffler [101, p 296] press these
kinds of cases.
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account that takes laws to be able to do explanatory work. In this way, these cases
have had a much greater impact than merely illustrating problems for the deductive-
nomological account and they provide a standard store of typically difficult cases
against which to test a proposed account of explanation.
Hempel’s deductive-nomological account does not deal with statistical explana-
tion, but his inductive-statistical account of explanation that does so and that is
largely motivated along similar lines also comes with a host of challenging cases.
These too have played a role as a rough litmus test of the feasibility of accounts of
explanation. However, since I will, mostly, not discuss statistical explanations I will
set these cases aside.
1.1.2 Causal accounts
The idea that causal relationships ground explanatory ones has two important
virtues; it captures much of the explanatory practices outside of fundamental physics2
and it gives a strikingly simply and intuitively compelling solution to the problems
that the deductive-nomological account encounters. In particular, a causal account
can make use of causal asymmetry in order to account for explanatory asymmetry.
Causal accounts come in many different versions, partly since there are many
different accounts of causal relationships and partly since there are many different ac-
counts of how one selects the explanatorily relevant part of the causal history. Lewis
puts the main idea very succinctly ‘. . . to explain an event is to provide some infor-
mation about its causal history ’ [66, p 217]. This still leaves a range of possibilities
about what kind of information about the causal history that counts. Moreover,
Lewis’ statement only claims that explanations of events are causal. However, it is
2Other accounts can, and typically do, also claim to capture this practice, but they typically do so
by giving an account of how causal explanation reduces to the preferred account of explanation. For
example, Hempel allows that there can be causal explanations but only because ‘. . . the assertion that
a set of events . . . have caused the event to be explained, amounts to the statement that, according
to certain general laws, a set of events of the kinds mentioned is regularly accompanied by an event
of kind E [my insertion: the kind of event to be explained]’ [43, p 232].
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later clear that he takes this account to extend to cover other kinds of explanation
too. It is typical for causal accounts to limit the domain application at least to
cover explanations that hold due to empirical reasons and to rule out, for example,
mathematical explanations.
Though causal accounts often have trouble accounting for how laws explain other
laws, for how conservation laws can explain, and for how idealisations that distort the
causal story can nonetheless be explanatory, there are strategies that causal accounts
can take towards debunking these kinds of cases. The most important aspect of
causal accounts, for our purposes, is that it is information about the causal relation
that carries explanatory power and even though it is possible to go some way towards
accounting for the seeming explanatory power of laws in terms of the information
that they provide about causal relationships they do not carry explanatory power
in virtue of being laws. There are two recent sophisticated at base causal accounts,
Woodward’s interventionist account [126] and Strevens’ kairetic account [112], that
I will return to as examples of causal accounts of explanation that have gone a long
way towards addressing the cases that are challenging for causal accounts in general.
In particular, Strevens has paid close attention the the problem of how to account for
the existence of explanations that distort the underlying causal story and I will say
a little more about his account next.
1.1.2.1 Strevens’ kairetic account
The main idea underlying Strevens’ account is to take an at base causal account
and to complement it with an account of what information about the causal history is
relevant that contains a trade-off between factors that can allow for some distortions
of the underlying causal history. The core of Strevens’ account is that the part of
the causal history that is explanatorily relevant is just the part that contains the
causal influences that made a difference to whether or not the event being explained
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occurred. Not all causal influences are relevant in this way. After all it is certainly
the case that the gravitational pull that the oncoming bus exerts on Jones just before
it hits him is a causal influence in the causal history of his death but it is not one
that makes a difference as to whether or not his death occurs.
Once we get further into the account this driving intuition, namely that we are
trying to identify the difference makers, has been refined into two different constraints
that are to be maximised.
. . . [T]he explanatory kernel corresponding to a veridical deterministic
causal model M with target e is the causal model K for e that satisfies the
following conditions:
1. K is an abstraction of M.
2. K causally entails e,
and that, within these constraints, maximizes the following desiderata:
3 K is as abstract as can be (generality), and
3 The fundamental-level realizers of K form a causally contiguous set
(cohesion).
Strevens [112, p 109 – 110]
The explanatory kernel is simply a kind of explanation (the ‘smallest’ explanation
on Strevens’ account) for the target e, where e is just the event to be explained. The
two desiderata are meant to capture the idea that the causal influences are difference
makers for e. The idea is that by making the causal model as abstract as possible
(generality), while still ensuring the entailment of e, and without going so far as to
make the causal influences too disjunctive (cohesion) we will capture the factors that
are crucial in order to bring about e.
There is a general challenge involved in making the the notion of generality and
cohesion precise enough to be able to provide guidance in evaluating our explanatory
practice. However, I think that there is another reason to be worried about their
inclusion in spelling out the basic explanatory constituents. If we were concerned
6
primarily with giving a pragmatic account of explanation, or more broadly, an account
of explanation that focuses on, as Strevens puts it, explanation as ‘. . . a communicative
act’ [112, p 6] their inclusion would be quite natural. However, Strevens takes himself
to be involved in the ontological project of spelling out what kind of facts about the
world explanatory facts are. When he says that we will be concerned with explanation
in the ontological sense [112, pp 6 – 7] I take Strevens to be saying that he will tackle
what Kim has called the metaphysical question.
The Metaphysical Question: When G is an explanans for E, in virtue
of what relation between g and e, the events represented by G and E
respectively, is G an explanans for E? What is the objective relation con-
necting events, g and e, that grounds the explanatory relation between
their descriptions, G and E? Kim [58, p 56]
This, of course, sits well with Strevens’ at base causal account, where the answer to
the question posed is that explanatory facts are causal facts, or that the relation is a
causal relation. The intuitive modification of further restricting attention to the causal
facts that make a difference still stays within the purview of this question. However,
once we spell out what it is to make a difference in terms of generality or cohesion it
seems to me that we have left the metaphysical question and started to answer the
communicative one. The notion of generality involved is that of abstraction, a removal
of details from a description of the world, but this seems to not have anything to do
with what relation has to obtain in the world but rather to be about what feature
the description of it has to take. The same worry holds for the cohesion requirement.
This requirement is based on a kind of similarity relationship. ‘A model is cohesive, I
propose, if its realizers constitute a contiguous set in causal similarity space . . . ’ [112,
p 104]. It could of course be that there is an objective similarity ranking such that
whether or not some particular causal process counts as a difference maker has to do
with how similar it is to other causal relations, but this brings out all the difficulties
involved in finding an objective notion of similarity. The notion of abstraction as
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well as that of cohesion seems to be easier to motivate if we are considering not
only what causal influences make a difference, but what difference makers we can
grasp. Now, however, the intuition that we started with does not seem to be one
of capturing purely what relation grounds explanation, or simply whether or not a
certain causal influence makes a difference, but rather whether it makes a difference
that is significant to us.
1.1.2.2 Woodward’s interventionist account
Woodward’s interventionist account is also an at base a causal account, but his
approach is very different from Strevens’.
Woodward offers a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an explanans E
to be an explanation for an explanandum M .
(EXP) Suppose that M is an explanandum consisting in the statement
that some variable Y takes the particular value y. Then an explanans E
for M will consist of
(a) a generalization G relating changes in the value(s) of a variable X
(where X may itself be a vector or n-tuple of variables Xi) and
changes in Y , and
(b) a statement (of initial or boundary conditions) that the variable X
takes the particular value x.
A necessary and sufficient condition for E to be (minimally) explanatory
with respect to M is that
(i) E and M be true or approximately so
(ii) according to G, Y takes the value y under an intervention in which
X takes the value x
(iii) there is some intervention that changes the value of X from x to x′
where x 6= x′, with G correctly describing the value y′ that Y would
assume under this intervention, where y′ 6= y.
Woodward [126, p 203]
Woodward’s fully worked out account is complex, but the intuitive idea is rather
simple. So, very roughly, a true (or approximately true) generalisation can explain
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the value of one of its variables in terms of the values of the other variable(s) if
and only if an intervention that sets the variables in the explanans to their actual
values also gives the variable being explained its actual value (and the generalisation
captures this) and there is at least one possible intervention on the variable(s) doing
the explaining that will result in a change in the value of the variable being explained
(and the generalisation captures this). So for example, on this account barometer
readings do not explain the coming of storms since we cannot bring a storm about
(or prevent a storm from coming) by an intervention that changes the value of the
barometer reading.
Interventions here are not interventions that we can currently carry out, or even
nomologically possible interventions, but logically possible ones. Now, roughly speak-
ing, interventions on Woodward’s account are such that ‘. . . an intervention on X with
respect to Y changes the value of X in such a way that if any change occurs in Y, it
occurs only as a result of the change in the value of X and not from some other source’
[126, p 14]. In order to deal with the possibility that there might be no physically nor
nomologically possible ways of altering, for example, the orbit of the moon that would
not also influence the tides, even though it seems as if the orbit of the moon can play
a part in explaining the tides, Woodward argues that the intervention only needs to
be logically possible. The worry with demanding that interventions be physically or
nomologically possible is that all interventions that would, for example, change the
orbit of the moon, would be ‘. . . in Elliott Sober’s words . . . “too ham-fisted” . . . ’ [126,
p 129] to satisfy the constraints that Woodward poses on interventions and in partic-
ular the constraint that the only effect on the dependent variable occurs as a result
of the change in the variable that is subject to intervention. Since it seems as if the
motion of the tides does depend on the orbit of the moon Woodward concludes that
in cases like these ‘ . . . Newtonian theory itself delivers a determinate answer to ques-
tions about what would happen to the tides under an intervention that doubles the
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moons orbit, and this is enough for counterfactual claims about what would happen
under such interventions to be legitimate and to allow us to assess their truth’ [126,
p 131]. The kind of counterfactuals that are ruled out by demanding the existence
of an intervention are thus only ‘. . . those for which we cannot coherently describe
what it would be like for the relevant intervention to occur at all or for which there is
no conceivable basis for assessing claims about what would happen under such inter-
ventions because we have no basis for disentangling, even conceptually, the effects of
changing the cause variable from the effects of other sorts of changes that accompany
changes in the cause variable’ [126, p 132].
While allowing not only nomologically (or physically) possible interventions, but
logically possible ones as well, solves the problem presented by cases where we doubt
whether there is a nomologically possible process that would count as an intervention
while we still think that we have an explanation, this also means that the reasons
for which a putative explanation fails to be explanatory has to be more complex
than we ordinarily think. Consider for example Woodward’s explanation of why the
period of a simple gravitational pendulum cannot explain the length of the pendulum.
Woodward allows that there is some interpretation of the counterfactual
• Had the period of P been T ∗, then the length would have been l∗
that makes it true, where P is the pendulum, T and T ∗ are its old and new period
respectively and l and l∗ are its old and new lengths. He goes on to argue that it is
nonetheless not explanatory to derive the length from the period.
. . . [T]here are no inventions on the period T that will change the length
of the pendulum. It is true that one might manipulate T by moving
the pendulum to a different gravitational field g∗ (without changing the
its length in any other way except via the effects, if any, of this change
in location), but this will not result in a change in the length of the
pendulum. Of course, one might also change the period of the pendulum
by changing its length, but this is not an intervention on the period with
respect to the length. In other words, any manipulation (e.g., moving
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the pendulum to a different gravitational field) that changes the period
via a route on which the length is not an intermediate variable between
the intervention and the period will not change the length, whereas any
process that changes the period will do so via a route on which the length
is an intermediate variable and hence will not count as an intervention on
the period with respect to the length. Woodward [126, p 197 – 198]
Here, however, the examples seem to only be concerned with nomologically possible
interventions, but given that interventions only have to be logically possible it is not
clear why we should limit ourselves to interventions of this kind. It certainly seems
logically possible to change the period of the pendulum in many ways other than
moving it to a different gravitational field, without making use of an intervention that
goes via a change in length. Now, of course, the question is whether the counterfactual
above would hold in such cases. That is, is there at least one logically possible
intervention on T with respect to l that changes T to T ∗ such that the closest possible





, due only to the change in T? To rule out that the period of the pendulum
can explain the length we have to consider not only such interventions as moving the
pendulum to a different gravitational field, but all logically possible interventions. In
other words, when Woodward writes that any process (or manipulation) that changes
the period has a certain property he is concerned with any logically possible process.
My worry with having to consider all logically possible interventions is not that I
think that there are logically possible interventions on T with respect to l such that
l does indeed change in the required way.3 My worry is just that we do not seem
to need to consider all such interventions in order to be able to tell that we cannot
3We can imagine a logically possible world where an intervention on T with respect to l takes
place and l changes in the required way. In particular, we can imagine that the intervention on T
is brought about by a small miracle and causes a small miracle to take place which brings it about
that l changes according to l = T
2g
4π2 . However I am not sure that this world is ever the closest
possible world where such an intervention on T takes place. The reason that I do not wish to claim
that there really are such interventions is that I am not confident about the extent to which the
occurrence of a small miracle should count against the closeness of a possible world to the actual
world. In particular, I am not sure whether a world with one such small miracle is more or less
similar to a world where the law l = T
2g
4π2 does not hold.
11
explain the length of the pendulum by its period. In particular, once we realise that
the length can vary arbitrarily when the period remains the same in the actual world
we know that the length cannot depend on the period, but in order to know this we
do not need to consider all logically possible interventions on the period with respect
to the length. All we need to do is to notice that when pendulums are not in motion
they can still be of any length.
1.1.3 Unificationist account
The unificationist account(s) take a radically different strategy from that of the
causal and the deductive-nomological account. The motivating intuition behind unifi-
cationist accounts is captured by Friedman’s statement that ‘. . . science increases our
understanding of the world by reducing the total number of independent phenomena
that we have to accept as ultimate or given’ [33, p 15]. This intuition is modified
somewhat by Kitcher’s development where the motivating intuition is that ‘[s]cience
advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of
many phenomena, using the same patterns of derivation again and again, and, in
demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of types of facts that we
have to accept as ultimate (or brute)’ [60, p 432].
Spelling out this intuition in detail takes some work. Here I will simply present
the main components of Kitcher’s version of unificationism (as developed in [60]).
Central this account is the notion of an argument pattern.
. . . A general argument pattern is a triple consisting of a schematic argu-
ment, a set of sets of filling instructions, one for each term of the schematic
argument, and a classification for the schematic argument. Kitcher [60, p
432]
A schematic argument is an argument where some of the vocabulary in the sentences
of the argument has been replaced by variables. The filling instructions say how
the variables can be filled and the classification for the schematic argument specifies
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which statements are premises and which are conclusions and which follow from which
(and how). To the extent that an argument pattern poses more demanding filling
instructions or a more demanding classification the argument pattern is said to be
more stringent.4
Kitcher calls the set of conclusions of a set of derivations D, C(D), and defines it
to be the set of all statements that are conclusions of some derivation in D. Now, the
unification achieved by a set of argument patterns ‘. . . varies directly with the size
of C(D), directly with the stringency of the patterns in the set, and inversely with
the number of patterns in the set’ [60, p 453]. The basic idea is that what matters
for unification is how many phenomena we capture and how many and how similar
the argument patterns that we use in capturing the phenomena are. There is an
immediate problem of how we are to balance these desiderata in cases where they
conflict. However, Kitcher claims that for actual (at least present and past) cases we
will not run into this problem.
It is worth spending a little bit of time on how this account tackles the problem
of explanatory asymmetry since it brings out an aspect of the account that seems to
be difficult to avoid on any unificationist account and that Woodward has dubbed
the winner-takes-all aspect of the account [127]. On an intuitive, first pass, notion of
unification many of the cases of explanatory asymmetry seem to be such that both the
explanatory derivation and the non-explanatory derivation are cases of unification.
For example, consider the case of the flagpole and the shadow where we seem to be
able to explain the length of the shadow by the height of the flagpole but not vice
versa. Here, on an intuitive understanding of unification, both the derivation of the
height of the flagpole from the length of the shadow and the derivation of the length
of the shadow from the height of the flagpole seem like they carry unificatory power.
After all, it is clear how they apply in other cases and can be used to account for a
4See Kitcher [60, p 433 forward] for a much more detailed discussion of stringency.
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number of different phenomena. In order to tackle this challenge it is crucial that it
is only members of the overall systematisation that achieves the best unification of
our beliefs that count as explanatory at all.
. . . [T]he heart of the view that I shall develop. . . is that successful ex-
planations earn that title because they belong to a set of explanations,
the explanatory store . . . Intuitively, the explanatory store associated with
science at a particular time contains those derivations which collectively
provide the best systematization of our beliefs. Kitcher [60, p 430]
Kitcher puts the requirement that only members of the best system are explana-
tory to work in accounting for how it is that shadows do not explain the heights of
the objects that cast them.5 The idea that he puts forward is that we can account for
the height of objects by a pattern that he calls the origin-and-development pattern
and furthermore that this pattern can not be replaced by a shadow pattern without
reducing the number of phenomena that can be explained (due to all the cases where
the object does not cast a shadow). Nor can we simply add the shadow pattern since
this would give us an increase in the number of argument patterns without an increase
in the number of phenomena accounted for.
Now, however, we are in a position where it seems like we have to know what
the best unification of our beliefs is in order to know whether or not we have an
explanation. This is clearly a tall order and it is not very plausible that anyone can
reasonably make such a judgement. Kitcher is aware of this and thinks that we can
account for this feature by thinking of these judgements as being passed down to us
from our community.6
Our everyday causal knowledge is gained by absorbing the lore of our
community. The scientific tradition has articulated some general patterns
of derivation. . . . So there passes into our common way of thinking, and
our common ways of talking, a view of the ordering of phenomena . . . .
Kitcher [60, p 436]
5See Kitcher [60, pp 484 – 489].
6Kitcher is concerned with how we make causal judgements here, but the same point can be made
with regards to explanatory judgements.
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This explanation does not, however, seem to address the fundamental worry. I think
that the worry is not simply that it is implausible to demand that we know what the
best unification of our beliefs is but also that it simply is not clear how it is relevant
to whether or not the length of the shadow explains the height of the flagpole what
goes on in, for example, macroeconomics and how to best unify our beliefs there.
I think that this is simply a feature of a more general worry about thinking of
explanatory power as being conveyed by membership of the best overall system. After
all, this means that it is possible to change our view about whether or not a particular
phenomenon explains another phenomenon without changing our view about any of
the underlying features of the two phenomena in question, but rather change only
our view of the most desirable trade-off between the three desiderata in light of the
addition of some intuitively completely unrelated phenomenon. On the unificationist
account explanation is a thoroughly global concern.
1.2 The challenges of non-exclusivity
All of the main accounts of explanation have some intuitive pull and it is tempting
to think that what has gone wrong in our analysis of scientific explanation is the
focus on a unified theory of explanation. Perhaps we ought to give up on the idea
of a single model of scientific explanation? There is something about this idea that
is compelling. After all, as Woodward puts it, ‘ . . . explanatory practice — what is
accepted as an explanation, how explanatory goals interact with others, what sort of
explanatory information is thought to be achievable, discoverable, testable etc. —
varies in significant ways across different disciplines’ [127]. However, while it does
seem to be the case that explanatory practice varies across disciplines it would still
be surprising to find that what it takes to be an explanation, in the ontological sense,
is completely unrelated in, say, biology and psychology. It seems very reasonable to
think that the expectations for how an explanation ought to look will vary, particularly
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since the accessibility of certain kinds of information, such as information about laws,
differs greatly in different disciplines.
Now, Woodward is not advocating a radical disconnect between explanation in
the various theories. Rather he argues that ‘[i]deally, such models would reveal com-
monalities across disciplines but they should also enable us to see why explanatory
practice varies as it does across different disciplines and the significance of such vari-
ation” [127]. This kind of variation is completely compatible with the idea that there
is something general to say about what scientific explanation is.
I think that giving up on the idea of a unified account of explanation and sim-
ply being permissive about he kinds of relationships that can do explanatory work
risks robbing us of an account of explanation that can be helpful in understanding
and evaluating explanatory debates altogether. While recognising that different dis-
ciplines face different problems in the information that is readily available is simply
an observation of the different positions that the various sciences find themselves in,
it would be surprising to find that explanations in chemistry could not be recognised
as such in biology. After all, scientific disciplines are not fundamental or natural en-
tities and there would not seem to be anything in principle banning a biologist from
adopting a chemistry-style explanation if one is available and genuinely explanatory
(other than perhaps the disapprobation of other biologists). Mostly this point seems
to be recognised. When ontological accounts of explanation are proposed and are not
taken to be universal they are typically accompanied by a criteria of demarcation of
their domain of application. For example, it is often claimed that causal accounts
apply to explanations of events, or of empirical phenomena, etc. It is important that
these categories are not ad hoc, both in order to be able to test the model against
cases that are intuitively judged to be cases of scientific explanation, but also in order
to ensure that the light that the model purports to shed on features of explanation
is preserved. For example, a causal account can attribute the irrelevance of certain
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factors to the explanation of some particular event to the causal irrelevance of these
factors. However, this is elucidation only works if we assume that all candidate expla-
nations for the phenomenon have to be causal. Without this we are left with either
the question of why the other kinds of explanation that are possible also judges the
factor to be explanatorily irrelevant or why, if they do not, we intuitively judge it to
be irrelevant.
1.3 The problem of the ubiquity and centrality of explana-
tions that are non-paradigmatic on the main accounts of
explanation
There is much to say about the merits and drawbacks of the standard accounts of
explanation (and I presented just some of it in section 1.1). Now I want to focus on a
problem that arises since they all seem to tap into some intuition about explanations.
Namely, what happens when the virtues of the different theories come into conflict.
Newton’s theory of gravity provides one such challenge for models of scientific
explanation. The theory of universal gravitational attraction was extremely success-
ful, showing a wide range of phenomena to be of the same type and predicting the
behaviour of different types of systems from a few laws. On the other hand, the
appeal to action at a distance was thought to be troubling and raised questions as
to whether the theory really could have identified the physical causes of the motions
predicted by the theory. Focusing on the fact that Newton’s theory of gravity greatly
increased our understanding of a range of phenomena, we seem to have an, at least
partial, explanation of those phenomena. However, taking the worries about action
at a distance seriously raises the worry that we have only systematically described the
behaviour of a, admittedly impressively varied, range of occurrences. Whether a the-
ory of explanation ends up ultimately judging Newton’s theory of gravity to provide
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or not to provide an explanation of these phenomena, we would like to understand
what it is about this case that allows the controversy to arise.
The challenge for theories of explanations, then, is to do one of three things;
1. Explain away the intuition that Newton’s law of gravity is capable of explaining.
2. Explain how all worries about action at a distance are misguided, but natural,
as worries about the explanatory status of the theory.
3. Account both for the fact that the theory of universal gravitation seems like it
greatly increased our grasp of a wide range of phenomena and the fact that the
theory gives a seemingly problematic explanation of these phenomena — our
understanding of which it increased.
Option 1 and 2 are debunking options where an ambivalent attitude towards
these cases is explained as natural, but ultimately inappropriate. On the deductive-
nomological model as well as on Woodward’s interventionist account and the uni-
fication theories of explanation, worries about action at a distance are simply not
relevant to the explanatory status of Newton’s law of gravity and some story about
how they can come to seem relevant is called for.7 Causal mechanistic accounts of
explanation could take action at a distance worries to also be worries about explana-
tory status (depending on the notion of cause being used), but none of these accounts
can, as they stand, allow for an ambivalent attitude towards the explanatoriness of
Newton’s theory of gravitation; it is always either paradigmatically explanatory or
paradigmatically non-explanatory.
This means that there is a seemingly sensible attitude to take towards explanations
involving Newton’s law of gravity that turns out to be surprising hard to account for
on the standard models of explanation. Given the worries about action at a distance
7On the assumption that these worries do not prevent us from regarding the law as at least
approximately true and for interventionist accounts with the added assumption that we are right to
think, as we normally do, that there is at least one logically possible intervention on, for example,
the mass of the earth with respect to the orbit of the moon where the orbit of the moon changes in
the required way.
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it seems perfectly sensible to doubt whether we have a causal explanation. However,
it also seems clear that Newton’s law of gravity does provide, in some sense, an
explanation of a wide range of phenomena. Contrary to the worries that arise from
the standard models failing to capture some feature, this problem arises since they
all seem to capture something true about explanations.
Neither is this an isolated case. On face value it seems perfectly conceptually
coherent to hold that general relativity can provide an explanation of inertial motion,
while denying that the explanation is causal. Similarly, as long as we accept the
quantum mechanical law as true, it also seems conceptually coherent to have no
doubts about the possibility of explaining the spin-up state of one of the particles in
an EPR set-up by reference to the spin-down state of the other, even if one doubts
whether there is any causal influence between them.
There is a seemingly simple solution to the problem I have just raised. Why
not be permissive about the kind of relations that can do explanatory work and let
information about the the causal history as well as information about subsumption
under laws count as explanatory? I think that there are two worries about doing
this and I have already discussed them in a general way in section 1.2. One worry
is simply that explanation does not seem to be something radically different in the
case where we think that subsumption under a law is explanatory and in the cases
where information about causal mechanisms is doing the explanatory work. Even if
they turn out to be different in some ways, we would like to know what it is that
they have in common. In particular, what it is that allows them both to be instances
of explanation. The second worry is even more pressing. Once laws are allowed to
do genuine explanatory work, we have to yet again face all the counter-examples to
the deductive-nomological account that the causal accounts were able to give such a
simple and intuitively forceful solution to.
There are several counter-examples to the deductive-nomological account, but the
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problem of explanatory asymmetry is particularly troubling. Whether or not one
takes the relation of explanation to be antisymmetrical (and I do not), there are still
many cases to illustrate that the relation of explanation is not symmetrical. One
might hope that some of these problems can be solved by being more careful about
what counts as a law and in particular by being careful to note any implicit ceteris
paribus clauses and whether or not they are violated.8 In particular, one might try
to avoid many of the problems of causal pre-emption, common cause and at least
some of the cases of explanatory irrelevancies in this way.9 However, no matter how
successful this strategy turns out to be for these cases, it does not help with the
problem of explanatory asymmetry. After all, there will still be cases where the
ceteris is paribus and the derivation can go ahead (or else the account would leave
us with no explanations at all), but if the ceteris paribus conditions are fulfilled for
the derivation that is explanatory then they will be fulfilled for the derivation that is
non-explanatory too.
The problem facing accounts of explanation that I have presented in this section
is a two-pronged one. A successful account not only needs to be able to account for
the seeming conceptual coherence of option 3, but needs to do so without running
afoul of the problems that plagued the deductive-nomological account.
8For example, taking laws to be something other than ‘true universal lawlike generalisations plus’,
one might be able to reject some of the examples of explanatory irrelevance on the ground that the
putative law is not really a law of nature.
9For example, Ruben considers, but rejects, this strategy in chapter VI [95].
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CHAPTER II
Explanation as actual dependence
2.1 Some preliminaries
The first difficulty facing anyone in the business of developing an account of ex-
planation is that of saying exactly what the target concept is. In everyday speech we
make use of the term ‘explanation’ in a variety of manners. Woodward lists a number
of ways in which the term can be used, ‘. . . we speak of explaining the meaning of a
word, explaining the background to philosophical theories of explanation, explaining
how to bake a pie, explaining why one made a certain decision (where this is to offer
a justification) and so on’ [127]. In the coming sections I am concerned mainly with
explaining why events occur or why they have certain features.
In trying to give an account of such explanations there are, at least, two different
projects that one could have in mind. One could be concerned with the descriptive
project of trying to give conditions that capture our explanatory practices, as they
actually are, or one could be concerned with the normative project of trying to provide
conditions for what our explanatory practices ought to (perhaps ideally) be like.
Within the descriptive project there are again several different goals one could have
in mind. One could try to find a conceptual analysis of the concept of explanation
that captures what is involved in this concept as we currently use it. Alternatively
one might try to capture merely the extension of this concept, by giving necessary
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and sufficient conditions (perhaps in terms of other concepts that have some desirable
feature, such as being better understood than the analysed concept) for explanation.1
Most accounts of explanation are concerned, to some degree, with both some form
of the descriptive and the normative project. That is, most accounts of explanation
are concerned with capturing at least some part of our explanatory practice, though
perhaps only in certain particularly clear cases, and with giving a prescription for
what an ideal explanation ought to look like. What I will try to do here will also be a
partly descriptive and a partly normative project. I will primarily be concerned with
giving an account of canonical explanations and in doing so I am trying to capture
part of our explanatory practices, at least in certain paradigmatic cases, and I would
also like to be able to explain why the controversial cases give rise to ambivalent
intuitions. I am not trying to capture only and exactly what is actually involved in
the concept of explanation as we in fact use it. However, I will try to give a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions that gives us a notion that is more precise than the
original while also being sufficiently similar to the original notion that the analysis
started with to merit the name explanation. My primary aim is to find an explication
of the concept of explanation.
My ultimate goal in doing this is to provide an account of explanation that can
satisfy Kitcher’s two criteria, in addition to, in the future, open up the possibility of
evaluating philosophical claims as to the superior explanatory status, as a scientific
explanation2, of one philosophical theory over another;
Why should we want an account of scientific explanation? Two reasons
present themselves. Firstly, we would like to understand and to evaluate
the popular claim that the natural sciences do not merely pile up unrelated
items of knowledge of more or less practical significance, but that they
increase our understanding of the world. A theory of explanation should
show us how scientific explanation advances our understanding. (Michael
1Carrie Jenkins drew my attention to this distinction with respect to analyses of the concept of
knowledge.
2See for example Putnam [88, p 73]
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Friedman cogently presents this demand in his (1974)3). Secondly, an
account of explanation ought to enable us to comprehend and to arbitrate
disputes in past and present science. [59, p 508]
I will have much more to say about the second desideratum than the first and to fully
understand how explanation relates to understanding goes beyond the scope of this
project. However, I hope to make it clear that the notion that I suggest underlies
explanation is at least an intuitively good candidate for bringing understanding.
Of course, there have been doubts as to whether it is possible to give both an
adequate and illuminating analysis of explanation in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions.4 Here, the proof of the pudding really is in the eating.
2.2 The intuitive notion of dependence
I think that the solution to the problems raised in section 1.3 lies in the notion
of actual dependence. Unlike counterfactual dependence between actual event a and
actual event b which is a matter of whether or not in worlds much like the actual
world where b fails to happen a also fails to happen, actual dependence between a
and b is, roughly speaking, a matter of whether or not a certain connection holds
between a and b. In particular, actual dependence is a matter of whether there is a
connection between the events a an b that is such as to guarantee that when b obtains
a obtains and that when b does not obtain then a does not obtain either.
The basic intuition that is driving my account is very simple. The difference
between a mere description of a phenomenon and an explanation of that same phe-
nomenon lies in whether information about what the phenomenon depends on has
been provided. For example, the length of the shadow does not explain the height
3My insertion: This reference is to Friedman [33]
4For example, van Fraassen claims that ‘[t]here are no explanations in science. How did philoso-
phers come to mislocate explanations among semantic rather than pragmatic relations?’ [114, p 150].
Here, he seems to put forward the view that there is no fruitful questions of explanation beyond the
pragmatics of explanation.
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of the flagpole, since the height of the flagpole does not depend on the length of the
shadow.5 However, the height of the flagpole can explain the length of the shadow,
since the length of the shadow does depend on the height of the flagpole. Similarly,
if the stability of the planetary orbits depends on the dimensionality of space-time6,
then the stability of the planetary orbits is (at least in part) explained by the dimen-
sionality of space-time.
Hopefully, this all sounds pretty plausible so it is worth noting how this driv-
ing intuition differs from that of some other accounts of explanation. In particular,
this motivation is distinct from the one that led Hempel to develop the deductive-
nomological account. Here the motivating intuition is that to explain is to show why
the phenomenon was to be expected given the laws of nature. It is also distinct
from the motivation for the unificationist accounts where to explain is to reduce the
number of phenomena that have to be taken to be brute and it is broader than the
intuition driving the causal account where to explain is to give information about the
causal history.7
As the examples above illustrate, the intuitive notion of dependence that I am
relying on is not restricted to causal dependence. I take this notion of dependence
to be capable of holding between a much wider range of entities. For example, I
take it to be able to hold between laws, so that it is possible for Newton’s law of
5I am ignoring cases where the flagpole was constructed specifically for the purpose of casting a
shadow of a certain length at certain times of the day. Here perhaps the height of the flagpole does,
in some sense, depend on the length of the shadow. Van Fraassen discusses a case like this in his
general discussion of the pragmatics of explanation [116, pp 132 – 134] and I will say more about it
in section 3.1.2.
6This example is noted by Woodward [126, p 220 – 221] and is discussed by Ehrenfest [26],
Barrow [5] and Callender [15]. If the dimensionality of space-time does not depend on the stability
of the planetary orbits (which seems plausible), then the stability of the planetary orbits does not
explain the dimensionality of space-time.
7Causal accounts seem to get closest to sharing the driving intuition that I am trying to capture
here. In particular, though Strevens develops an at base causal account his motivation for this
seems to allow for there to be other metaphysical notions of influence and dependence that could
do explanatory work [112, pp 177 – 180]. Kim [58] includes among others mereological dependence
in addition to causal dependence and takes the relevant explanatory notion to be asymmetrical and
transitive while remaining within a broadly unificationist framework.
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gravity and laws of motion to explain Kepler’s second law of planetary motion (or
certain features of this law) by showing that Kepler’s law depends on the Newtonian
ones.8 Indeed, one of the advantages of pursuing an intuition underlying explanation
that is broader than causal dependence is the hope of being able to give an account
of explanation that can handle the standard counter-examples facing the deductive-
nomological model while being able to give an account of explanation that can also
handle the instances of scientific explanation that are not obviously causal.
2.3 Towards an understanding of dependence
So far I have relied on an intuitive notion of dependence. However, in order to
build an account of explanation on the notion of dependence a better understanding
of the kind of dependence involved is needed. Crucially, we would like to have a way of
understanding dependence that does not rely in an ineliminable way on our intuitions
about explanation. Here I will focus on developing an account of dependence of how
particular matters of fact9 depend on other particular matters of fact, but I expect
that much of what I say will carry over to other kinds of dependence.10
2.3.1 Counterfactuals and actual dependence
The relation that I wish to capture is closely related, but not identical, to the
familiar notion of counterfactual dependence. That is, event (or aspect of an event)
a counterfactually depends on a distinct event (or aspect of event) b if and only if the
8For now I will set aside the question of exactly how we should regard cases of laws explaining
other laws in general. In particular, how we should treat cases where what is explained is not why
another law holds, but rather why a false generalization holds as well as it does. See for example,
Sklar [104].
9I do not intend to contrast facts with events here. I merely mean to clarify that I am not here
offering conditions for how laws or generalisations, in general, depend on other laws or generalisa-
tions. Having said that it will be clear that the account allows for a very straightforward extension
to account for explanations of certain kinds of generalisations.
10In particular I expect that the general strategy, as well as the general kind of conditions posed,
will remain the same for laws depending on other laws. What will vary is what is kept constant
(and what is not) in our counterfactual evaluations.
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following two counterfactuals hold;
1. If b had happened then a would have happened.11
2. If b had not happened then a would not have happened.
How to account for the way we evaluate these sorts of counterfactuals is, famously,
a very difficult problem. Luckily, for the purposes of the account of explanation
that I wish to give we can get by with only an intuitive notion of counterfactual
dependence.12
Counterfactual dependence on its own seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient
for explanation. When we consider what it is that we are trying to capture, this is not
surprising. When we explain a by b, if we are interested in dependence relations at
all, as I wish to claim that we are, we are interested in the actual dependence relation
between a and b. Since we are interested in the actual dependence relation it is at
first glance puzzling why what holds or does not hold in a non-actual world should
matter at all. In a way, but only in a way, this is right. We can obtain information
about the actual dependence relation by considering certain kinds of counterfactuals.
Of course finding out that a counterfactually depends on b gives us reason to think
that in a world much like the one where a and b actually occur, had b not happened
then a would not have happened. Whether counterfactual dependence is relevant to
actual dependence hinges on exactly how the other world is ‘much like’ this one. In
order to reach the counterfactual claim we need to have made judgments about what
the relationship between a not holding and b not holding looks like. However, so far
this has not yet told us what the relationship between a and b is when a and b actually
do occur. Only if we also think that the relationship between a not holding and b
not holding that we used to reach the judgement that had b not held then a would
11This holds trivially if a and b occur.
12In fact, once the notion of actual dependence has been spelled out further there is no need to rely
even on our intuitions about particular counterfactuals, but only on our general ability to consider
counterfactual scenarios.
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not have held is one that also holds in the actual world and one that is informative
of the connection between a and b holding do we have information about the actual
dependence relation between a and b.
This explains why counterfactual dependence alone is not sufficient for actual
dependence and so not sufficient for having an explanation of a in terms of b. There
are many familiar cases from the literature on the insufficiency of counter-factual
dependence for causal dependence that will also serve as examples here. For example,
plausibly the counterfactual ‘Had the barometer not fallen then the storm would not
have come’ is true (at least in some contexts), but yet it does not seem as if the
coming of the storm depends on the falling of the barometer.13
Figure 2.1: An example of a common cause (the meteorological conditions) support-
ing counter-factual dependence between the two effects.
It also explains why counterfactual dependence on its own is not necessary for
explanation. Whether it is true that in the possible world(s) closest to the actual
world where b does not happen that a also does not happen is only interesting if this
world is one where the relation by which we judge it to be the case that a would, or
would not, have happened had b failed to occur, is a relation that also holds in the
actual world and that gives information about the connection between a and b. If
it does not, then it need not be troubling for b explaining a that a does not depend
counterfactually on b. Here too the literature on counter-factual analyses of causation
provides several examples that are equally applicable to the relationship between
13I first encountered this particular case in Salmon [98, p 47].
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counter-factuals and dependence. For example, consider cases of overdetermination
due to back-up causes. Here we have a situation where a does not counterfactually
depend on b, but yet we take a to (causally) depend on b.
It might be helpful here to consider some specific cases in order to see that counter-
factual dependence is not actual dependence. To see that counter-factual dependence
is not sufficient for actual dependence consider a case, modified from Sanford’s [99, p
192 forward]14 discussion about dependence and conditionals.
• If Jim had been fired then Bill would have been fired too.
Many different circumstances could be imagined that would serve to make the counter-
factual statement true, but only some of them involve Bill’s job actually depending
on Jim’s. It could be that Jim is the son of the employer and only if the company
went bankrupt, bringing with it the firing of all employees, including Bill, would Jim
be fired. Or perhaps Bill is a terrible worker, known to be disliked by his employer,
and if anyone at all were to be fired he would be sure to be the first one to go. In
neither of these cases does Bill’s firing depend on Jim’s. In the first scenario they
have a common cause, the insolvency of the company. In the second case they do
not even have to have a common cause, instead the truth of the counter-factual is
guaranteed by our knowledge that whatever was the cause of Jim’s being fired the
employer would rather have fired Bill, so if Jim was fired either Bill had already been
let go for incompetence or he was fired for the same reasons that Jim was. However,
if Bill’s job is contingent on Jim’s job, perhaps say because Bill is Jim’s personal
assistant, then Bill losing his job does depend on Jim losing his. However, these
differences in circumstance are not reflected in the simple counter-factual statement
above.
14Sanford’s cases are somewhat different in details and they concern conditionals, but they can
easily be adapted to counter-factuals.
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Neither is counter-factual dependence necessary for actual dependence. For ex-
ample, consider cases of overdetermination due to back-up causes. We can imagine
that a very practised assassin has brought along a trainee assassin to the execution of
Jones.15 In fact, the trainee assassin is the cause of Jones’ death. However, had the
trainee failed then the other assassin would have fired his gun and would have been
sure to kill Jones. In this case, it seems as if Jones’ death does depend on the trainee
assassin’s actions, but yet, the counter-factual statement
• Had the trainee not fired then Jones would not have died.
is false, since in such a circumstance the more experienced assassin would have fired
and Jones would have died anyway. Here the counter-factual failing to hold does
not count against actual dependence since in evaluating the actual dependence the
relationship between the trainee assassin and Jones is kept fixed.16
2.3.2 Strict dependence and actual dependence
From section 2.3.1 we have one clue that allows us to narrow in on the notion that
we are interested in. For the purposes of explanation, considerations of counter-factual
scenarios matter only when the relationships between the entities doing the explaining
and the entity being explained is kept fixed in our counter-factual evaluations.
This means that it might seem promising to try to capture actual dependence in
terms of another familiar notion of dependence, namely strict conditional dependence.
After all we might think that the lesson from section 2.3.1 is simply that we should
look at whether a and b covary in all the worlds where it is true that the particular
relationships r, for example the law in question, obtains.
As it turns out the notion of actual dependence is distinct from that of strict
15I believe that I first came across this particular example in a lecture by Carrie Jenkins in 2009.
There are several versions along similar lines to be found in the literature on overdetermination and
back-up causes.
16I will return to this case in more detail in section 3.4.1.
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conditional dependence, and it is so for quite illuminating reasons. It is clear that
they are related. After all, the lesson from the last section seems very similar to
saying that if the relation obtains, then a happens if and only if b happens. Now, it
might seem as if we could characterise this in terms of a strict conditional, letting R
stand for ‘r obtains’, A for ’a happens’ and B for ‘b happens’:
Strict conditional (R→ (A↔ B))
Though this notion is related to actual dependence — it is a necessary condition for
actual dependence — it is not sufficient for actual dependence. Importantly, necessity
conditions posed on relations between statements are simply not fine-grained enough
to capture the notion of actual dependence.17 While the necessity condition involved
in the strict conditional guarantees that all possible worlds where R holds are such
that the consequent of the conditional also holds, in order to find out whether or
not there is actual dependence we would need further information as to whether
r described in R is a relation between events or states at the world and moreover
whether dependence is guaranteed via this relation.18
To claim that the inference goes via a certain relationship is to say that the
relationship r stipulates a connection between a and b and that the inference makes
use of this connection. This notion of a connection is clearly a metaphysical one and
most merely logically respectable relationships are not taken to give us a connection
between events or aspects of events. Laws of nature and causal relationships are
typically take to be able to provide such a connection (and perhaps geometrical
17While both ultimately advocating theories of explanation different from Aristotle’s both van
Fraassen [115] and Brody [12] argue that a notion more fine-grained than that of necessity is required
if a model of explanation in the Aristotelian spirit is to be successful. However, they both identify
this more fine-grained notion with that of essence, which I do not.
18For a dramatic illustration of the importance of this restriction, consider for example what
happens to the strict conditional if the biconditional in the consequent of the conditional relates two
statements that hold in all possible worlds.
• (R→ ((2 + 1 = 3)↔ (896 ∗ 1 = 896)))
Here R can be a statement to the effect that any relation at all r holds and r can be completely
unrelated to any mathematical claim.
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relationships can too). In fact, the existence of such a connection can be taken
to be why it has proved to be so difficult to account for natural laws or causal
relations in metaphysically innocuous terms. The notion of natural laws have resisted
analysis in terms of true universal generalisations plus (where this plus is taken to be
Humeanly acceptable plus) and the notion of cause has proved resistant to analysis
in terms of constant conjunction or counterfactuals, etc. Nonetheless I think that we
regularly make judgements as to whether or not a relationship gives us a connection
between events or aspects of events. Neither do these judgements seem to, at least
straightforwardly, require us to make explanatory judgements in order to make them.
After all, while all cases of lawlike relationships seem to provide a connection between
the aspects of events that it relates, it is not the case that any aspect of an event
so related can explain any other (as we have seen in the counter-examples facing the
deductive-nomological account). For judgements about causal relations the situation
seems somewhat different since they seem to be more closely tied to explanatory
judgements. However, the notion that causal relations connect events (or aspects of
events) can be taken to stem from the notion of a causal influence19 doing so and
judgements of causal influences are not directly tied to explanatory judgement (as
we can see from the literature on causal explanation that is devoted to determining
what aspect of the causal history is explanatory).20
Many laws of nature will provide examples of a relation such that it is possible to
conclude via this relation that when a obtains b obtains and when a does not obtain
b does not either. In fact many laws of nature are stated in terms of the numerical
equality of certain features. For example, when I make use of the Newtonian law
of gravity to infer the gravitational force exerted on a mass by another mass, I am
making an inference that goes via the relationship postulated. On the other hand,
19I am indebted to Strevens’ [112, Chapter 6] and [110] discussion here. Like Strevens I take it to
be the case that, for example, the influence of Mars on me counts as a causal influence on the event
of my typing this, but it hardly counts as a cause of my typing.
20I will say more about the nature of causal claims in section 2.3.5.
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if I from noting that there is a gravitational force exerted and that this force is self-
identical conclude that there is a gravitational force present I have not inferred to the
existence of a gravitational force via the relation of self-identity since this relationship
is not needed in order to make the inference from there being a gravitational force
exerted to there being a gravitational force exerted. Moreover, noting whether or not
an inference makes essential use of of a relation in this way does not require us to
already be able to make a judgement as to the explanatory relevance of the relation
in question.
It is worth to look at another case to illustrate the importance of taking the
relation to be able to provide a connection between a and b. It is always possible to
gerrymander a relationship21 so that the relationship holding between the relevant
kinds of entities entails that a obtains if and only if b obtains. However, this does
not provide a relationship between a and b such that it is possible to conclude that
b obtains (or does not obtain) via any relationship between a and b, since on such
constructions the connection between the two and what work, if any, it is doing in the
inference is simply left opaque. The waters are a little muddier here than in the case
above. While I think that it is plausible that we do not need to rely on our intuitions
about explanatoriness (or dependence) in order to sort the gerrymandered relations
from the natural ones, without a full account of what it takes for a relationship to be
natural rather than gerrymandered it is not possible to rule out the possibility that
the best such account will have to rely on a notion of explanation. If such an account
does have to rely on judgements about explanatoriness then the account offered of
explanation in terms of dependence will not be a reductive one, but it will still be an
informative one. After all, in many debates over explanatory status the naturalness of
the relation that is doing the putative explanatory work is not what is in question.22
21Consider for example the relation r that is such that rxy is true iff x = a and y = b and a and
b obtain and there is a law connecting a and b.
22Moreover, the assumption that we have some way of sorting natural relations from gerryman-
dered ones shows up, in some form or other, also in the deductive-nomological and causal accounts
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Now we have one piece of the reason why actual dependence is not strict condi-
tional dependence. The strict conditional remains silent on whether or not the fact
that a and b covary has anything at all to do with the possibility of inferring one from
the other via r. There is a second dissimilarity between actual and strict conditional
dependence; strict conditional dependence is a relationship between statements or
propositions, not between the events, the aspect of events, or the states themselves.
When we are interested in, for example, what event a depends on, we are not looking
for what relations might obtain between the proposition that a obtains and other
propositions. What we are after is how a itself relates to other events.23
At first glance it might seem as if the notion of actual dependence is symmetric,
however, this is not so and here the fact that the relationship is between events
(or states or aspects of events) rather than between statements does some important
work. To see this, let us consider what happens if the relation does not merely connect
a and b but, more typically, includes other conditions, let us call them c.24 Now it
might be that the relation guarantees that b depends on a and c both happening, but
that it is not the case that a depends on b and c happening. The corresponding strict
conditionals would be:
1. (R→ ((A&C)↔ B))
2. (R→ ((B&C)↔ A))
Now, it is is of course possible for 1 to be true and for 2 to be false.
of explanation. On unificationists accounts it is not clear that there is a restriction on relations in
terms of naturalness, but there is a trade-off between stringency and strength where related con-
ditions seem to be in play. There is yet another naturalness constraints that is shared between all
accounts, namely naturalness constraints on what counts as an event, or as a phenomenon, to start
with.
23And mutatis mutandis for aspects of events.
24As will become clear in section 2.3.4 when considering dependence on more than one event
or state, there are two different things that this could mean. It could be the case that there is
dependence on both of these events, or that there is dependence on some other feature of events,
instantiated by the two events in question.
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However, it might seem as if there is nonetheless a kind of symmetry here. After
all, it seems as if, as long as 1 is true it would be the case that B depends on A&C and
that A&C also depend on B. After all, A&C is as good a statement as B! However,
since actual dependence is meant to hold between events, states, or aspects of events
the same does not hold for actual dependence. After all, while a conjunction (or
disjunction, etc.) of two statements forms a new statement, this is not, in general,
true of events, states, or aspects of events.25
2.3.3 Actual dependence
Let us start with the simplest, though I think rather rare, case, where we only
have two events a and b and one relation r.
Actual Dependence b actually depends on a as guaranteed by relation r if and only
if: r is a relation between the events or aspect of events a and b that obtains in
the actual world and
1. Via r and the fact that a happens it is concludable that b happens.
2. Via r and the fact that a does not happen it is concludable that b does
not happen.
The claim that the inference goes via r plays an important role in the above
definition. This can be made clearer by rephrasing the conditions (albeit in a way that
makes the kinship to counter-factual dependence and strict conditional dependence
less perspicuous).
Actual Dependence b actually depends on a as guaranteed by relation r if and only
if: r is a relation between the events or aspect of events a and b that obtains in
the actual world and
1. Whenever r and a obtain b obtains.
25Of course, it might be that there is something analogous to conjunction that holds between some
events, but it is not the case that a union of events in general produces an event.
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2. Whenever r obtains and a does not obtain, b does not obtain either.
3. Moreover, r provides a connection between a and b and this connection is
utilised in 1 and 2.
The via clause is what allows the conditions to go beyond a mere strict conditional
in the first formulation. It is also this clause that demands that r is eligible to provide
a connection between a and b and that rules out gerrymandered relations that would
make the truth of the conditions trivial. This is what condition 3 establishes in the
latter formulation of the conditions.
What this condition demands is that we have some way of sorting all the re-
spectable logical relationships into those that are candidates for providing a connec-
tion between the events (or aspect of events) described in the explanans and the
events (or aspect of event) described in the explanandum and into those that are
not. This condition is of course reminiscent of the condition that the explanans make
essential use of at least one law of nature in the argument for the explanandum or the
requirement that the explanans cite, part of, the causal history of the event described
in the explanadum. As I discussed in section 2.3.2 it is by no means trivial that it
is possible to divide the relationships into those that are candidates for providing
connections (the ones that are, in some sense, the natural ones), but it is at least
prima facie plausible that we can sort the respectable logical relationship in this way,
at least in many clear cases. Of course there are likely to be cases where we are
genuinely uncertain as to the status of a relationship. In these cases I claim that we
should also be uncertain as to the explanatory status of putative explanations that
rely on the relationship.
2.3.4 Explanation and dependence
The deductive-nomological account and the causal account share a focus on the
relationship that has to hold between b and a in order for b to explain a. While
the nomological account stresses nomological necessitation, the causal account allows
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only causal relationships to count. In both cases though, we are looking for what is
responsible for the target phenomenon, or what it is that brought it about. Prima
facie, it seems as if nomological necessitation would be one way for something to
bring something else about. However, when we try to specify the notion of nomolog-
ical necessitation in terms of subsumption under a law, we run into the problem of
symmetry. The notion of dependence solves this problem. In order to specify how
nomologically necessitating a phenomenon can be a way of bringing about or being
responsible for that phenomenon it is not enough for there to be a law and certain
particular facts that are sufficient to guarantee that it is true that the target phe-
nomenon obtains. Rather, it also has to be the case that the phenomenon depends
on the particular facts.
On the theory of non-probabilistic explanation of particular facts that I am putting
forward the explanans E contains statements of two kinds. Statements of particular
facts, asserting that some event or aspect of some event holds or does not hold, let
us abbreviate these “EPF”s, and statements of empirical26 principles of inference,
let us call them “EIP”s. Moreover, EIPs typically27 come in two kinds - statements
about laws and statements about causes. For example, statements such as ‘the match
was struck’ or ‘the mass is 5 kg’ could serve as EPFs while statements such as ‘the
striking of the match caused it to light’ and ‘the acceleration of a massive object in a
gravitational field is independent of the mass of the object’ are candidates for EIPs.
A collection of statements E canonically28 explains another statement M if and
26I am calling these principles “empirical” to distinguish them from purely logical or mathematical
principles of inference.
27I do not wish to claim that these are the only two possible kinds of EIPs. I do not know of
a clear example of an EIP that is neither lawlike nor causal, but it is not essential to my account
that there are no such EIPs. Geometrical relations that hold between events or aspects of events
are perhaps an instance of EIPs that are not lawlike, at least, they seem to differ in kind from other
natural laws such as Newton’s laws of motion.
28I do not wish to claim that every instance of explanation as it is given is of this kind. In particular,
much of what is needed to fulfil these conditions would not typically be stated explicitly. That is,
most explanations will be explanations in virtue of their relation to some canonical explanation,
while not themselves being canonical explanations.
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only if;
1. The statements invoked in the explanans E and the explanandum M are true.
2. The relation(s) described in the EIP(s) guarantee that the event or aspect of
event described in M depends on the events, or aspects of events, described in
the EPFs.
That is:
(a) The relation(s) described in the EIP(s) provide a relation between the
events or aspects of events described in the EPFs and the events or aspects
of events described in M, such that:
(b) There is some state or collection of states S that obtains in virtue of the
events (or aspects of events) described in the EPFs happening such that
via the relation(s) described in the EIP(s) it is concludable that the event
(or aspect of event) described in M happens.
(c) There is some state or collection of states S that obtains in virtue of the
events (or aspects of events) described in the EPFs happening such that
via the relation(s) described in the EIP(s) it is concludable that the event
(or aspect of event) described in M does not happen when S does not
obtain.
Just as in section 2.3.3 the dependence can be cashed out in a way that obscures
the relationship to counterfactuals, but that makes the use of the via clause clearer.
A collection of statements E canonically explains another statement M if and only
if;
I The statements invoked in the explanans E and the explanandum M are true.
II The relation(s) described in the EIP(s) guarantee that the event or aspect of
event described in M depends on the events, or aspects of events, described in
the EPFs.
That is:
i The relation(s) described in the EIP(s) provide a relation between the events
or aspects of events described in the EPFs and the events or aspects of events
described in M, such that:
ii There is some state or collection of states S that obtains in virtue of the events
(or aspects of events) described in the EPFs happening such that together
with the relationships described in the EIPs it is derivable that the event (or
aspect of event) described in M happens.
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iii There is some state or collection of states S that obtains in virtue of the
events (or aspects of events) described in the EPFs happening such it is not
possible for it to be the case that S does not obtain when M does given that
the relationships described in the EIPs do.
iv The relationships described in the EIPs provide a connection between the
events (or aspects of events) described in the EPFs and the event (or aspect
of event) described in M and this connection is utilised in IIii and IIiii.
Conditions 1 and 2b are essentially a broadened version of the conditions we find
in the deductive-nomological theory of explanation; they are broader since it is not
the case that only laws are counted as legitimate empirical principles of inference. On
their own this is clearly a much too permissive account of explanation. Condition 2 as
a whole is meant to capture the intuitive idea that dependence relations are crucial to
explanations. This condition is what takes the place of demanding that the EIPs are
laws in the deductive-nomological account, or the demand that they are causal in the
causal account. The underlying intuition here is that of capturing the relationship
of bringing about, or being responsible for, whether that come about due to a causal
necessitation or nomological necessitation.29
The intuitive idea behind dependence is largely captured by condition 2c. As it
turns out however this notion is, in and of itself, not strictly speaking enough to
capture the notion of dependence. This is not surprising, at least not if the relation
we are trying to capture does not hold between statements or propositions at all, but
rather between events or aspects of events. The latter part of condition 2 taken on
its own only guarantees that some set of statements holding makes a difference to
another statement holding. An EIP could fulfil condition 2b and 2c, but be unable to
guarantee a dependence relation between the events or aspects of events of interest.
Condition 2a is there to ensure that the empirical principles of inference relate the
events described in the EPFs and M . Without this condition relations that are
trivially true could end up counting as dependence relations. For example, whenever
29Or some other, as of yet unexplored, metaphysical relation of necessitation.
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event a holds and event b holds the statement that ‘a holds if and only if b holds’ turns
out to be true and we can use this to construct a perfectly good logical relationship
that is constructed to ensure the truth of the statement in all worlds where the
relationship obtains between a and b. Condition 2a, is needed to makes sure that
it is the connection between the events (or aspects of events) described in the EPFs
and M given by the EIPs that is doing the inferential work in condition via clause
in conditions 2b and 2c. Without this requirement, while we have guaranteed that
the EIP gives a relation between events that is capable of supporting dependence, we
have not guaranteed that it is this relation that allows the inference to hold and so
not guaranteed that this is the relation that is invoked to do explanatory work when
giving such a derivation.
What kind of natural relations can provide connections between events? Again,
we find that both causal relations and lawlike relations can, plausibly, hold between
events, and so again we have reason to expect that both can be used to give depen-
dence relations and figure in explanations30.
On the account of canonical explanation that I have put forward here, a statement
of particular fact M is explained by a collection of other statements about particular
facts, EPFs, and statements of relations, EIPs whenever the EIPs together with the
EPFs allow us to to derive M and the relations described in the EIPs guarantee that
the event (or aspect of event) described by M depends on the events (or aspects of
events) described by the EPFs.
2.3.5 How laws and causes explain
Given that lawlike relations and causal relations can both necessitate certain out-
comes and that they can both hold between events, as well as supporting counter-
30I do not wish to claim that only lawlike and causal relations can hold between events. Clearly,
other relations, such as spatiotemporal ones, also hold between events. However, most of these will
not fulfil the conditions posed above.
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factual reasoning, I claimed in section 2.3.4 that both laws and causal relations can
guarantee dependence and hence do explanatory work. However, the way in which
causal relations and lawlike relations guarantee dependence differs in important ways.
Let us first look at how laws can guarantee dependence. Let us stipulate that it
is a law that an event has a certain aspect A if and only if it has aspect B. Now let
us say that event a has aspect A and aspect B. Now we can try to explain why event
a is A by citing that event a is B. Given the law we can derive that a is A from the
fact that a is B and moreover, the law guarantees that the event being A depends
on it being B. In particular keeping the lawlike relation between the aspects of the
event fixed, it is not possible for a to be B but to fail to be A. Here, I have chosen
a case where the law guarantees both that A depends on B and that B depends on
A. Since many laws look like this taken on face value, we should worry that the
problem of asymmetry raised in section 1.3 is as much of a problem for my account
as for the simple solution I dismissed. However, as we will see later, contrary to
the simple solution, with the notion of dependence in place, the attempt to rescue
the deductive-nomological account that Ruben [94, Chapter VI], rightly, rejected —
that is being careful about exactly what the law is stating and about which ceteris
paribus conditions are involved — can break the symmetry in the cases where we have
intuitions of explanatory asymmetry. I will say much more about this in section 3.1.
For now I will just note that the crucial difference is that the deductive-nomological
account is wholly local in a way that a dependence account is not and this allow us
to look for a break in the symmetry of the situation outside of the specific instance
where the ceteris paribus conditions are fulfilled both in the explanatory direction of
derivation and in the non-explanatory one.
The way that causal relations end up doing explanatory work is by, more or less,
directly claiming that a certain kind of relation of dependence holds. For example, if
event a caused event b we can explain why event b occurred by citing the occurrence
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of a and the causal relation between them. Note that I phrased causal explanations
here in terms of token causal relations. That is causal relations between two specific
events or aspects of events. We sometimes cite type causal relations when explaining
why a particular event occurred. For example, we might explain Bridget’s lung cancer
by citing her heavy smoking and the type causal relation that smoking causes lung
cancer. Type causal relations cannot, however, on their own guarantee dependence.
It can still be true that smoking in general causes lung cancer while it not being the
case that Bridget’s lung cancer was caused by her smoking. This means that type
casual relations on their own cannot explain why Bridget, in particular, developed
cancer.31
Token causal relations seem to guarantee dependence a forteriori since the token
causal relationship seems to give us a directed connected between a and b such that
the relationship allow us to deduce b and moreover, makes it vacuously true that it
is impossible for it to be the case that a causes b and for it to not be the case that a
while being the case that b, since a causes b only when a and b both obtain.
At first glance it might seem as if we have a symmetry problem in this case too.
After all, from the token causal relationship we can deduce that a and moreover it
is not possible for it to be the case that not b while it being the case that a while
the token causal relationship holds. Here it matters that token causal relationships
provide a directed connection between events (unlike say, relationships of identity).
So, it is not the case that the deduction that we make of a makes essential use of the
connection between a and b that has been postulated (even though the deduction does
make essential use of the truth of the claim that a causes b), since that connection as
directed is not so applicable.
We can easily see why it would be the case that token causal claims would look
31At least, they cannot explain canonically. Of course, when given an explanation like the one
above we would typically take it it be implied that Bridget’s lung cancer was caused by her smoking
and that the token causal relation also holds.
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like, in part, brute assertions of dependence if we accept a fairly minimal, but not
trivial, claim about causal relations.
A claim about causal relations A claim that a causes b involves, in part, the
claim that there is, under certain circumstances,32 some connection between
features instantiated by a and the features instantiated by b such that via this
connection it is guaranteed that the features instantiated by b hold when the
features instantiated by a do and that they do not hold when the features
instantiated by a do not.
This is not an analysis of causation, but rather merely something that I take to
hold true of causal claims.33
This seems to be reflected in how we read causal diagrams.34 In the simplest case
we read figure 2.2 as a causing b and figure 2.3 as a not obtaining and therefore not
causing b to obtain.
Figure 2.2: Causal diagram of a causes b
32It seems plausible that there is some assumption as to unmentioned conditions of the kind
sometimes called enabling or background conditions holding in our causal judgements. This would
also suffice to break the symmetry discussed in section 3.1 even at the level of the strict conditional.
Consider the two strict conditionals that such a view would demand:
1. ((R&C)→ (A→ B))
2. ((R&C)→ (¬A→ ¬B))
Here it is of course possible to combine 1 and 2 to give a single strict conditional where the the
consequent is the biconditional claim A↔ B, but this does nothing to guarantee that the background
conditions C are suitably considered background conditions for B just as for A (indeed we would
expect that they are not).
33As an analysis of causal claims it is clearly much too weak. In particular I imagine that there
will be pragmatic considerations that govern which features of the events our causal claims pick out
as salient. The way that we describe the event in question will probably generally be a guide to
what features we have in mind, so that if I am discussing the event of Jones’ death, it is unlikely
that the colour of his glasses is among the salient features of the event.
34See for example Pearl [86] and Woodward [126] for a thorough discussion of causal models and
graphs.
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Figure 2.3: Causal diagram with a and b not occurring
Similarly, in cases of back-up causes we find that when the causal relationship is
fixed (indicated in red in figure 2.4), this essentially has the effect of reducing the
situation under consideration to that of figure 2.2 and figure 2.3. In this situation,
even though we would not predict that b would not occur were a to not occur (since
the back-up cause would kick in were a to not occur), we still treat b as depending
(causally) on a occurring.35
Figure 2.4: Causal diagram of a back-up cause
If we change the situation to one where we do not have a back-up cause, but a
case of pre-emption or overdetermination, the same reasoning still applies. The claim
about causal relations does not tell us exactly why this happens (that would require
a more detailed account), but there are two possibilities. The first one is that there
are two distinct features of the effect that the two causes are connected to (so that
the fact that the effect would still have happened in the absence of one cause, or
the the actual cause, does not interfere with the relationship between that cause and
35Though this way of ‘focusing in’ on one causal chain is in some ways similar to the effect
that Woodward’s sophisticated interventionist treatment has in such cases the surface similarity
is rather misleading. Woodward is providing a non-reductive analysis of causal claims in terms
of interventions, counter-factuals, and other causal relations (and moreover, while Woodward does
address token causation, it is not the main focus of his account). Here, I am starting from the point
where the causal question is already settled and kept fixed rather than trying to provide an analysis
of that causal relation.
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some feature of the effect). This would, of course, make these cases unusual since we
typically pick out the salient feature of the effect in our description of the event. A
second option is to locate the difference in the ‘under certain circumstances’ clause. In
the mere claim about causal relations what these are has not been specified but some
candidates would be the default states that Hall mentions [40] or the circumstances
specified by the quasi-Newtonian inertial laws (or lawlike generalisations) as Maudlin
suggests [78].
What I have said here does not amount to an analysis of causation, but given
the way in which causal statements guarantee dependence a forteriori, causal claims
look a lot like, at least partially, brute assertions of dependence. That is, they seem
like brute assertions that there is some relation between the events that allows one
to depend on the other, without being told anything much specifically about what
that relation looks like. These claims about token causal relations leave much about
the nature of token causal claims open. In particular, nothing in the story above
requires us to accept a view like the one suggested by Davidson [20, 19] and criticised
by Anscombe [3] and Woodward [124], where the truth value of (token) causal claims
are fixed by the truth values of laws (perhaps of a special kind) and other (non-causal)
particular facts, nor does it force any particular relationship between token and type
causal claims such as reducing the one to the other.36
36In particular, in order to make sense of causal claims as being, in part, claims about dependence
we do not need to assume that the relation r involved is reducible to a lawlike one and much less
to assume that causal claims are reducible to claims about subsumption under laws. In particular
what I have said above differs from Hempel’s claims about causation.
. . . [T]he import of the claim that b was caused by a may then be suggested by the
following approximate formulation: Event b was in fact preceded by event a in circum-
stances which, though not fully specified, were of such a kind that an occurrence of an
event of kind A under such circumstances is universally followed by an event of kind
B. Hempel [42, p 349]
I think that Anscombe is right in her critique of analysis of causation in terms of mere subsuption
under lawlike regularities and that the import of causal claims, as far as explanation goes, involves
more than this.
. . . [C]ausality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the
core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds . . . Now analysis in terms
of necessity or universality does not tell us of this derivedness of the effect; rather it
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The notion that causal claims are, at least partially, a brute assertion of depen-
dence (in some form) is not unique to me. Strevens37 distinguishes causal claims from
the notion of causal influence by applying his difference making criteria and claims
that ‘... if c and e are singular events, then c was a cause of e is true just in case c is
a causal difference-maker for e’ [112, p 181]. Strevens is leaving the notion of causal
influence unanalysed while providing an analysis of causal claims by using this notion
and that of explanatory relevance — which to Strevens is difference-making. Strevens’
full account of what it takes for an event to be a difference maker is too subtle to
give full justice to here, but in broad outlines his starting point is that difference-
making can be roughly captured by Mackie’s INUS (insufficient but necessary part
of an unnecessary but sufficient) condition38 adapted to make claims about causal
sufficiency and necessity and adapted to allow idealisations and abstraction through
a trade-off between cohesion and generality (for just a little more about Strevens’
account see section 1.1.2.1). What I am saying is in broad agreement with Strevens’
point here, however I do not, like Strevens, take causal claims to be partly reducible
to explanatory claims nor do I take dependence to be analysed in terms of Strevens’
notion of difference-making. Nonetheless, this general strategy of separating the anal-
ysis of causal claims into two parts allows us to get a hold on token causal claims
without requiring a full conceptual analysis of causation and it leaves the door open
for both a conceptual analysis of what it takes for an influence to be causal as well
as for a substantive theory of what the characteristic features of causal influences in
our world actually are (if there are any).
forgets about that. [3, p 7]
37See for example Chapter 6 of [112] and [110, p 159 – 160].
38Though of course, Mackie himself took this to be an analysis of causal claims, which Strevens
does not.
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2.3.6 Explanation and dependence - a nomological comeback
With a better understanding of what the target notion of actual dependence looks
like and the role that it can play in explanations, we are ready to take on a second
try of tackling the question of what the role of laws in explanations should be taken
to be.
We have seen that in order to capture the relevant notion of lawlike necessita-
tion for explanatory purposes mere subsumption under a law of nature is not strong
enough. However, on a dependence account this is not to be counted against the
notion that laws can do explanatory work, rather it should be taken to be evidence
that subsumption under laws is not on its own adequate for capturing the notion
relevant to explanation.
I have already said that I think that both causal statements and certain kinds of
subsumption under laws can do explanatory work. However, causal relations guaran-
tee dependence by what looks like39 mere brute assertions that dependence holds (as
we saw in section 2.3.5). That is to say, it seems as if causal relations, at least when
it comes to their explanatory role, function as brute assertions that a certain kind of
relation holds.
This gives us one way in which laws are superior to causal relations in the explana-
tory work that they can do. After all, the causal relations merely asserts that the
dependence holds while laws gives us detailed information about how the relationship
looks like. In this sense, the dependence account allows nomological relations to make
a comeback as the queens of explanatory relations. There is some truth to Hempel’s
claim that ‘[t]o the extent that a statement of individual causation leaves the rele-
vant antecedent conditions, and thus also the requisite explanatory laws, indefinite
it is like a note saying that there is treasure hidden somewhere’ [42, p 349]. This is
39At least when taken at face value. It might of course be that a full analysis of causal claims will
reveal more structure to such claims than is apparent at first glance.
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not to say that causal relations are not extremely valuable. After all, it is very rare
that we are able to state the fundamental laws relevant to a certain phenomena, and
even when we think that we can state the relevant laws we can only rarely derive
the phenomenon of interest from them together with other particular facts. Causal
relations are invaluable in allowing us to explain nonetheless. Also, unlike Hempel,
I think that the note comes with a whole lot of information about the relation of
dependence. However, unlike the case of explanation from laws our use of causal
explanations relies on us having a theory of causal influence that gives us information
about how causal influences behave (this point will return in section 4.1.1.2). This is
not merely like having a note that states that there is a treasure hidden somewhere
(which in my case is a relation that guarantees dependence and not necessarily a law
of nature), but rather like having a note that points to the general area of the full
treasure and moreover tells you that a part of the treasure has been attached to the
note .
2.4 Non-canonical explanations
The conditions posed on canonical explanations in section 2.3.4 are very demand-
ing and explanations as typically given do not take this form. Rather, explanations in
general can be understood in terms terms of their relations to canonical explanations.
There are two different roles that the notion of canonical explanation plays when
understanding explanation in general. The first has to do with what the primary
ontological categories that stand in explanatory relationships are. Here I have stressed
that we are interested in what the relationships are between the events or aspects of
events and in particular, in giving explanations, we are interested in whether or not
those relationships guarantee dependence. However, even within explanations why
there is a whole range of, seemingly disparate, ontological entities that regularly are
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called explanations.40 On the account that I have proposed in section 2.3.4 a collection
of statements, or a speech act, etc., that typically gets labelled as an explanation
merits the name by conveying information about some canonical explanation and in
particular by giving information about the relations of dependence involved in the
relevant canonical explanation.
The second role that the notion of canonical explanation has to play in an account
of explanation in general is as a regulative ideal. That is, the canonical explanation
gives us information about what an explanation ideally ought to look like. Of course,
explanations in general will not typically fulfil all of these criteria. Yet we can still
understand what it is that allows us to recognise them as explanations by noting the
information that they do carry about the underlying canonical explanation, even if
in practice this information will not be flawless. There are several ways in which
we would expect this to manifest itself. For example, we are often unable to give
information about the underlying dependence structure without invoking idealisations
and approximations. Moreover, in practice much in terms of limitations of the range
of application will not be spelled out explicitly, at least if there is a presumption that
the audience are aware of these limitations41 and we would also expect that there are
cases where we are unable to spell out all the limitations42 in a generally agreed upon
way.
An understanding of how approximations, idealisations and identification of condi-
tions of application work does not follow straightforwardly from an account of canon-
ical explanation, but such an account does give us a framework for understanding
why disagreements about these issues can giver rise to disagreement about explana-
40Jenkins [56] discusses several such categories.
41In introductory texts we typically find such conditions explicitly discussed.
42When it is not clear what these restrictions are we would also expect there to be the possibility
of debates about the explanatory status of a putative explanation. For example, if we are not sure
whether or not certain cases should be ruled out as applicable (often by labelling them non-physical
cases) we could find that whether or not we take a certain relationship to guarantee dependence
depends on the circumstances where we take it to legitimately apply. I take the debate in Smith
[108] to be of this kind.
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tory status and accepting the account allow us to (and constrains us to) understand
approximation and idealisation in terms of deviations from canonical explanations.
2.4.1 Approximations, idealisations, and explanatory frameworks
While we would like to give explanations that are true, we are often not able to
muster such explanations or we face a trade-off between offering a strictly true account
and one that gives us information over a range of circumstances that is particularly
tractable, etc. Though the relationship of approximating truth is not an easy one,
I will rely on us having some notion of what it means to move closer towards the
truth. In particular, we do need some such notion if we are to judge putative laws as
approximately true.
Idealisations seem to be distinct from merely taking a law to be approximately
true, since we sometimes make idealisations knowing that we are distorting the un-
derlying mechanism43. Here I will follow Weisberg [121] and use the term idealisation
for any intentional distortion of the truth in our scientific theories. For my purposes
here this use of idealisation is particularly interesting since the canonical account that
I proposed sets truth as an aim for scientific explanation so intentional distortions
away from the truth are prima facie puzzling. Such idealisations also seem much more
troubling to account for than our reliance on merely approximately true laws where
these approximations come about simply due to us not having complete knowledge.
After all, if we are striving to find canonical explanations, and these demand truth,
then a distortion moving us away from the truth and that we know does so does not
sit well within the account.
Weisberg [121] has distinguished between three different kinds of idealisation in a
way that will be helpful for understanding how intentional distortions can nonetheless
fulfil an explanatory goal. The first kind of idealisations that Weisberg discusses is
43Strevens discusses several such examples in [110] and [112, chapter 8].
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Galilean idealisation. The idea here is that the driving motivation for idealisation
is to make the problem at hand computationally tractable. For example, even if we
are interested in explaining how a hockey puck moves on ice, we might decide to
exclude any influence of friction, fully knowing that this will distort the truth of the
situation, in order to be able to apply our theories in a way that is computationally
much simpler. This kind of idealisation can be rather straightforwardly understood in
relation to canonical explanation. Here the aim is to faithfully represent the actual
world and the relations within it, however, simplifications are made for pragmatic
reasons of tractability. For example, we can imagine that, as Weisberg points out,
with new mathematical techniques or greater computational power we would expect
these idealisations to become increasingly deidealised.
Minimalist idealisations however are not expected to be deidealised with increasing
computational ability. Rather, the way Weisberg characterises them, these idealisa-
tions are trying to capture only the causal factors that make a difference.44 There
seems to be two different, complementary, ways of understanding minimalist idealisa-
tions. On the one hand an explanation that gets categorised as a minimal idealisation
for leaving out certain causal factors could nonetheless be a canonical explanation on
the account that I have proposed in section 2.3.4. After all, on the account that
I have proposed even if causal information is omitted, or distorted, it can still be
the case that we take the relationship to be a law of nature (being careful to note
any restrictions on where we take the law to hold) and that we can have a true, if
not fundamental, relationships that is capable of doing explanatory work. On this
account then, these kinds of minimal idealisations are not ones that we would expect
to be deidealised with increases in computational techniques; they are perfectly ade-
quate in their own right. Of course, if we take the stance that there are no genuine
non-fundamental laws of nature (or relationships that provide a genuine connection
44The characterisation of minimalist idealisation starts on [121, p 642].
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between events or aspects of events other than at the fundamental level), then we
have reason to deny the existence of these kinds of explanations. However, I do not
think that we have a reason to deny the existence of such relationships, even if we take
the stance that they are all ultimately ontologically reducible to connections between
fundamental entities in accordance with fundamental laws. This is just the familiar,
but not uncontroversial, point that ontological reduction need not entail explanatory
reduction in another guise.45
Of course, in many, indeed probably most, circumstances we do not have a per-
fect understanding of the conditions under which a law holds (if nothing else simply
because we typically do not take ourselves to have discovered the true laws of nature,
even if we do think that we can approximate them). In these circumstances we would
expect that the kinds of laws that could be employed in a minimal idealisation are
subject to a kind of deidealisation, but not exclusively due to increases in computa-
tional ability or novel mathematical techniques. Rather, we expect that increases in
knowledge of the limitations of the law will lead to changes in how we understand
its explanatory status even in idealised circumstances. In the case of minimal ide-
alisations this lack of full knowledge is akin to approximations in general and not
intentionally introduced.
The third kind of idealisation that Weisberg discusses is that of multiple-model
idealisation. Here the idea is that we have ‘. . . multiple related but incompatible
models, each of which makes distinct claims about the nature and causal structure
giving rise to a phenomenon’ [121, p 645]. What Weisberg has in mind here is
idealisations from sciences that deal with complex phenomena, such as the weather,
or examples from ecology that deal with predation. In these cases the move away from
what we take to be true seems especially stark since we know that the different models
are incompatible and so cannot possible all be true. As Weisberg points out, in some
45See Potochnik [87] for a very clear argument of how the two can come apart. I will say a little
more about these issues in section 2.5.2.
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cases the justification for using several different models is simply one of increased
predictive accuracy. In these cases the idealisations might simply not be concerned
with increasing our understanding at all, and the fact that several, incompatible,
models are employed need not be troubling for the purpose of understanding idealised
explanations (the multiple models employed in weather prediction that Weisberg
discusses seem to be of this kind).
Not all cases of multiple modelling seem to be concerned exclusively with predic-
tion though, in particular the models offered from ecology seem as if they are also
concerned with allowing us to understand such systems. In the sense that there can
be many, and prima facie conflicting, different non-fundamental laws that cover the
same phenomena this is not surprising on the account that I have proposed. The
way in which these models are incompatible, however, had better be in terms of the
conditions of application that they pose. It would not be compatible with what I
have proposed above to find explanatory conflicting non-fundamental laws that con-
flict about the behaviour over some class of phenomena where they share all of their
conditions of application. Luckily, the models employed in ecology appear to be ex-
actly of the innocuous kind, ‘[i]n ecology . . . one finds theorists constructing multiple
models of phenomena such as predation, each of which contains different idealizing
assumptions, approximations, and simplifications [my emphasis]’ [121, p 646].46
I think that there is a fourth kind of idealisation that does not fit neatly into any
of the three categories of idealisation that Weisberg mentions, but that is most closely
related to Galilean idealisations. Unlike the case of Galilean idealisation where the
justification for idealisation is a lack of computational tractability, we can also idealise
46Weisberg also mentions the use of both the molecular orbital and the valence bond models of
chemical bonding. While there seems to be support for using many different models in understanding
ecology, it is less clear that this is the case when it comes to molecular orbital and valence bond
models. That is, unlike the case from ecology it is not clear that the use of both models is accepted
(even though there are people who do accept the use of one or the other of the models) and moreover
when the use of both is accepted it is not clear that they are taken to be in incompatible, or even
distinct models at all. Ian Mckay drew my attention to a paper by Hoffmann, Shaik and Hiberty
that illustrates this point [50].
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not primarily for computational tractability, but in order to gain understanding by
being able to apply a familiar theoretical framework and a familiar set of laws. If we
are looking for relations of dependence then it makes very good sense for us to do
this since doing so allows us to use our laws and our theory in order to explain the
idealised situation. This case is similar to what Strevens [112, chapter 8, pp 325 – 329]
has called pre-idealisations. Strevens describes these cases as ones where we distort
the underlying causal story in a way such that the distortion included does make a
difference to the phenomena described in the explanandum. While I do not think
that they have to be instances of the introduction of distorting causal information
that makes a difference to the phenomena we are interested in explaining, I think
that Strevens provides a very useful way of thinking of these cases as explanations
relative to an explanatory framework. The framework provides a, not always explicit,
given that clause. When we make idealisations in order to be able to make use of a
familiar theoretical framework in understanding the explanations I think that we are
making a kind this kind of move. We would not expect these kinds of idealisations
to be removed by mere increases in computational power, but we would expect them
to be subject to a kind of deidealisation. In particular, such an idealisation is only
good in so far as we know when and to what extent the application of the familiar
theoretical framework is applicable. With further increases in scientific knowledge
we would expect these idealisations to be either replaced altogether or for us to gain
increased understanding of the the limits on their use, which, in the limiting case,
would turn them into minimal model explanations.
2.5 A short digression into metaphysics
The metaphysics literature contains several notions of dependence. Here I would
like to say a little about how some prominent accounts of metaphysical dependence
relates to what I have proposed in this chapter.
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2.5.1 Ontological dependence and its relationship to actual dependence
In the metaphysics literature there has been a resent resurgence of interest in
the notion of dependence47. However, the interest has typically been concerned with
ontological dependence and only occasionally connecting with the notion of scientific
explanation. Some of what I have said in the previous section is in direct conflict
with some of the notions of ontological dependence that have been proposed. For
example, Schaffer suggests that the notion of ontological dependence48 is primitive
and irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. The notion of actual dependence that
I have introduced is relative to a relationship. One can, of course, in extension say
that one entity actually depends on another if and only if there is a relationship
connecting them that guarantees dependence, but the central notion is that of a
relationship guaranteeing dependence and what it takes for a relationship to do so.
Unlike Schaffer I do not take the relationship of dependence to be primitive, nor
irreflexive, antisymmetric, or transitive. This is not to say that it is never that case
that a depending on b and b depending on c allows one to conclude that a depends on
c. Whether or not one can make such an inference will depend on whether or not it
is the case that the relationship connecting a and b and the relationship connecting b
and c combine appropriately.49 Similarly, some relationships that support dependence
might be such as to allow for it to be the case that a depends on a, but then again,
as a matter of fact there might be no such connections between events in the actual
world.50
47See for example Schaffer’s [100] call for a metaphysics that focuses on relations of dependence,
and of course Fine’s [31] [30].
48Schaffer is talking about the notion of grounding, which I take to be one of ontological depen-
dence.
49For example, where we are dealing with relationships that come with certain restrictions on
their application, like causal ones, it may well be that the circumstances that are appropriate for
it to be the case that c causes b and that b causes a cannot be combined to a set of circumstance
appropriate for c to cause a. See for example Maslen [75, p 350 forward] for a discussion of cases
that seem to raise problems for the transitivity of causation.
50I do not think that we have good examples of such a relationship though the notion of an
unmoved mover is perhaps of this kind.
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Though the notion of ontological dependence and that of actual dependence are
not identical, I think that they are related. In particular I think that the notion of on-
tological dependence can be understood as actual dependence restricted to questions
about existence51.
Fine proposes an analysis of dependence in terms of the primitive notion of essence.
In some ways my account is in the tradition of modal existential analyses of depen-
dence that Fine rejects, but in some aspects what I have said is importantly different
from the accounts that Fine has in mind. In particular, I have argued in section 2.3
that logical necessity is not sufficient for actual dependence. However, even though
I think that many cases of ontological dependence will also be cases of actual de-
pendence, the reverse does not hold. This is of course no criticism of the notion of
ontological dependence as characterised by Fine and others; it was never intended
to elucidate explanatory relationships, but we can see how attempts to elucidate the
notion of dependence in terms of essence turns out to not be very helpful here. For
example, it seems at best unclear and at worst just outright false to say that the
presence of a distant mass is part of the essence of the acceleration of a given massive
body. Similarly, it is not at all clear that the the height of the flagpole is part of the
essence of the length of the shadow. The notion of actual dependence is much better
suited to tackle these kinds of cases.
Some of the problem cases that Fine brings to bear on the modal existential
account are ones where, even though they do not straightforwardly apply to the
notion of actual dependence, what I have said about actual dependence can go some
way towards dispelling the problems for a modal existential account. The idea driving
the modal existential account is that if a ontologically depends on b then it should
be the case that it is not possible for a to exist without b existing.
51This is not to be taken to mean that I am endorsing an existence analysis of ontological depen-
dence. I merely mean to stress that ontological dependence is normally concerned with what other
existing entities (if any) the existence of some particular entity depends on.
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Where “A” stands for “a exists” and “B” stands for “b exists”.
In particular, Fine brings up the problems associated with necessarily existing entities,
such as (at least arguably) the number 2. The modal existential account runs into
trouble here since it seems to be true that necessarily if Socrates exists then the
number 2 exists,52 since after all it is necessary that the number 2 exists. On the
modal existential account this would seem to imply that Socrates depends on the
number 2, but that seems absurd. My account of actual dependence would not
reach the same conclusion here. After all, it is certainly not the case that there is a
relationship between the number 2 and Socrates that guarantees Socrates existence
from the existence of the number 2.
In the case of another of Fine’s famous cases, namely that of the relationship
between the singleton containing Socrates and Socrates himself, things gets a little
more complicated. Here is is clear that I can make an inference in both directions.
That is, I can infer from the existence of Socrates to the existence of the singleton set
containing Socrates and vice versa. As Fine points out it is nonetheless intuitively
clear that Socrates does not depend on the singleton set with him as a member, but
the existence of such a set might depend on the existence of Socrates. Even given
this it is far from clear that the account of actual dependence that I have given above
that Socrates depends on the existence of the singleton set containing Socrates. After
all it is far from clear that there is a connection between Socrates himself and the set
containing him such that the existence of the set guarantees his existence. There is
of course a relationship between the statements ‘Socrates exists’ and ‘The singleton
52This example is from Fine [31, p 271], see also [30].
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set containing Socrates exists’, but as I have already discussed in section 2.3.4 this
kind of relationship between statements (or propositions) is not enough to guarantee
dependence between the entities (or events) themselves.
2.5.2 Where are explanations?
I started this chapter by a discussion of the wide range of uses of the term ”expla-
nation” 2.1. However there is one further aspect of the variation in use that I have
not yet discussed and that is related to the metaphysical question of what kind of
an entity an explanation is.53 Different considerations here seem to pull in different
directions. On the one hand when we are interested in having an explanation of why
some particular phenomena occurs, we seem, at least on face value, to be asking a
question about what kind of relationships obtain in the world, where those relation-
ships do have to have anything at all to do with our own existence or the existence
of humankind in general.On the other hand explanation seems to be tied to under-
standing and to the successful delivery of information, both which seem to be about
us. However, this apparent duality is, I think, only apparent.
On the view that I have been presenting above, explanations are things capable
of providing information about a relation that holds (or at least seems to hold) in
the mind-indepent world. On my view then, it is quite appropriate to talk of the
explanation as a way of talking about these relationships themselves. However, it
also seems appropriate to call the information (and sometimes, the act of conveying
this information) about these relationships the explanation. While the explanatory
relationships themselves are not (or at least seem not to be) in the mind, information
about these relationships are.
This kind of view allows for a more nuanced view on what the role of explanations
in the special sciences are. There is nothing in this view itself that rules out there
53I am much indebted to Jenkins’ discussion of these issues in [56].
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being relations of dependence at different levels of description, and nothing at all to
indicate that these relationships can only hold at the ontologically most fundamental
level. However, it also opens up for the possibility of another kind of information
about the explanatory relationships that could appropriate come to be called an
explanation, namely, information about patterns of these relationships. These higher
level explanations really are dependent for their explanatory power on the underlying
relationships, since they are explanations only in virtue of providing information
about these features.
Notice how this is different from the scenario where there are relations of depen-
dence between events or aspects of event at a more course-grained level. Here too, it
is plausible to argue that these relationships exists because other more fundamental
relationships hold, but their status as explanations are not similarly derivative on
the fundamental relationships. They are not simply providing imperfect information
about the fundamental relationship, rather they are providing information about a
bona fide relation of dependence (albeit one whose existence is due to the existence
of other more fundamental relations). Moreover, they are providing information that
might not be accessible at the fundamental level.54 Note that none of this implies
that it would be impossible to give an explanation of the same phenomenon from us-
ing only ontologically fundamental entities and relationships between them, but such
an explanation might provide very different information from the information that
we get from the higher-level explanation. That this is so becomes particularly clear
on the account that I have sketched since whether or not we have an explanation is
not merely a matter of whether or not we have a derivation of the phenomenon in
question, it is also a matter of what would have happened had circumstances been
different. Now the various lawlike relations invoked in an explanation of the tar-
get phenomenon might very well be applicable and silent in different counter-factual





The problems of explanatory asymmetry,
explanatory irrelevancies, common cause, and
causal pre-emption
The problem of explanatory asymmetry, explanatory irrelevancies, common cause,
and causal pre-emption are four of the standard counter-examples facing the deductive-
nomological account. Looking at how the account I proposed in section 2.3.4 deals
with these cases will make it clearer exactly how the account I am proposing works
and in particular how it escapes the worry raised for the simply permissive account
in section 1.3.
3.1 The flagpole and the shadow
The intuitive pull towards accepting subsumption under natural laws as a form
of explanation is very strong. However the idea that subsumption under laws was
explanatory famously fell on hard times with the onslaught of counter-examples to
the deductive-nomological account, especially since that account spells out the intu-
ition that laws can explain in a very natural and straightforward way by thinking of
explanations as arguments that proceed (essentially) from natural laws. Among these
counter-examples the problem of explanatory asymmetry, the problem that one can
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often use a law to predict greater number of phenomena than the law is taken to be
capable of explaining, is particularly troubling.
Whether or not one takes the relation of explanation to be antisymmetrical there
are still many cases to illustrate that the relation of explanation is not symmetrical.
Many such cases are by now familiar,1 for example while it seems as if the height of
the flagpole can explain the length of the shadow, it does not seem as if the length
of the shadow can explain the height of the flagpole.2
This asymmetry poses a problem for the deductive-nomological account since the
law that allows us to derive the length of the shadow from the height of the flagpole
equally allows us to derive the height of the flagpole from the length of the shadow.
Supporters of a causal theory of explanation will claim that the relevant difference is
that the height of the flagpole causes the length of the shadow but that the length of
the shadow does not cause the height of the flagpole, while a unificationist will have
to argue that allowing an argument pattern for the length of the shadow explaining
the height of the flagpole will result in a less well unified system than one where this
pattern is omitted but the opposite is true for the argument pattern of deriving the
length of the shadow from the height of the flagpole.3
The structure of these solutions show why simply being permissive about what
the explanatory relations are is not an option. In particular, allowing both laws
and causal relationships to act as genuine explanatory relations destroys the causal
solution to the counter-examples faced by the deductive-nomological account. On
the unificationist account the solution to the counter-examples forces an even less
forgiving position. Here only the best explanation is an explanation at all.4
1A version of the flagpole and shadow case (using the Empire state building and its shadow down
Fifth Avenue) that I will discuss here was proposed by Bromberger [13, p 92-93].
2I am ignoring cases where the flagpole was constructed specifically for the purpose of casting
a shadow of a certain length at certain times of the day . Here perhaps the height of the flagpole
does, in some sense, depend on the length of the shadow. I discuss this case in section 3.1.2.
3This characterisation is clearly a simplification of two broad classes of theories, but I think that
it captures the driving intuition behind such models of explanations.
4Woodward dubs this position the ‘winner-take-all conception’ of explanation [126, p 367 and
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At this point it is tempting to simply abandon laws as carrying non-derivative ex-
planatory power in favour of, for example, causal accounts of explanation and instead
give an account of how some laws can be seen to be explanatory in virtue of being
parasitic upon the preferred explanatory relationship. This is, of course, a perfectly
legitimate option, but I will argue for the less explored option (see chapter IV) —
namely for keeping laws as being genuinely, non-derivatively, capable of explaining
and for explanations not being antisymmetrical by nature. There is nothing in the
nature of dependence relations in themselves that rules out mutual dependence, and
so nothing to prevent symmetrical explanations. So, how does my account deal with
these cases?
Let us look closer at the, by now familiar, case of the height of the flagpole and the
length of the shadow as an example of explanatory asymmetry. On the dependence
account of explanation that I have outlined above we do not need to invoke any
distinctively causal reasons for why the length of the shadow does not explain the
height of the flagpole. Neither do we need to evaluate counterfactual claims about
what would have happened had we been able to intervene to change the length of
the shadow, nor claims about which system of argument patterns that is the most
unified.
Though neither putative explanation 1 nor putative explanation 2 are canonical
explanations, we know that that putative explanation 1 is not parasitical upon a
canonical explanation with the right dependence. On the account of explanation
proposed in 2.3.4 the failure is to be found in condition 2. We do not have an
inference principle that guarantees a relation of dependence such that the height of
the flagpole depends on the length of the shadow.
forward]. Even though the intuitive notion of unification seems to admit of degrees, the unificationist
account cannot solve the asymmetry problem without demanding that only the members of the best
unfication count as explanations. Otherwise, the derivation of the height of the flagpole from the
length of the shadow would not fail to be an explanation, or even be an incredible terrible one. After
all it surely does unify phenomena.
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Let y be a variable for the height of the flagpole and H be the height of the specific
flagpole in question, similarly let x be the variable for the length of the shadow and L
the length of the specific shadow and let z be a variable for the angle the sun makes
with the horizon at the location of the flagpole and the shadow and let a be a specific
such angle. Let us also assume that none of H,L and a are zero and that H = L tan a.
Putative Explanation 1
EIP y = x tan z
EPF x = L
EPF z = a
M y = H
Here the height of the flagpole is derived from the length of the shadow, but it
is not explained by the length of the shadow, while, so the example goes, below the
length of the shadow is both derived and explained by the height of the flagpole.
Putative Explanation 2
EIP x = y/ tan z
EPF y = H
EPF z = a
M x = L
To break the apparent symmetry between the two cases, we have to ask whether
or not information about what the height of the flagpole and the length of the shadow
depends on has been provided. In particular, we need to ask whether the height of the
flagpole depends on the length of the shadow and whether the length of the shadow
depends on the height of the flagpole.
The first thing to notice is that this counter-example to the deductive-nomological
model can be subject to the complaint I noted in section 1.3. In particular as it stands
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the EIPs are false.5 Let us first consider putative explanation 1. Here it is claimed
that the height of the flagpole is given by the length of the shadow multiplied by the
tangent of the angle of the sun with the horizon. For the case where the angle of the
sun with the horizon is 0, tan 0 = 0, but the height of the flagpole clearly does not
need to be 0 in this case. A similar problem occurs in putative explanation 2. When
z = 0 the EIP gives the length of the shadow as being ill defined, when, intuitively
the length of the shadow is 0.
To fix this problem let us first turn the EIP into a conditional statement of the
form ‘if z 6= 0, then y = x tan z’ and similarly for putative explanation 2. As I
noted above, for the standard deductive-nomological account, this has not changed
the problem. Since z 6= 0 holds in both cases the deduction still goes through.
Let us now consider what has happened to the information about the alleged
dependence of the length of the shadow on the height of the flagpole and vice versa.6
Once the EIP is a conditional it can no longer guarantee dependence of the height of
the flagpole on the length of the shadow or of the length of the shadow on the height of
the flagpole. When z = 0, the EIP no longer delivers a verdict on what happens and
so it is not possible for the relation described in the EIP to guarantee that the state
described in M does not hold when S instantiated by the states described in the EPFs
does not hold. That is, the relation that holds between the angle of the sun with the
horizon, the height of the flagpole and the length of the shadow is unable to guarantee
that, for example, the length of the shadow depends on the other two. However, there
is an EIP easily available that we could include in the case of putative explanation
2. We can just add an EIP stating that ‘If z = 0, then x = 0’ to correspond to our
5Here my strategy and reasoning has much in common with the reasoning that Cartwright [16,
particularly essay 2 and 8] puts forward. However, we take the lesson from noticing that laws come
with conditions of application to lead to very different conclusions (see for example Cartwright [17]).
6There are going to be other such corrections that are needed in order for the EIP to be true, but
this one will suffice to show how it is that we know that putative explanation 1 cannot be parasitic
upon a canonical explanation that guarantees the dependence of the height of the flagpole on the
length of the shadow.
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observation that when there is no sun there is no shadow.
With this premise in place the deduction goes through, just as before, and now
the EIPs do guarantee that M depends on the EPFs. Too see this consider whether
there is a collection of states S such that the EIPs allow us to conclude that M holds
from S and that were S not to hold M would not hold. The states that are in play
when deducing M from the EIPs and the EPFs are, of course, there being sun and
the relevant ratio of the height of the flagpole and the tangent of the angle the sun
makes with the horizon.7 This means that we need to consider whether it is possible
to have x = L (M) together with it not holding that the ratio given by r = y/ tan z
instantiated by y = H (EPF) and z = a (EPF) holds, while both of ‘If z 6= 0, then
x = y/ tan z’ (EIP) and ‘If z = 0, then x = 0’ (EIP) hold. There are two options to
consider here:
• If z 6= 0, having x = L, but it not being the case that the ratio is given by the
number H/ tan a will violate ‘If z 6= 0, then x = y/ tan z’.
• If z = 0, having x = L will violate ‘If z = 0, then x = 0’.
This shows why putative explanation 2 is an explanation. Here we are given
information about a relation of dependence. To see why we are not given information
about a relation of dependence in the case of putative explanation 1, let us see whether
there is any similar EIP we could add in order to guarantee the dependence in this
case. It is clear that the one corresponding to the fact that when there is no sun there
is no shadow will not do in this case. To see this, consider whether it is possible to
have y = H (M) and that it is not the case that the number given by r = x tan z
instantiated by x = L (EPF) and z = a (EPF) holds, while having both of ‘If z 6= 0,
then x = y/ tan z’ (EIP) and ‘If z = 0, then x = 0’ (EIP) holding. For 1 this is a
7There is a complication here that I am suppressing. If we are explaining only why x = L, where
L is just a given number, then this depends on there being sun and on one other particular fact,
namely the appropriate ratio between the height and the tangent of the angle. However, if we are
explaining why x = L = Htan a , then this particular facts depends both on the height and the angle
independently.
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possibility. In particular when z = 0 and x = 0 and y = H we do not have a violation
of ‘If z = 0, then x = 0’ (nor, of course, of ‘If z 6= 0, then x = y/ tan z’). What is
needed is rather a premise more like ‘If z = 0, then y = 0’8, but we cannot add such
a premise since it is simply false that when there is no sun there is no flagpole.
With the notion of actual dependence in place we can break the symmetry be-
tween these two cases without invoking any specifically causal considerations. For
the solution I have suggested to work it is enough to speak of wanting to guarantee
dependence and of facts about the conditions under which there is a shadow and the
conditions under which there is a flagpole.9 Similarly, there is no need to try to evalu-
ate counterfactual statements asking what would have been the case had we been able
to intervene to change the length of the shadow, and in particular whether the height
of the flagpole would have been different or not under such an intervention. Nor do
we need to ask any questions about which set of argument patterns that provides the
best overall unification of all of our knowledge.
3.1.1 Time asymmetry - prediction versus retrodiction
While I think that a solution analogous to the one proposed in section 3.1 will
work for nearly all cases of explanatory asymmetry, the difference between prediction
and retrodiction provides a special case. After all, it is often claimed that while
predictions can sometimes (but not always) also be explanations, retrodictions are
never explanatory.10 In particular, a causal theorist has a readily available account to
8Or, to be more precise, what is required is any premise such that if fixes the length of the flagpole
at anything but H when there is no sun. However, very plausibly there is no such restriction related
to the absence of sunlight to place on the height of the flagpole.
9Of course, this is not to deny that causal information could, in particular cases, play a role in
breaking the symmetry. Most of the time we would probably use our knowledge of causal relations
to make judgements about the conditions under which there would be a flagpole and a shadow.
However, the crucial point here is that it is enough to have information about these conditions to
break the symmetry. Whether we came to have it via reasoning about causal relations is not relevant
to the solution to the problem itself. The solution works equally well if we had gained information
about these conditions from simple observations, without forming any beliefs about causal relations
in addition to ones about lawlike connections.
10See for example Loewer [70, p 294].
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give of the lack of explanatory retrodictions. After all, we typically (though perhaps
not always) take causation to be future directed and antisymmetrical. However, once
we allow laws to do genuine explanatory work we encounter the problem that many
laws can be used to retrodict as well as to predict. In particular, many laws of
physics are such as to allow retrodiction as well as prediction. Should we then take,
for example, the retrodiction of the position of the earth from its current position to
be an explanation of its past position?
I think that how we answer that question on a dependence account of explanation
is bound up with our metaphysical picture of the nature of time. This comes about
quite naturally since the question that we have to answer is whether or not the laws
of nature guarantee the dependence of the past location on the future one.11 Given
any kind of view of the nature of time where the future is in a weak sense open, we
are likely to think that the past cannot depend on the future. One way to imagine
this would be to ask whether or not it is the case that it would be possible, given the
relevant laws under consideration, for the apocalypse to have come about between the
past occurrence and the present one. If this is a possibility then the past occurrence
cannot depend on the future one, since the future one could not have taken place and
the past one still would have.
I know what it would be to believe that the past is unreal (i.e. nothing
ever happened, everything was just created ex nihilo) and to believe that
the future is unreal (i.e. all will end, I will not exist tomorrow, I have no
future). Maudlin [77, p 259]
This means that even once we have acknowledge the existence of time symmetric
laws, it does not immediately follow that we will also have time symmetric explana-
tions. After all, we have already seen how we typically have to be careful in noting
any implicit restrictions in application of the laws before trying to read of relations of
11Of course, even in making a prediction (at least when given less than the total state of the
universe) we are forced to make some qualifications such as ‘given that nothing interferes with the
system, then . . . ’.
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dependence from those laws. Whether or not time symmetric laws involve time sym-
metric explanations hinges on whether or not we take the law in question to govern
the nature of time or not. Figuring out exactly what these restrictions are is by no
means a trivial matter and it will often involve a rather sophisticated understanding
of the whole theory of the world of which the law is a part. This however is, I think,
as it should be when it comes to questions about explanations involving notions as
fundamental as the nature of time. Understanding what depends on what is not
something that we can acquire simply by being told that there is a lawlike connection
between two phenomena, as the problem of symmetry shows.
There is then, nothing in the account of explanation proposed in the previous
chapter that rules out the possibility of explanatory retrodictions as well as explana-
tory predictions. Rather, whether we think that there can be such explanations hinges
on whether or not we take time symmetrical laws to be able to guarantee the depen-
dence of past occurrences on future ones. Moreover, whether or not we take this to be
possible will depend on what we take the nature of time to be like and in particular
on whether we take past occurrences to be fixed. Merely knowing what the laws look
like will not be enough to settle these questions.
3.1.2 Van Fraassen Style Flagpoles (or Towers)
Van Fraassen [116, pp 132–134] has famously constructed a sample case where it
seems plausible that the height of the flagpole can be explained by the length of the
shadow.
I think that van Fraassen is right that his story raises trouble for the idea that
explanation is antisymmetrical, but I do not think that it precludes us from giving
an informative set of necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific explanation. In
section 3.1 I have argued that the case of explaining the height of the flagpole from
the length of the shadow by an application of a trigonometric relationship that raised
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trouble for the deductive-nomological account does not count as an explanation on
a dependence account of explanation. Importantly, the claims was merely that that
relationship cannot explain the height of the flagpole by the length of the shadow.
This leaves room for the possibility that some other relationship could do so. In fact,
I take van Fraassen to have given us a causal story, including the intention of the
constructor of the flagpole, in order to explain the height of the flagpole by the length
shadow.
The story (adapted to deal with flagpoles and shadows and deprived of much
of its literary style) goes something like this. A person, let us call her Jaineba, has
compelling reasons to want the flagpole that she is about to construct to cast a shadow
at a specific spot at a specific time on a specific day. She figures out how tall the
flagpole has to be in order to cast such a shadow and the flagpole is built according
to her orders. In this case the cause of the shadow being produced with a certain
height is it being ordered to be of a certain height. Moreover, the cause of it being
ordered to be of a certain height is Jaineba’s desire that it cast a shadow of a certain
length (at a certain time at a certain day). Here we can give a causal explanation of
the height of the flagpole that involves the length of the shadow, but we cannot give
the same explanation as the one discussed in section 3.1, even though the length of
the shadow figures in the causal explanation of the height of the flagpole.
On the kind of account of explanation that I have proposed it is perfectly possible
for there to be an explanation of the height of the flagpole from the length of the
shadow. All that is needed in order to address the counter-examples to the deductive-
nomological account, and to allay our fears that the same problems will plague the
dependence account, is to show how the kind of symmetry cases that were problematic
for the former are not a problem for the latter. This does not force us to argue that it
is never the case that the length of the shadow can play any role in any explanation
of the height of the flagpole.
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3.1.3 Shadowland
Let us consider a potentially worrying case; in particular, a possible world, let us
call it shadowland, where all objects casts shadows and that is completely flat and
moreover is one where the sun is always a constant, let us say, 60 degree angle with the
horizon (and perhaps also one where the objects that populate it have always existed
and continue to exist undistrubed).12 In this world there will be no observations that
will break the symmetry in the way I suggest that we know that it is broken in the
case of the actual flagpole and the actual shadow. Does this mean that we also have a
case where the length of the shadow explains the height of the flagpole? After all this
would seem to be the kind of case that the unificationist account (see section 1.1.3)
would be committed to taking to be a case where it is indeterminate whether or not
the best system includes an origin and development patter or a shadow pattern.
On the account that I have proposed however, it does not matter if, as a matter
of contingent fact, the objects are never disturbed and always cast shadows. As long
as the situation is one where it is possible that the sun is blocked, etc. then the same
considerations as in the actual case of the flagpole and the shadow still apply. Of
course, we might be epistemically unfortunate if we find ourselves in such a world
since we are less likely to find out about the asymmetry. Moreover, the possible
world that we most naturally consider when we are asked to imagine shadowland is
one where the laws are kept fixed and it is a matter of contingent fact that the situa-
tion in shadowland obtains. In such a situation the application of the trigonometric
relationship of explanation 1 and 2 is still not able to explain the height of the flagpole
by the length of the shadow.
In order to make it the case that the the application of the trigonometric relation
does allow the length of the shadow to explain the height of the flagpole all of the
situations where the light is blocked, or the flagpole is situation next to a deep gorge,
12A particular thanks to Laura Ruetsche for pressing this type of objection.
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etc. have to be ruled out as a matter of natural law and not merely not obtain as a
contingent matter of fact.
3.2 The hexed salt
With section 3.1 in place, we can also explain how a dependence account of ex-
planation rules out explanatory irrelevancies. This case too is problematic on the
deductive-nomological account since it seems to involve a deduction from a law of
nature. Yet again, a causal account would identify the problem as the inclusion of
non-causes in the explanation. The unificationist account would identify the problem
as the inclusion of details in the argument pattern that weakens the unificatory power
of the pattern and an interventionist account would diagnose the problem as stem-
ming from it being possible to intervene with respect to the irrelevant factor without
affecting the phenomenon in the explanandum.13
Let us consider the case of the hexed salt.14 Mike the magician waves his hands
and casts a spell on a sample of salt. He later puts the salt in a cup of water and it
dissolves. Below is a putative explanation for why the sample of salt dissolved when
put in water.
Putative Explanation 3
EIP All samples of hexed salt dissolve when put in water.
EPF This sample, S, is a sample of salt.
EPF This sample, S, is hexed.
M This sample, S, dissolves after having been put in water.
Intuitively it is immediately clear that putative explanation 3 will not count as an
explanation on the dependence account. After all, we do not think that the the fact
that the sample dissolved depended on it having been hexed.
13Again, this is a simplified sketch of the general strategy that these accounts would take in
dissolving the counter-example to the deductive-nomological account.
14I first came across this case in Salmon [98, p 50], but he attributes it to Kyburg [62, p 147].
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Understanding this in terms of the conditions given in 2.3.4 turns out to require a
little more work. In particular explanations of the form given in 4 are not explanatory
on my account.
Putative Explanation 4
EIP All Fs are Gs.
EPF b is an F.
M b is a G.
Putative explanations like this turn out not to be explanatory for two reasons.
Firstly, merely saying that ∀x(Fx→ Gx) does not guarantee that the EIP is able to
provide a conection between aspects of events, rather than merely a relation between
statements.15 Secondly, even if we take the EIP to be lawlike, it does not guarantee
the dependence of the event described in M on the event described in the EPF. After
all, it is possible that the EIP holds and that M holds but that the EPF does not
hold. So the first step we need to take is to modify the EIP to a claim of the kind
∀x(Fx↔ Gx).16 With this in mind let us go back to putative explanation 3. There
are several ways in which we could change the EIP. However it does not seem very
promising to change the EIP to an “if and only if” statement, since even though it
seems true that all samples of hexed salt dissolves in water, it is not true that all
samples that dissolve in water are hexed salt.17
Putative Explanation 5
EIP ∀x(x is water soluble ↔ were x to be put in water then x would dissolve).
EPF b is water soluble.
EPF b is put in water.
15Of course, intuitively we do not take merely accidental generalisations to be explanatory, so it
is not surprising that this condition is needed.
16Note that even though laws are often schematised as ∀x(Fx → Gx), laws in physics typically
assert equalities, not merely universal conditional statements.
17Neither is it true that all samples that dissolve in water are salt.
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EPF b is hexed.
M b dissolves after having been put in the water.
It is clear that putative explanation 5 is not explanatory. In particular it can
be false that b is hexed even when M and the EIP holds since the EIP makes no
mention of the sample being hexed at all. Now it is clear that this EIP does not
guarantee that the fact that the sample dissolves in water depends on it being hexed.
However, when we remove the offending EPF we do have something that looks like an
explanation. It is no longer possible for at least one of the EPFs to not hold when the
EIP and M do.18 However, this explanation still looks peculiar. In particular, it does
not seem as if the EIP is an empirical principle of inference at all. Rather it seems to
give us a condition for when something counts as water soluble. This peculiarity is,
I think, merely a reflection of a peculiarity of the original case. An explanation like
3 without the irrelevant hexing of the salt could still felicitously elicit the response
that ‘I know that salt is water soluble, but I want to know why it dissolves!’. This
explanation seems to, in a way, have explained why the sample dissolves, but it has
done so merely by noting that the sample substance belongs to a class of things that
are water soluble and being water soluble plausibly just means, roughly, having a
propensity to dissolve when put in water. The explanatory work here is done by
what seems to be a linguistic principle of inference, not a physical one.
There is another explanation that we might have in mind when we say that the
sample being salt explains why it dissolves when put in water. Rather than a cleaned
up version of explanation 5, we could have a causal explanation like 6 in mind.
Putative Explanation 6
18To see that this is so, consider making the second EPF false, so that b is not put in water. This
immediately conflicts with M holding, which claims that b dissolves after having been put in the
water. So, instead let us consider making the first EPF false. This means that it no longer holds
that b is water soluble. By the EIP we get that it is not the case that were b to be put in water
then b would dissolve. This means that in the closest possible world where b is put in water (which
is the actual world), b does not dissolve. However, according to M b does dissolve and so again we
have found that we cannot make both M and the EIP hold when at least one of the EPFs do not.
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EIP b being hexed salt caused it to dissolve when put in water
EPF b is hexed.
EPF b is salt.
M b dissolves after having been put in the water.
If this is the kind of explanation that we are looking for the standard causal account
response to the problem of explanatory irrelevancies will apply. The problem here is
simply that it is not b being hexed salt that caused it to dissolve, it is b being salt
that did so.
3.3 The barometer and the storm
Let us look another very familiar case from the explanation literature.19 Namely,
the problem of the common cause as illustrated by the putative explanation of the
coming of a storm by the falling of barometers.
Putative Explanation 7
EIP Barometers fall if and only if a storm will arrive shortly.
EPF A particular barometer, B, falls.
M A storm will arrive here shortly.
Again we have a derivation while lacking an explanation and again the causal
account addresses this difficulty for the deductive-nomological account by pointing
out the absence of a causal relation of the right kind between the falling of the
barometer and the coming of the storm. Again, I think the causal account is, in
important ways, correct, but that the appeal to causation is not strictly needed in
order to explain the counter-example.
19I first encountered this case too in Salmon [98, p 47].
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Here the crucial point is one that has already been often noted and that, at first
glance, seems to provide evidence for an interventionist account of explanation.20
Though the barometer falling might be correlated with the storm arriving shortly this
is so only for non-interfered with readings of the barometer where the barometer is
working. That is, I cannot bring a storm about by changing the dial of the barometer.
For such cases the correlation clearly fails. To simplify the case, let us assume that
in non-interfered with cases the correlation is perfect (so that non-interefered with
barometers never fail to accurately predict the coming of storms).21
Now 7 should be modified to look something like the following;
Putative Explanation 8
EIP If barometers are only observed and not interfered with, then barometers fall if
and only if a storm will arrive shortly.
EPF A particular barometer, B, falls.
M A storm will arrive here shortly.
Here condition 2b is violated and we no longer have a derivation of M from the
EIP and the EPF. We could try to fix this problem by adding another particular fact
to the effect that the barometer reading is only observed.
Putative Explanation 9
EIP If barometers are only observed and not interfered with, then barometers fall if
and only if a storm will arrive shortly.
EPF A particular barometer, B, falls.
EPF Barometer B is only observed and not interfered with.
M A storm will arrive here shortly.
20There is a way to make quick work of common cause cases like this one. In particular it unclear
whether condition 2a is fulfilled. My own hunch is that it is not. However, since I want to avoid a
detailed discussion of how to treat lawlike generalisations, I will pursue another solution to the case.
21There are several other restrictions that are needed in order to make the EIP true, but this one
will suffice in order to illustrate the problem.
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Just as in the discussion of explanatory asymmetry, all of this does not help the
deductive-nomological account, since there are, presumably, cases where the barome-
ter is not interfered with, but yet the barometer reading does not explain the coming
of the storm. However, once we are concerned with guaranteeing dependence, pu-
tative explanation 9 ceases to seem like an explanation. In particular condition 2c
does not hold. That is to say, it can still be the case that both the EIP and M hold
while both of the EPFs do not. In particular if it does not hold that the barometer is
not interfered with, the EIP can hold even if a storm will arrive shortly regardless of
whether the barometer falls or not. This situation is similar to the one we dealt with
above in the case of explaining the length of the shadow by the height of the flagpole,
so let us apply the same strategy and try adding another inference principle.
Putative Explanation 10
EIP If barometers are only observed and not interfered with, then barometers fall if
and only if a storm will arrive shortly.
EIP If barometers are not only observed with and not interfered with, then . . . ?
EPF A particular barometer, B, falls.
EPF Barometer B is only observed and not interfered with.
M A storm will arrive here shortly.
It is unclear which claim about the coming of storms we can add in place of the
. . . in our new principle of inference. In particular, for the falling of barometers (that
are not interfered with) to explain the coming of storms on a dependence account,
it needs to be the case that if it is false that the reading is only observed and not
interfered with, then the storm will not arrive shortly. However, we have no obser-
vations to support such a claim. The only way to fill in the . . . that would make 10
accord to condition 2 is a way that makes the principle of inference false and thereby
violates condition 1. Since we think that there is no such principle we can add, we
are also committed to holding that there is no canonical explanation in the vicinity
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that putative explanation 7 can provide information about and hence 7 fails to be
explanatory.
In this case my diagnosis of the problem with explanations like 7 is closer to an
interventionist account than a general causal account of explanation. Yet information
about interventions does not hold a special status on this account of explanation.
While in this case information about behaviour under intervention can be used to
show how it is that putative explanation 7 fails to be explanatory, such information
is just one kind of information among many that can turn out to be relevant. Instead
of focusing on how barometers and storms behave when barometers are interfered
with we could have focused on malfunctioning barometers etc. That is to say, 7 does
not fail to be explanatory merely because the EIP does not hold under interventions.
Rather it fails to be explanatory because once we adjust the EIP to account for the
limited situation under which it holds we do not have tacit background belief in the
existence of some other well-supported EIP that we could add so that they jointly
would support the dependence of the coming of storms on the falling of undisturbed
barometers. Or, to put this differently, the coming of storms does not depend, neither
in a lawlike nor in a causal way, on the falling of barometers.
3.4 The tragic case of Jack and the poison
The case of Jack and the poison is an example of causal pre-emption and this
fourth kind of problematic case for the deductive-nomological model is particularly
tricky to account for on the model I have proposed in section 2.3.4.
The case typically goes something like the following;
Putative Explanation 11
EIP All humans who consume 2 grams of poison X die within 35 minutes.
EPF Jack, a human, consumes 2 grams of poison X at noon.
M Jack dies within 35 minutes of noon.
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In some cases, putative explanation 11 appears to be genuinely explanatory. How-
ever, adding a causal claim can make 11 cease to seem like an explanation of Jacks
death.
Putative Explanation 12
EIP All humans who consume 2 grams of poison X die within 35 minutes.
EIP Jack getting hit by a bus at 10 past noon causes his death at 15 minutes past
noon.
EPF Jack, a human, consumes 2 grams of poison X at noon.
EPF Jack is hit by a bus at 10 past noon.
M Jack dies within 35 minutes of noon.
Now it no longer seems as if the consumption of the poison explains Jacks death.
Moreover, while Jack’s death in this case is overdetermined, we could eliminate all
reference to his taking poison in 12 and still have an explanation, but we could not
similarly eliminate all reference to his getting hit by a bus.
Here I think the causal account is right in pointing out that it is not the lawlike
statement about what happens when humans swallow poison X that is doing the
explanatory work. In fact, on my account, 11 is not explanatory at all as it stands.
It is clearly possible for Jack to die within 35 minutes of noon and for Jack not to
consume poison X at noon while it holds that all humans who do consume 2 grams
of poison X die within 35 minutes. In particular Jack could have consumed poison
at 10 past noon, or not consumed poison at all but been hit by a bus. Intuitively,
what matters in this case is not subsumption under lawlike regularities, but what the
cause of Jack’s death is, or more broadly, what Jack’s death depends on.
Our intuition that 11 is explanatory (in the cases where we have such an intuition),
then, supposedly comes from the fact that we think a very closely related putative
explanation 13 is explanatory.
Putative Explanation 13
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EIP Taking poison X at noon causes Jack’s death within 35 minutes of noon.
EPF Jack takes poison X at noon.
M Jack dies within 35 minutes of noon.
Here Jack’s death really does depend on Jack’s taking of the poison.
It is worth pausing to look at how this example works in greater detail, since
it will make it clearer how the account of explanation proposed in 2.3.4 deals with
explanations where the EIP takes the form of a causal relation. We can just take it to
be assumed that explanation 13 fulfils condition 1. Condition 2b is more interesting,
but at first glance still relatively straightforward. Given that Jack takes poison and
that this is the cause of his death, we can conclude that his death happens. Moreover,
condition 2a is fulfilled. A causal relation is able to hold between events, and the
derivation makes use of this causal relation. Condition 2c is where things get very
interesting. It is not trivial that it is impossible for M to hold when the EIP does and
EPF is false. In particular, in order for it to not be the case that the causal relation
holds vacuously while it is the case that Jack dies within 35 minutes of noon due
to some other cause, even if he does not take the poison, any analysis of the causal
claims as a material conditional, or in general an analysis that makes them vacuously
true when the cause does not obtain have to be ruled out.22
For token causal claims it seems plausible that they cannot hold vacuously. It is
very strange after all to say that Jack’s death was caused by him swallowing poison
if he never swallowed poison (or if he did not die). For type causal claims it is more
plausible that they can hold vacuously, at least in the sense that it might be the case
that nobody fulfils the type causal description. For example, it might be true that
smoking causes cancer even if no one ever smokes, or if the few people who do so
die of other causes. Moreover, for type causal claims it is clearly possible for it to
be the case that Jack smokes (or takes poison) and yet dies of other causes without
22Luckily, an analysis of ‘c causes e’ as ‘if c obtains then e obtains’ is not very promising, but of
course this does not show that no analysis that makes causal claims vacuously true could be.
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violating the type causal claims. In order for it to hold that it is impossible for M to
hold when the EIP does and the EPF is false, we need to read the causal relation in
putative explanation 13 as a token causal relation. This point holds quite generally
and mere type causal relations typically do not satisfy condition 2c, since they do not
make any claims as to the exclusivity of the type causal relation. That is, they do
not claim to have listed exhaustively the only way in which this type of effect can be
produced.23 In particular, a regular type causal EIP is going to be susceptible to the
same kind of causal pre-emption counter-example that we have just discussed. That
is, if the EIP claims merely that taking poison causes death, it will not be strong
enough to support the dependence of Jack’s death on his taking the poison, since it
will be possible for this to be true and for Jack to die, but from a different cause (or
from no cause at all) which does not involve him taking poison. Or, to put things
differently, it is not enough that taking poison generally causes death in humans for it
to be the case that Jack’s death in particular depends on the fact that he took poison
(he could, for example, have been hit by a bus). As I stressed in section 2.3.5 these
considerations also make it plausible that a mere type causal relationship could not,
on its own, explain why Jack died (though it could explain the related explanandum
of Jack’s death being likely (or in this case even certain)).
On this analysis condition 2b and 2c hold trivially in the case of token causal
relationships. However, condition 2a is far from trivial. It is plausibly also true that
if event c is before e both event c and e have to obtain. However, the temporal
ordering provides just that, an ordering, but not a connection between the two events
in question. Token causal claims however, do seem to provide such a connection.
As I argued in section 2.3.5, token causal claims look a lot like, at least partially,
brute assertions of dependence. Taking token causal claims to be brute assertions of
dependence makes it clear why they fulfil all of condition 2. When we unpack how
23The most dramatic failure occurs when we consider the possibility that the event mentioned in
the explanandum is, in this instance, not caused at all.
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the token causal claim does explanatory work we find that they do so by something
along the lines of ‘c by virtue of being of type C, causes an event of type E, namely
e’ holding when ‘c causes e’ is true.
It is worth stressing how weak a claim the one in section 2.3.5 is. The gist of the
claim is that when we unpack what it is for c to cause e along the lines above, we find
a commitment to there being, under some appropriate circumstances, a relationship
that guarantees that a salient feature of e (which I called E) depends on a salient
feature of c (which I called C). This claim is compatible with an a range of analyses
of causation. For example, one could spell out what the appropriate circumstances
come to in terms of a default state and deviations from the default24, or in terms of
time evolutions of a certain kind of system of laws25, etc.
3.4.1 Poor Jack is subject to an overdetermined death
When an event is causally overdetermined, the notion of causal claims as brute
claims about dependence does subtle and important work.26 For this case we can
imagine that Jack swallows poison just as in the previous section and moreover that
just at the moment where the poison is about to have its effect Jack is also hit by a
bus. Here Jack’s death is overdetermined. Jack’s consumption of poison caused his
death, but so did his being hit by a bus and either cause on their own would have
guaranteed his demise.
Does this case pose a problem for the claim about causal relations made in section
2.3.5? After all, it is clear that it is false that had Jack not swallowed the poison then
he would not have died, since after all he was also hit by a bus. Similarly it is also
the case that it is false that had Jack not been hit by a bus then he would not have
died, since in this case he would still have swallowed poison.
24See for example Hall [40].
25See for example Maudlin [78].
26Thank you to Peter Railton for pressing this point.
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Here it becomes important that the claim is merely that under certain circum-
stances there is some feature of the event that depend on some features of the cause.
This means that the there are two different ways of answering the challenge posed by
overdetermination cases. The first has to do with how one specifies the circumstances
that are relevant to assessing the causal claim. In particular, these circumstances
do not have to be those that actually obtain (if we adopt a default and deviation
from the default analysis of causation then they will not always be the actual cir-
cumstances). The second way to tackle these cases relies on the fact that the claim
is only that there is some feature of the effect that depends on the cause. This is
plausibly so even in the case of overdetermination. What makes these cases confusing
on this analysis is that the dependence does not hold between the aspect of the event
that we would typically take to be the most salient, namely the property of being
the death of Jack. Nonetheless, there are closely related properties that could be so
related. For example, we could think that the property of Jack’s death being one of,
say heart failure, where this is the way that poison X works, depends on his taking of
the poison while another feature of his death, say internal bleeding, depends on the
bus accident.
On a dependence account of explanation since both the swallowing of poison and
the being hit by a bus are causes of Jack’s death (by stipulation), both count as
explanations of Jack’s death. There is sense in which only citing one of the causes
will not offer a complete explanation, but any of the causes will nonetheless turn out
to be explanatory on their own. On the second suggestion for how to understand
these cases that I gave this situation is easily accounted for. There is, after all,
some important feature of the death that depends on him taking poison and some
important feature of the death that depends on him being hit by a bus. Nonetheless,
what we indicated that we are interested in, by the way that we described the case,
was Jack’s death and not something more specific (that entails Jack’s death). So
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there is something odd about explanations in overdetermination cases. Neither an
explanation that that cites just one of the causes nor an explanation that cites both




Putting the dependence account to use
In chapter III I hope to have shown how one can allow that both laws and causal
relations can do genuine explanatory work without running afoul of the standard
counter-examples to the deductive-nomological account of explanation. With this
in place we can return to the cases discussed briefly in section 1.3 and see how a
dependence account of explanation provides a solution to the problem that it often
does not seem conceptually confused to think that we have a lawlike explanation
while thinking that we lack a causal one. That is, the challenge that is posed for the
standard accounts of explanation by there being cases where it does not seem to be
required that one is conceptually confused in order to hold that we have a genuine
explanation, namely a lawlike one, but that we also lack something explanatory,
namely an account of the causal mechanism or the causal history of the explanandum.
4.1 Newton’s theory of universal gravitation
Newton’s argument for his theory of universal gravitation is presented in the third
book of the Principia, ‘De Mundi Systemate’, and makes use of his famous rules of
philosophical reasoning.
The argument for universal gravitational attraction starts by an analysis of the
known data. Newton notes how the forces governing the motion of Jupiter’s moons
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are inversely proportional to the distance between them and Jupiter and how this
relationship holds also for the motion of the planets around the sun and the orbit of
the moon around the earth.
The second step of the argument identifies the force acting on the moon with the
force of gravity observed at the surface of the earth. We get this by an argument
showing that the force that keeps the moon in orbit around the earth predicts that the
moon, if on the surface of the earth, would experience the same acceleration towards
the centre of the earth as the acceleration due to gravity that we actually experience.
. . . [I]f we imagine the Moon, deprived of all motion, to be let go, so as to
descend towards the Earth with the impulse of all that force by which it is
retained in its orb; it will, in the space of one minute of time, describe in
its fall 15 1/12 Paris feet... since that force, in approaching to the Earth,
increases in the reciprocal duplicate proportion of the distance, and, upon
that account, at the surface of the Earth, is 60 x 60 times greater, than
at the Moon; a body in our regions, falling with that force, ought, in the
space of minute of time, to describe 60 x 60 x 15 1/12 Paris feet, and,
with this very force we actually find that bodies here upon Earth do really
descend. Newton [84, Book III, Proposition IV, Theorem IV, p 216 – 217]
Newton’s rules of philosophical reasoning include not postulating more causes than
are needed to explain the phenomena and to, as far as possible, assign the same effects
the same cause. Using these rules of reasoning Newton is able to conclude that the
cause of objects on earth falling towards the centre of the earth and the cause of the
moon not moving in a straight line, but orbiting around the earth, are one and the
same. Gravitational attraction causes objects on earth to fall towards the centre of
the earth and it also keeps the moon in its orbit.
By the same two rules that lead to the identification of the force of gravity and
the force that holds the moon in its orbit, we can now note that the effect of Jupiter
on its moons and the sun on the orbiting planets is of the same kind as the effect
of the earth on the moon and therefore they too are kept in orbit by gravitational
forces.
85
Newton then goes on to draw the conclusion that every planet exerts a force due
to gravity on every other body, and that the force of gravity exerted by a given planet
on a given body is proportional to the mass of that body, by first noting that ‘. . . all
sorts of heavy bodies, (allowance being made for the inequality of retardation, which
they suffer from a small power of resistance in the air) descend to the Earth from
equal heights in equal times’ [84, Book III, Proposition VI, Theorem VI, p 220] and
that ‘. . . forces, which equally accelerate unequal bodies, must be as those bodies;
that is to say, the weights of the Planets towards the Sun must be as their quantities
of matter’ [84, Ibid., p 222].1
Moreover, each part of, for example, the moon, must gravitate towards the earth
with a force proportional to its mass and the same holds generally for any two planets.
For if some parts did gravitate more, others less, than for the quantity of
their matter; then the whole Planet, according to the sort of parts with
which it most abounds, would gravitate more or less, than in proportion
to the quantity of matter in the whole. Newton [84, Ibid., p 223]
After arguing that the force of gravity experienced by a body or a planet towards
another planet has to be composed of the force of gravity resulting from the mass of
the parts of which the planet or the body is made, by the third law2 it follows that
likewise the distant planet gravitates towards all the parts of the body (or the other
planet). Of course, the force of gravity experienced by this distant planet also has
to be composed of the force of gravity resulting from the mass of the parts of which
the planet is made, so each massive part of the distant planet must gravitate towards
each part of the other body (or planet). Now we reach the generalized conclusion
that every object with mass exerts a force on every other object with mass that is
proportional to its mass and the mass of the other object.
1In other words, gravitational mass is identical to inertial mass. This means that the gravitational
force given by FG =
GMgmg
r2 is really just FG =
GMimi
r2 . When this is the only force acting between
two masses we can use Law II, F = mia to give us a = GMir2 , so the motion of mi under gravity is
independent of the specific mass of mi.
2‘To every Action there is always opposed an equal Reaction; or the mutual actions of two bodies
upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.’ [84, Book I, p 19 – 20]
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Given that we at least accept Newton’s law of gravitation and his mechanics as
approximately true, we have gained a remarkable amount of understanding of the
motions we observe. In particular, varied phenomena such as the motion of the earth
around the sun, the moon around the earth, the acceleration of bodies close to earth
towards the centre of the earth and the motion of the tides, are now closely related
and attributable to the same cause, namely the power of gravity.
4.1.1 Newtonian gravity and action at a distance
Newton’s theory of gravity poses a challenge for models of scientific explanation.
The theory of universal gravitational attraction was extremely successful, showing a
wide range of phenomena to be of the same type and predicting the behaviour of
different types of systems from a few laws. On the other hand, the appeal to action
at a distance was thought to be troubling and raised questions as to whether the
theory really could have identified the physical causes of the motions predicted by
the theory. Focusing on the fact that Newton’s theory of gravity greatly increased our
understanding of a range of phenomena, we seem to have an, at least partial, expla-
nation of those phenomena. However, taking the worries about action at a distance
seriously raises the worry that we have only systematically described the behaviour
of a, admittedly impressively varied, range of occurrences. Whether a theory of ex-
planation ends up ultimately judging Newton’s theory of gravity to provide or not to
provide an explanation of these phenomena, we would like to understand what it is
about this case that allows the controversy to arise.
The challenge for theories of explanations, then, is to do one of three things;
1. Explain away the intuition that Newton’s law of gravity is capable of explaining.
2. Explain how all worries about action at a distance are misguided, but natural,
as worries about the explanatory status of the theory.
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3. Account both for the fact that the theory of universal gravitation seems like it
greatly increased our grasp of a wide range of phenomena and the fact that the
theory gives a seemingly problematic explanation of these phenomena — our
understanding of which it increased.
Option 1 and 2 are debunking options where an ambivalent attitude towards
these cases is explained as natural, but ultimately inappropriate. On the deductive-
nomological model as well as on Woodward’s interventionist account and the unifica-
tion theories of explanation, worries about action at a distance are simply not relevant
to the explanatory status of Newton’s law of gravity and some story about how they
can come to seem relevant is called for.3 Causal mechanistic accounts of explanation
could take action at a distance worries to also be worries about explanatory status
(depending on the notion of cause being used), but none of these accounts can, as
they stand, allow for an ambivalent attitude towards the explanatoriness of Newton’s
theory of gravitation; it is always either paradigmatically explanatory or paradigmat-
ically non-explanatory. It is the hope of being able to account for the possibility of
holding option 3, without being involved in conceptual confusion, that lead me to
try to modify the existing accounts of explanation. Why would we be interested in
pursuing this, at first glance, strange solution to the puzzle?
For now I will set aside the possibility that there is a story to be told of how we are
mistaken in thinking that Newton’s law of gravity is sometimes explanatory4 and I will
simply assume that the choice comes down to the other two options. Since it is hard to
see an obvious candidate for a debunking story available to the deductive-nomological
account of explanation (and since I think that the account already struggles to account
3On the assumption that these worries do not prevent us from regarding the law as at least
approximately true and for interventionist accounts with the added assumption that we are right to
think, as we normally do, that there is at least one logically possible intervention on, for example,
the mass of the earth with respect to the orbit of the moon where the orbit of the moon changes in
the required way.
4Of course, with a good debunking story available, option 1 cannot be so easily ignored. On a
causal model of explanation, one possible such story is to argue that certain features of this law
leads us to mistakenly conclude that there is a causal relation, where there in fact is none. I will
return to discuss one such debunking story in section 4.2.4.
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for causal seeming scientific explanations in the special sciences), I will focus the
discussion that follows around the various causal models of explantion. In order to
want our account of explanation to allow for the third option all we need is an account
of how action at a distance worries regarding causal explanations are, at least, not
fundamentally confused and how they are relevant to considerations of explanatory
status. Or, to put things differently, why concerns about action at a distance ought
not to be debunked as irrelevant to explanatory status.
4.1.1.1 Action at a distance
Given that we at least accept Newton’s law of gravitation and his mechanics as
approximately true, we have gained a remarkable amount of understanding of the
motions we observe. In particular, varied phenomena such as the motion of the earth
around the sun, the moon around the earth, the acceleration of bodies close to earth
towards the centre of the earth and the motion of the tides, are now closely related
and attributable to the same cause, namely the power of gravity.
In spite of the great advances in our understanding made by the theory of gravity,
Newton worried about the action at a distance the theory postulates and seemed to
hold that he had not discovered the physical causes of gravitation, even though he
had discovered the law governing motion under gravity.
Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our
sea, by the power of Gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this
power. . . But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those
properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypothesis. Newton
[84, Book III, General Scholium, p 392]
Newton seems to take the theory of gravity to be explanatory while having reserva-
tions about the nature of the interaction the theory postulates. Even though we can
correctly describe the motion of massive particles under gravity and, at least given
that we accept Newtons rules of philosophical reasoning, we can conclude that seem-
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ingly varied kinds of motion arises from the same cause, we do not yet know what
this cause is.
When contemporary causal accounts consider these kinds of worries it is typically
simply to dismiss them on the grounds that there seems to be no good a priori
reason to rule out causal relations that invoke action at a distance. For example,
in the quotation below Woodward gives a debunking story as to why action at a
distance could come to seem to be relevant to explanatory status. The debunking
story is essentially one that notes that many causal interactions are spatiotemporally
continuous processes, but that there is no good reason to take this to be an a priori
constraint on causal relations, presumably implying that this is the mistake that one
can make and thereby ending up taking action at a distance to be worrying for the
explanatory status of Newtonian gravity.
It is perfectly true that Newton himself regarded this feature as unsatis-
factory or at least as indicating an important incompleteness in his theory,
but there seems to be no reason to deny that his theory describes a causal
relationship between the two bodies, and this seems to have been the
conclusion reached by most physicists a generation or two after Newton.
. . . What does seem to to be true of the relationship between causation and
spatiotemporal continuity is this: putting aside some well-known interpre-
tative problems that arise both in quantum mechanics and General Rela-
tivity, it follows, according to the van Dam-Wigner theorem, from Lorentz
invariance, that if energy and moment are conserved in some interaction,
they are conserved locally. Hence, if a causal interaction involves transfer
of energy-momentum in accord with a conservation law, that interaction
will be mediated by spatiotemporally continuous processes that propagate
at finite velocity. However, although many causal interactions involve
energy-momentum transfer from cause to effect, not all do. . . . Moreover,
both Lorentz invariance and the conservation of energy-momentum are
clearly empirical truths and not a priori constraints that follow just from
the notion of causation. Woodward [126, p 148]
Though I think that Woodward is right that action at a distance cannot be ruled
out on a priori grounds, I think that it is far from clear that we need to construe the
worries about action at a distance as stemming from an a priori conceptual objection
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to the idea of causal action at a distance. Rather, several different concerns have
been raised about action at a distance, only some of them based on objections from
conceptual incoherence, and here I will attempt to identify and separate some of the
different lines of objection.
Historically the worries about action at a distance have been associated with
concerns over allowing ‘occult’5 qualities in our physical theories, but why should we
think that postulating action at a distance amounts to postulating such qualities? The
objection to the inclusion of occult properties in science was a concern of Descartes’.
. . . [I]t is a most absurd suggestion that in all the particles of the universe
there resides some property in virtue of which they are drawn towards
each other and attract each other in their turn; and that in each particle
of terrestrial matter in particular there is a similar property in respect to
other terrestrial particles which does not interfere with the former prop-
erty. For in order to make sense of this one would have to suppose not only
that each particle of matter had a soul, and indeed several different souls,
which did not impede each other, but also that these souls were conscious,
and indeed divine, to be able to know without any intermediary what was
happening in those distant places, and to exercise their powers there. . . .
Descartes [23, Letter to Mersenne 20 April 1646, AT IV 316, p 191]
This objection could be viewed in two ways. We could think of this comment as
an a priori objection against this kind of entity and this kind of interaction. However,
this is not the only way of seeing the objection. In particular, it is interesting to
note that it is not, to Descartes, inconceivable to have action at a distance. A divine
being seems to be able to act at a distance. The objection is concerned with what
ordinary matter would have to be like in order to act in this way. Descartes seems to
be pointing out that ordinary matter is not, as far as we are aware and perhaps as a
matter of conceptual necessity, of this kind. What he is pointing out is the fact that
in the cases where we do conceive of action at a distance, it is normally with regards
5Though the original meaning seems to simply have been ‘secret’ or ‘hidden from the senses’,
the use of the word was connected to knowledge obtained by magical or supernatural means. By
the time of Leibniz and Clarke’s correspondence and also around at the time of Descartes’ letter to
Mersenne the meaning of the word ‘occult’ seems to have been changing from its earlier connotation
of inaccessibility to the senses to the notion of unintelligibility. See for example Hutchison [53].
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to intelligent, often magical or divine, action. However, we have no reason to believe
that ordinary matter, such as the moon or the water of the oceans, perform any
intentional actions, of the magical kind or otherwise. This gets us some way towards
understanding why we would be suspicious of action at a distance, but it is not yet
clear why the fact that we are not familiar with any other kind but intentional, often
magical, action at a distance should make action at a distance merit the charge of
being occult, or unintelligible.
We have already seen how Newton, in spite of his law of universal gravitation,
was uncomfortable with the notion of action at a distance. In the Leibniz-Clarke
correspondence, both Leibniz and Clarke seem unhappy with action at a distance,
but their criticism of it is rather different.
The debate about action at a distance starts towards the end of Leibniz’ third
letter where he notes that ‘. . . the attraction of bodies, property called, is a miracu-
lous thing, since it can not be explained by the nature of bodies’ [64, Leibniz’ Third
Letter, 17, p 18]. This point is made clearer in the fourth letter where Leibniz
responds to Clarke’s challenge that this criterion of miracles makes even animal mo-
tion miraculous. In this passage the lack of a medium is stressed. It is miraculous
that ‘. . . bodies should attract one another at a distance without any intermediate
means. . . ’ [64, Leibniz’ Fourth Letter, 45, p 27].
Clarke makes the even stronger claim that it is not only miraculous, but contra-
dictory to assume that there could be action at a distance. ‘That one body should
attract another without any intermediate mean is indeed not a miracle but a contra-
diction, for it is supposing something to act where it is not. But the means by which
two bodies attract each other may be invisible and intangible, and of a different na-
ture from mechanism. . . ’ [64, Clarke’s Fourth Letter, 45, p 35]. While Clarke holds
that action at a distance is impossible he does not want to commit to the only ways
of acting available being mechanical, or visible and tangible.
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At this point the debate about action at a distance turns into a debate about the
kind of influences we should admit into nature. Leibniz holds that the only natural
influences are ‘. . . subject to mechanical laws’ [64, Leibniz’ Fifth Letter, 124, p 64],
where by being subject to mechanical laws he means that they ‘ . . . follow the order
of efficient causes. . . ’ [64, Ibid.]. It is not clear whether the means of attraction
that Clarke refers to in his fourth letter are efficient causes, or whether the comment
about them being different from mechanisms should be taken to mean that they are
different from efficient causes. Leibniz responds to the suggestion of a different kind
of attraction by commenting ‘[t]hat means of communication (he says) is invisible,
intangible, not mechanical. He might as well have added inexplicable, unintelligible,
precarious, groundless and unprecedented’ [64, Ibid. 120, p 64].
Earlier in his fifth letter, Leibniz remarks that action at a distance is something
which its proponents must presume to be ‘. . . effected by miracles, or else they have
recourse to absurdities, that is, to the occult qualities of the schools, which some men
begin to revive under the specious name of forces, but which bring us back again into
the kingdom of darkness. This is inventa fruge, glandibus vesci6’ [64, Ibid., 113, p 62].
Here we get a clearer idea of the worry that action at a distance raises with regard
to occult properties. Part of the worry, as seen above with regards to the invisibility
and intangibility of the influence, is that it is unprecedented and precarious. Now
the problem of ‘inventa fruge, glandibus vesci’ is a methodological charge. When
discussing the history of action at a distance Hesse mentions Bacon’s lists of the
various phenomena for which he can find no mechanical explanation.
The phenomena which he is most ready to ascribe to action at a distance
without any material medium are those which savour most of witchcraft,
magic, astrology, and telepathy, and since these were beliefs most discred-
ited by the subsequent advance of physical science, the fact that action at
a distance was discredited with them is not surprising. Hesse [46, p 95]
6‘This is to feed on acorn when wheat has been discovered’. Thank you to Peter Railton for a
translation correction.
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Non-mechanical action at a distance explanations had long been associated with magic
and teleological explanations.7 Given that these had been discredited and that giving
explanations in terms of efficient causes had been more successful, to revert to this
kind of explanations for what seems as a purely physical phenomenon is ‘to feed on
acorns when wheat has been discovered’. The past track record of invoking these
different kinds of action to explain phenomena might be enough to make the method-
ological recommendation in favour of mechanical efficient causes, and against such
influences as attraction at a distance. This way of understanding the objection also
fits well with the charge that to postulate action at distance is precarious, groundless,
and the purely empirical charge that it is unprecedented (as a scientific explanation).
However, more is needed to explain the charge of being ‘occult’ and ‘absurd’. The
charge of being ‘occult’ could be an a priori objection, but, as I argued earlier con-
cerning the quotation from Descrates, it might be possible to interpret the objection
differently. It seems as if matter would have to act in a way very different from what
we are used to if it is to act at a distance. Acting in an unfamiliar way, however, is
not enough to bring a charge of ‘occultness’. In order to bring this charge we need
the assumption that Leibniz makes; namely that mechanical action is the only form
of efficient causation there is. Since action at a distance cannot be explained me-
chanically, we could then conclude that action at a distance could not be explained
in terms of efficient causation at all. Here we might perhaps make most sense of
7Hutchison argues that even on the earlier use of ‘occult’ to mean inaccessible to the senses the
occult was also closely associated with the magical and supernatural.
Many Aristotelians shared Montaigne’s view that occult properties, even when real,
were methodologically unstudyable. . . . Occult qualities could thus be detected ex-
perimentally, but could not be studied scientifically, since scientia in the Aristotelian
tradition was, above all, a knowledge of causes. . . . [S]upernatural revelation was widely
regarded as the path to a knowledge of occult virtues, and the occult was closely associ-
ated with mysticism and demonism. Being outside the province of natural philosophy,
and dependent on a supernatural epistemology, occult powers were excluded from offi-
cial science, just as their namesakes are today, now that the originals have been fully
accepted. Hutchison [53, p 235 – 236]
.
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the worries about action at a distance being occult. If this sort of action can not
be explained in terms of efficient causation at all and the proper realm of scientific
investigation is limited to the search for efficient causes then to postulate action at a
distance is to make the theory scientifically inexplicable and unintelligible.
In general there seems to be four strands of objections raised against the existence
of action at a distance.
1. Objections from empirical observations as to the nature of causal interactions
and the nature of matter.
2. Objections to the methodology of invoking attraction at a distance when ex-
plaining purely physical behaviour of matter.
3. Objections to the inclusion of ‘occult’ properties, such as attraction at a dis-
tance, or forces, in general.
4. Objections from ‘absurdity’, such as Clarkes claim that action at a distance is
conceptually incoherent.
The much greater success of using mechanical explanations for physical phenom-
ena than explanations using alternative kinds of interactions gives some support for
2 independently of the considerations for 3 or 4. Of course, if we could establish that
action at a distance is a conceptually incoherent notion or that it requires the postu-
lation of an occult form of interaction outside of the realm of what can be investigated
by scientific methods, then we would also have reasons for 2. However, to object to
action at a distance as requiring the postulation of occult entities that ‘bring us back
into the kingdom of darkness’, seems to require taking mechanical action as the only
possible form of efficient causation and the proper realm of scientific investigation to
be limited to a search for efficient causes.
4.1.1.2 A theory of causal influence versus a concept of causation
Where does the previous discussion about the worries associated with action at a
distance leave us? While I do not think that we have good reason for claiming that
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action at a distance is conceptually incoherent or ruled out as impossible on a priori
grounds, etc., I do think that we have (or at least had) very good reason to be wary
of postulating such action. Moreover, some of these reasons are closely related to the
methodological worries and the empirical worries of the last section.
The strongest reasons to be worried about action at a distance are to be found in
option 1 of the previous section. To start getting a grip on what is motivating this
worry, let us consider a simple example. My friend’s favourite cup is found broken
on the kitchen floor. If I explain the cup being broken on the floor by saying that
the falling of a branch in the garden caused it to be on the floor and broken, it
seems exactly right to demand further information as to the mechanism of how this
happened. Only when I have told the story of how the falling of the branch caused
the ceiling to cave in on the second floor, which caused vibrations in the wall, which
caused the frame on the kitchen wall to fall onto the table and push the cup off the
edge of the table, do we have something that starts to look like an explanation.
Why does it seem as if the right thing to do is to demand further information about
the causal mechanism in this case? The simple answer is that the first explanation
did not invoke a causal influence8 of a kind that is familiar. Causal influences of the
push/pull kind are the kind of causal relations that we are most familiar with. In
particular this is how we normally causally interact with material objects when we
intentionally try to do so, and moreover these push/pull interactions are such that
the cause and the effect are contiguous in space and time. Now, the branch falling
in the garden is not in physical proximity to the cup on the kitchen table and so the
causal relation here is not of the familiar push/pull kind.
What gets employed in all of these kinds of cases is a theory of how relations of
causal influence works, based on our previous empirical observations of and interac-
8I owe the distinction between causal influences and causal claims to Strevens [112, particularly
section 2.23 and chapter 6], though I do not make use of Strevens’ particular account of causal
claims.
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tions with the world,9 and most of the time we are perfectly right to be sceptical of
a causal explanation where the cause and the effect are not contiguous in space and
time (this is why saying that I was in a lecture hall far away from the cup at the time
of its fall is a good alibi against the charge of being the direct cause of the breaking of
the cup). At the very least, if my causal explanation is such as to connect two events
that, on the relevant level of description, are not contiguous in space and time, it is
legitimate for me to question whether the explanation is omitting mention of events
that form part of the causal chain leading from the cause to the effect. That is to
say, presuming that the relevant level of description has been settled, the explanation
is not merely such as to make it possible to ask for more details, but such as to have
omitted any mention, at any level of description, of some event in the causal chain.
Cases of action at a distance — such as the Newtonian gravitational attraction
between masses — are particularly troublesome since the cause and effect are not
only non-contiguous in space but moreover are simultaneous. Given that we think
that causal processes take some amount of time (or that the cause has to precede the
effect)10, the option of saying that what we have is an explanation that is giving only
an indirect cause is not available.
Our theory of how causation works should, of course, be open to revision in the
same way that our other theories of how the world is ought to be, but we are right to
be wary of claims that a theory gives us a causal explanation of some phenomenon
when this requires a revision of our theory of causation and our only evidence that
such a revision is warranted comes from the theory under consideration. Given that
our interest in causal explanations stems from an interest in finding explanations
9Of course, our theory of causation could also derive from our other theories about the world.
If we hold, for example, that no causal influences can propagate faster than the speed of light, we
probably do not take this restriction to be part of the concept of causal influence, but rather take it
to follow from the theory of special relativity.
10Again, it does not need to be the case that it is part of the concept of causality that the cause
precedes the effect, etc., for this worry to be legitimate. It is enough that it is part of our theory of
causal influence that it does so.
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given in terms of an influence that we take to be instantiated in the world, whether
the influence we need to postulate in order to have a causal explanation is one that
we have good reason to believe really is instantiated is crucial.
On this way of viewing action at a distance worries it is conceptually possible to
have action at a distance. What is worrying about postulating it is that it does not
conform to our theory of how causation works.
Newtonian mechanics as applied to particles does well with the push/pull form
of causation mentioned earlier. However, explanations in terms of push/pull action
by contact are hard to come by for phenomena such as electromagnetic interactions.
Still, while considering propagation trough the aether, we find attempts to give ex-
planations in terms of this kind of causation. In particular, Hesse [46, pp 4 – 5]
mentions attempts by Kelvin to give mechanistic accounts of electromagnetic inter-
actions. Even if, as Hesse points out, these models were not taken realistically and
were not viewed as capturing a real, physically grounded, causal relation, the mere
fact that they were viewed as illuminating and that the possibility of giving a mecha-
nistic model was viewed as significant is enough to illustrate the desire for these types
of explanations, where the basic causal interactions are of the push/pull form.
However, the desire for such explanations seems to have shifted as the sciences
changed. As field theories started to become well developed and confirmed, the
criteria for causal interactions changed. While earlier causal interactions would have
been conceived of in terms of action by direct contact, i.e. pushes and pulls, now
causal interaction becomes subtler. Hesse [46, p 197] lists several conditions that
each separately were considered enough to conclude the action to be mediated and
unlike the gravitational action at a distance;
1. the propagation is affected by changes in the medium
2. the propagation takes time
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3. energy can be located between the interacting bodies
None of these hold in the case of gravitational attraction, so even on this modified
view, Newtonian gravitational attraction is still an action at a distance, and as such
requires a new, distinct, type of causal influence. In so far as this gives us empirical
reason to be worried about whether we really have uncovered the causal mechanism
behind this phenomena, we do, at least, have reason to be doubtful of whether we
have a causal explanation.
4.1.2 The worry restated
In section 4.1.1.2, I argued that action at a distance worries are, or at least were,
sensible worries as to whether a causal relation really exists in putative causal expla-
nations using Newton’s law of gravity. In so far as we are ever concerned with giving
causal explanations, action at a distance worries are relevant to explanatory status.
This means that there is a seemingly sensible attitude to take towards the ex-
planations involving Newton’s law of gravity that turns out to be surprising hard to
account for on the standard models of explanation. Given the worries about action at
a distance it seems perfectly sensible to doubt whether we have a causal explanation.
However, it also seems clear that Newton’s law of gravity does provide, in some sense,
an explanation of a wide range of phenomena. Contrary to the worries that arise from
the standard models failing to capture some feature, this problem arises since they
seem all seem to capture something true about explanations.
As I stated in section 4.1.1, on the deductive-nomological account of explanation
as well as on Woodward’s interventionist model, worries about action at a distance
seem entirely irrelevant as to the explanatory status of a putative explanation. Of
course, the deductive-nomological model does allow that there could be a subset of all
explanations that, while being explanations, are also such that the law involved gives
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us a causal relationship.11 This, however, is quite different from recognising the role of
causal explanations, in the sense of recognising that worries about action at a distance
can be worries about the absence of a relation that does explanatory work. Rather,
it is merely the recognition that a relation that allows what is clearly an explanation
to be classified as causal is missing. Similarly, the interventionist account could
distinguish between different types of causal relations (and a unificationist account
could do the same), but it will also not amount to recognising the worry about action
at a distance as relevant to considerations of explanatoriness.
On the various causal accounts of explanation, action at a distance worries are
relevant in so far as they are taken to be worries about whether or not a causal
relation holds in the case under consideration. However, if they are decided to be
serious worries then there is no room to also hold that we unquestionably do have
an explanation, albeit perhaps not a causal one. Of course, a causal account of
explanation does not need to claim to cover all kinds of explanations that there are,12
but the putative explanations involving Newton’s law of gravity seems to be the kind
of case where we can expect a causal explanation to exist. After all, this is a case of
explaining particular motion, where causal accounts typically do very well.
4.1.3 Dependence to the rescue
So how does the theory proposed in section 2.3.4 make option 3 of section 4.1.1
happen?
Here is the position that I would like to make it possible to hold. We can hold,
11Just as the deductive-nomolgical model also allows that there could be a subset of all expla-
nations that are ‘linear explanations’. That is, explanations where the law postulates a linear
relationship between the relevant variables.
12In order to be able to give an account of explanation that holds only for certain class of cases
some account of what distinguishes those cases are needed. It is particularly troublesome to claim
that the case of explanations involving Newton’s law of gravity is not one where we expect a causal
explanation, since, on face value, it looks so similar to the cases where a causal account must
demand that a causal explanation is required in order for their solution to the counter-examples to
the deductive-nomological account to hold.
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with good reason, that Newton’s law of gravity together with Newtonian mechanics
explains part of the behaviour of the tides, of massive objects on earth, of the celestial
planets, etc. We can also hold, with Newton, that all of these phenomena should be
attributed to the same cause. However, we also have good reason to be wary of
postulating action at a distance and so reason to be wary of thinking that we also
have a causal explanation where we have identified the physical cause of the behaviour
of the planets and the tides, etc.
How can we, while keeping a unified account of explanation, hold that the law of
gravity is capable of explaining motion under gravity while being sceptical of whether
the theory identifies what the physical cause of the motion is, all without denying
that causal information is relevant to explanation?
On the account of explanation that I have sketched we can explain the acceleration
of a particle with mass m acted on only by the force of gravity by appeal to Newton’s
law of universal gravitation.13
Let M be a variable for the distant mass and M a particular such mass. Similarly,
let r be a variable for the distance between m and M , and G a variable for the
13This also shows why the presence of a distant mass can explain the acceleration experienced by
a second mass, but why the presence of acceleration on a given mass cannot explain the mass of a
distant body. To see this, consider the trying to explain the mass of a distant body in this way.
Putative Explanation 14
EIP If m 6= 0, then a = MGr2
EIP If m = 0, then a = 0
EPF m 6= 0
EPF a = a
EPF G = G
EPF r = r
M M = M
Consider the case where it holds that M = M, but where it does not hold that m 6= 0 nor that
a = a. Here two of the EPFs are false while M holds without violating any of the EIPs, so the EIPs
holding does not guarantee the dependence of M on the EPFs.
Intuitively, this corresponds to the simple observation that the existence of the distant mass M is
not dependent on the existence (and therefore not dependent on the acceleration) of the other mass
m.
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gravitational constant, and r and G specific values for these variables.
Putative Explanation 15
EIP If m 6= 0, then a = MG
r2
EIP If m = 0, then a = 0
EPF m 6= 0
EPF M = M
EPF G = G
EPF r = r
M a = MG
r2
Now there is a feature, namely the relevant ratio, instantiated by the aspects of
events described in the EPFs such that there is no way for M to hold when all the
EIPs do and either this feature or the independent EPF does not. This allows us to
conclude that the EIPs, when true, guarantee the dependence of M on the EPFs. To
see this, consider making the first EPFs false by making m 6= 0 false. In this case, the
second EIP will come into force and demand that a = 0, which means that M cannot
hold, since we are trying to explain a specific non-zero value for the acceleration.
Hence, the first EPF cannot be one that is false when the EIPs and M hold. The only
other option is then to make the ratio instantiated by the last three EPFs false while
M and the EIPs still hold. This, however, is impossible to do since this violates the
consequent of the first EIP (and since m 6= 0 must hold, thereby violates the EIP).14
Does this mean that we also have a causal explanation? On the account I have pro-
posed this is far from clear. I imagine that a causal explanation would go something
like the following;
14There is a complication here that I am not addressing. There are two ways to interpret M in
this explanation. Either we think of M as a = a and further more as MGr2 , which demands that
M = M, G = G and r = r, or we think of M as just giving a value for the acceleration, a = a. In
the first case the acceleration depends on M,G, m 6= 0 and r independently, while in the second
case it merely depends on m 6= 0 independently of the other variables and on the ratio of M,G and
r given by MGr2 .
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Putative Explanation 16
EPF There is a distant mass M present.
EIP The presence of a distant mass, M, instantaneously causes a force, F, to be
exerted on the mass m.
EIP The force F exerted on the mass m causes the mass m to experience acceleration
a, given by a = a = MG
r2
.
M Mass m experiences acceleration a.
Action at a distance worries are concerns about whether the first EIP is true. We
can have doubts about the truth of this claim even if we accept the second claim that
the force of gravity exerted on the mass is the cause of it experiencing the acceleration
and that this acceleration is given by MG
r2
.
On this account it is possible to hold that Newton’s law is clearly explanatory as
a law, while at the same time holding it to be unlikely that we have discovered the
physical cause of this motion and thereby doubt the causal explanation. If we take
the aim of explanations to be to lay out relations of dependence between events (or
aspects of events), both lawlike dependence and causal dependence turns out to be
ways of doing this. This also means that it is possible to doubt whether we have one
kind of dependence without doubting whether we have the other. On this account of
explanation it is perfectly possible to not doubt that we have a lawlike explanation,
but to doubt that we have a causal one, while at the same time recognising that
causal relations can do genuinely explanatory work.15
4.2 General relativity
In the move from Newtonian theories to the theory of general relativity we find yet
another example of great explanatory progress and yet another example of showing
15As opposed to recognising merely that they are a way of classifying some other, for example
lawlike, relation, where that other relation is carrying all the explanatory power.
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seemingly disparate phenomena to be intimately related. The notion of inertial mo-
tion and the notion of motion under gravity have undergone some dramatic changes
in the shift from Newtonian gravity to the theory of general relativity. In particular,
whether or not we are provided with the resources to explain inertial motion has
changed drastically between the two theories.
As well as being of interest in its own right, this case also give us insight into
the nature of scientific explanation since the standard models of explanation run into
difficulties in capturing this case, and others like it. Here too we find an example
where none of the standard accounts of explanation can easily accommodate the
discussion as to the nature of the explanations that the account offers. In particular
we have a case of explanation of particular motion, in this case inertial motion, where
we would expect to find a causal explanation but yet find that there are conceptual
and, importantly, empirical objections to postulating a causal relationship. Though
here too we will seem to have a lawlike explanation while lacking a causal one it
differs in one important way from the case involving Newtonian gravity in section 4.1
and the case from quantum mechanics in section 4.3. Here a causal reconstruction
of the lawlike explanation shows itself to be inappropriate rather than it being the
case that a causal reconstruction seems possible but involves postulating a kind of
causal influence that is in serious conflict with our best theory of the nature of causal
influence.
4.2.1 Inertial motion in Newtonian mechanics
Inertial motion appears as a fundamental postulate — defined by the first law of
motion under an assumption of absolute space and time — rather than as a candidate
explanandum in Newton’s theory of motion.
Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right
line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impress’d thereon.
Newton [84, Book I, Axioms or Laws of Motion, p 19]
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While Newtonian mechanics together with the theory of gravity can explain much
of the observed phenomena, the framework seems incapable of being used in an ex-
planation of inertial motion itself. After all, the behaviour of a body that is subject
to no forced motion is an unexplained postulate of the theory and not something that
the theoretical framework can be used to explain.
Even if one is worried about the ability of the Newtonian framework to explain
inertial motion in general, one might be able to explain the motion of a particular body
moving inertially. On many accounts of explanation it would seem that the framework
can do such explanatory work. After all applying the law to a particular case would
give a clear case of subsuming that particular case under a law of nature and showing
why the behaviour was to be expected, thereby fitting the general intuition driving the
deductive-nomological account. It also seems to fit well with the intuition driving the
unificationist models of explanation, after all, the Newtonian framework, including
the first law, allows us to deduce a great range of varied types of phenomena from a
few stringent argument patterns. For causal accounts of explanation the situation is
less clear. It does not seems as if we are supplied with causal information in Newton’s
first law of motion. When we explain the motion of an unforced body by citing this
law we do not seem to be giving any causal information as to that motion. However,
if we allow absences to act as causes then it could be argued that the absence of
external forces is a cause of the motion having the features that it does.
Even in the cases above though, there would be something potentially misleading
about the claim that we have an explanation of inertial motion in the individual case
while not having an explanation of inertial motion in general. In particular, what
seem to be explain by applications of the first law is not why this particular motion is
inertial motion at all, but why this particular body moves in a particular way. That
is, even though we can, perhaps, explain the motion of the particle, that does not
amount to an explanation of why inertial motion is motion of that particular kind,
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even though it is an explanation of an individual instance of motion that as a matter
of fact is inertial.16 This is just an instance of the difference between explaining why
p is X and explaining why Y is X (even when p is Y ), but to make this clear it might
be helpful to put the case in this form. So, while Newton’s theory can, perhaps,
explain why the motion of the particle is the way that it is — namely, uniform in a
straight line with respect to absolute space — and the particle is moving inertially,
this does not explain why inertial motion is of the kind that the particular motion
of the particle is, namely, uniform motion in a straight line with respect to absolute
space.
There is yet a final alternative to consider. It is possible that it is simply true
by definition that inertial motion is geodesic motion, so that once the spatiotemporal
properties have been fixed, it is simply a mistake to ask for further explanation of
why force free particles behave as they do. As Brown notes, it does not seem to be
possible to simply postulate the mystery out of existence.
. . . there is a prima facie mystery as to why objects with no antennae
should move in an orchestrated fashion. If free particles have no antennae,
then they have no space-time feelers either. How are we to understand the
coupling between the particles and the postulated space-time structure?
Brown [14, p 24]
That is, nothing in Newtonain theories of motion tells us that it is simply in the
nature of particles to track the structure of spacetime.17
16Neither does this change when one considers a geometrised version of Newtonian theory. Here
too it is simply a postulate of the theory that inertial motion is along time-like geodesics. See for
example Malament [72, p 231 and forward] in his lecture notes on different ways of geometrising
Newtonian theory. Weatherall [119] gives a very interesting presentation of the assumptions that are
needed in order to derive something like a geodesic principle in Newtonian theories. However I do
not think that his discussion shows that inertial motion can be explained, rather than postulated,
in Newtonian theories. I will say more about this in appendix A.
17Earman [25, p 45 – 47] develops a view along these lines, but where certain spacetimes can be
ruled out on grounds of theory construction and simplicity. This strategy however, does not seem
to explain why inertial motion has a certain character as much as it gives a methodological reason
for not assuming more spacetime structure than is required to support the theory.
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4.2.2 A very brief introduction to general relativity
Einstein saw general relativity as solving two conceptual problems present in New-
tonian theories. First, general relativity gives us the theoretical equality of gravita-
tional and inertial mass that earlier we could only infer from the fact that objects
with different mass experience the same acceleration when in the same gravitational
field. As Einstein argued, ‘[i]t is . . . clear that science is fully justified in assigning
such a numerical equality only after this numerical equality is reduced to an equality
of the real nature of the two concepts.’ [27, p 56 – 57]
Second, the structure of spacetime plays a new role in general relativity. In New-
tonian dynamics space and time provided the backdrop for the motion of material
bodies, but these bodies did not in any way act on space or time. Einstein was
unhappy with what he saw as the assumption that spacetime is ‘independent in its
physical properties, having a physical effect, but not itself influenced by physical
conditions’ [27, p 55]. Assuming that space and time really do act in Newtonian
dynamics,18 this violation of the action-reaction principle was seen by Einstein to be
‘. . . contrary to the mode of thinking in science . . . ’ [27, p 55 – 56].
This problem does not occur in general relativity. The structure of spacetime
both acts upon matter and is acted upon by matter.19 The stress-energy tensor poses
a constraint on the way in which spacetime structure influences matter and matter
influences spacetime structure.






18Brown [14, p 140 and forward] questions this assumption.
19For now I will continue to talk of spacetime acting. We will see later that the situation is not
quite so straightforward.
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Where Ruv is the Ricci tensor, guv is the g-function, R is the scalar curvature and
Tuv is the stress-energy tensor. The stress-energy tensor can be viewed as recording
the ‘energy density, momentum density and stress as measured by any and all ob-
servers at that event . . . ’ (Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler) [82, p 131] for all events in
spacetime. The stress-energy tensor is, roughly speaking, the source of gravity.
From the field equations together with certain other assumptions20 one can derive
the motion of a free particle acted on only by gravity. It can be shown that the
equation of motion derived in part from the field equations is (approximately) motion
along time-like geodesics of the spacetime.21 The theory itself now plays a role in
explaining why it is that that free motion, in the sense of being acted upon only by
gravity will result in geodesic motion. Inertial motion is ‘straightest-line’ motion in
part because of the way the field equations work and so is, in part, a consequence of
the fundamental and distinctive laws of our theory.
. . . [I]s it not a pretensious parade of pomposity to say it [my insertion:
the derivation of the equations of motion] comes “from Einstein’s field
equation” . . . when it really comes from a principle so elementary and long
established as the law of conservation of 4-momentum? . . . However, in no
theory but Einstein’s is this principle incorporated as an identity . . . The
Maxwell field equations are so constructed that they automatically fulfil
and demand the conservation of charge; but not everything has charge.
The Einstein field equation is so constructed that it automatically fulfils
and demands the conservation of momentum-energy; and everything does
have energy. Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler [82, p 475]
Here our theory has the resources to explain why a free particle p moves along
geodesics of the spacetime. We can derive this motion from a particular application of
the field equation (together with assumptions about the energy condition). Following
the reasoning of Geroch and Jang [35], we first notice that in special relativity, in flat
spacetime, we find that contained in the the world tube of a body moving inertially
20I will say more about them below.
21See for example Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler [82, p 471– 480] for a sketch of such a derivation
or Geroch and Jang [35] or the discussion by Malament [73] for a derivation and discussion of the
assumptions that the derivation requires.
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there is an image of a curve that is a timelike geodesic. In doing so we have modelled
the freely moving body by a non-zero symmetric tensor field (energy-momentum field)
on Minkowski spacetime such that this tensor field is conserved and satisfies an energy
constraint such that the propagation of energy at points where energy-momentum
field is non-zero is timelike.
Once we move to a curved spacetime and the situation in general relativity the
reasoning from special relativity does not straightforwardly apply. However, if we
consider a curve that is surrounded by an arbitrarily small world tube modelled in
the same way as in the special relativity case and fulfilling the same energy condition,
we can make use of the result from special relativity by noting that the closer we get
to the curve in question, the closer we are to the situation in special relativity. If we
then fix a flat metric that coincides with the, possibly non-flat, metric on the curve
(where their respective derivatives coincide on the curve too), the results of special
relativity can be recovered with respect to the flat metric. Since we are considering an
arbitrarily small world tube, the curve that we started with has to be arbitrarily close
to a timelike geodesic with respect to the flat metric. Finally, since the two metrics
and their derivatives coincide on the curve, the curve is also a geodesic with respect
to the curved spacetime that we were originally interested in.
This is far from a rigorous summary of the reasoning in Geroch and Jang [35]
but I hope to have said enough to show that it is at least plausible that there is
an explanation of why inertial motion of particles is, approximately, motion along
geodesics of the spacetime.22
4.2.3 Where are the causal claims?
Assuming that we accept that there is, at least in certain situations, possible to
derive inertial motion in a non-trivial way from the theory of general relativity, while
22I say more about this proof in appendix A.
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the only derivations available in Newtonian theory are trivial ones (since the nature of
inertial motion is a postulate of the theory), what does this tell us about the difference
in the explanatory status of the two theories with respect to the geodesic principle?
The first qualification needed here is that the geodesic principle no longer seems to
hold unrestrictedly in general relativity. Rather what is potentially explained is why
and when it does hold.23 On a deductive-nomological account it seems straightforward
why this would be an explanatory improvement. After all, we used to not have a (non-
trivial) derivation of inertial motion from the laws of nature and now do have such a
derivation (at least for certain cases). On the unificationist account it is a little less
straightforward to judge whether or not we have an explanatory improvement. Part
of the difficulty here is that it is simply not a local matter whether or not a certain
derivation is an instance of an argument pattern that achieves unification, but there
is at least a prima facie case to be made for the general relativistic derivation to have
an advantage over the situation in Newtonian theories, namely that it reduces the
facts about the world that we have to take as brute by no longer making the principle
of geodesic motion24 such a fact. The situation is even more difficult to judge on a
causal account of explanation. The problem is that it is not clear the derivation can
be construed as giving causal information at all.
There is a common way of viewing the situation in general relativity that ends
up being somewhat misleading. Consider for example the following passage from
Strevens.
To understand Kepler’s laws, what is important above all is, first, to ap-
preciate that all planetary acceleration, that is, all change in planetary
motion, is caused by masses and their arrangement; . . . These claims are
true on both the Newtonian theory and on the general theory of relativity.
23This seems to be a common feature of explanations that we think of as explanations as to why
a certain law holds. Often what is explained is not strictly speaking why the law or principle as
originally conceived of holds, but rather why a more restricted generalization holds as well as it does.
See for example, Sklar [104].
24Or rather a suitably restricted version of it.
110
. . . [A]lthough Newtonian theory has false things to say about the under-
pinnings of the dependence - implicating as it does a force acting directly
between objects rather than by way of mass’s effect on the curvature of
spacetime . . . . Strevens [112, p 327– 328]
The picture that I take Strevens to have in mind in support of these causal claims
is one where the presence of a massive body causes the bending spacetime and that
that spacetime curvature in its turn causes bodies to deviate from the path that they
would have taken had spacetime been flat in order to travel shortest distance paths
in the new curved spacetime.
There seems to be, at least, three different strands of worries about trying extract a
causal story from the explanation in the previous section. One line of possible worries
arises from considerations as to what the relata of causal relationships are and the
fact that many of the main contenders do not naturally extend to treating spacetime
itself as such an entity. For example, taking the relata of causal relations to be events
seems to rule out spacetime playing this role. After all events are happenings in space
and time (or in spacetime).
A second and third line of worry arises not from metaphysical considerations
but from empirical worries about the nature of the relationship that comes from
attempting to simply read off a causal process from the derivation of the equations of
motion from the field equations. In particular Sklar points to features of the equation
that tell against reading the curvature of spacetime as being caused by the mass-
energy distribution, since the mass-energy distribution in turn depends on the metric
features of spacetime.
. . . [T]he stress-energy tensor . . . takes into account the distribution of
mass-energy in the world utilizing the metric features of this distribu-
tion. It is not only how much mass there is, but also how it is distributed
that counts . . . It is more enlightening to look upon the equation as giving
a lawlike “consistency” constraint upon the joint feature of the world —
spacetime structure and mass-energy distribution. Sklar [105, p 75]
The third worry comes with trying to identify what it is that allows us to think
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that an explanation has been given in the general relativistic case, but not in the
case of Newtonian theory. Brown gives an answer to the question that at first seems
tailored to the causal account, namely that the relevant difference between spacetime
in general relativity and previous theories is that here spacetime is a dynamical agent.
Do we want to say that the non-commutivity of velocity transformations in
SR, and the Thomas precession are caused, or explained by the existence
of curvature in relativistic velocity space? Do we likewise want to say
that the curvature of the configuration space is causing the motion of the
N-body system in mechanics to be what it is? Note a crucial difference
between these cases and general relativity: the geometry here is not a
dynamical agent, there are no non-trivial equations of motion which couple
it with matter. It is absolute. Brown [14, p 135]
The claim Brown seems to be making is that while absolute spacetime does not
explain, spacetime as a dynamical agent might. The account of explanation that
Brown seems to have in mind looks like a causal one and moreover it diagnoses the
difference between Newtonian theories and general relativisitc theories as a matter of
whether or not the spacetime involved is dynamic or not. However, construing the
difference in this case as straight-forwardly causal is problematic. In particular, as
Brown notes, the explanation of the previous section seems to proceed from a kind
of conservation law and as Malament notes [73] from an energy principle. Both of
which are types of cases where causal accounts run into problems.
. . . it cannot simply be in the nature of free test particles to ‘read’ the
projective geometry, or affine connection or metric, since in the general
theory their world-lines follow geodesics approximately, and then for quite
different reasons. Brown [14, p 24]
The worry here is not one that is arising directly from the structure of the field
equations not lending itself to a causal reconstruction, but rather that in particular
the explanation of inertial motion given does not.
The situation in the case of general relativity is in many way analogous to the
one that we found in the case of Newtonian gravity. While we do seem to have
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an explanation of the phenomenon under consideration, it seem possible to doubt
whether we have a causal relationship and a causal explanation available. Moreover,
though it is possible to raise conceptual worries as to the existence of the causal
relationship required in order to have a causal explanation, these worries do not
have to arise from primarily conceptual concerns but can be driven by empirical
considerations.
On the account of explanation that I have proposed the lawlike explanation, will,
in highly simplified form look something like 17 below.25
Putative Explanation 17
EIP Energy-momentum is locally conserved.
EIP There is a limit on the speed of propagation of energy.
EPF p is a free body.
M In so far as the body p is sufficiently small compared to the curvature it will move
along a geodesic of the spacetime.
Accepting 17 as explanatory does not force us to also accept the causal explanation
18. In particular we could reject either of the EIPs in the causal explanation (for
example, we see Sklar questioning the first and Brown questioning the second) without
questioning either of the EIPs in the explanation from laws above.
Putative Explanation 18
EPF There is a distant mass M present.
EIP The presence of a distant mass, M, causes spacetime curvature.
EIP The curved spacetime causes the mass m to move along a shortest distance curve
in curved spacetime rather than along a straight line in flat spacetime .
M Mass m experiences motion along a geodesic of curved spacetime.
25What follows is not really the explanation, but a simplification highlighting the EIPs that a
proof by Geroch and Jang [35] and discussed by Malament [72, section 2.5] [73] relies on.
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4.2.4 More trouble for causal accounts - debunking the explanatory sta-
tus of Newtonian gravity
The problems raised in the previous sections are particularly acute for causal
accounts of explanation not only since explanation of motion in general relativity
is a central case that turns out to be difficult to account for on the theory, but also
because of the role that some causal theorists, like Strevens, have put general relativity
to in accounting for the possibility of holding that Newtonian theories of gravity are
explanatory while doubting whether they provide anything like an accurate causal
explanation.
The worry that is motivating Strevens is somewhat different from the one that I
have outlined above since he is not directly concerned with the possibility of holding
Newton’s theory of gravity to be capable of figuring in explanations while doubting
whether those explanations are causal. The problem that he is addressing is how a
causal account should handle the worry that Newtonian theory seems explanatory
even though it seems to present a gross distortion of the causal influences. As it turns
out though, his suggestions could be adapted in order to give a general account of
why we find some of the applications of the theory explanatory even while doubting
the causal story provided by the theory — that is Strevens can be seen to be giving
a debunking story of the kind I set aside in section 4.1.1 — and it is therefore worth
spending some time considering his line of argument in detail, even though his main
concern diverges somewhat from mine.
The problem that Strevens is addressing directly arises since even once we become
convinced that Newtonian gravity fundamentally misrepresents the nature of grav-
ity, and in particular grossly misrepresents the causal influences at play, the theory
nonetheless retains much of its explanatory force. Since the kairetic account bases
explanatory power with the causal mechanism, or rather, the causal influences that
are difference makers for the target phenomenon, a gross distortion of the causal influ-
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ences at play would seem to make for a very poor explanation. In order to account for
the seeming discrepancy between theory and intuition Strevens argues that the cru-
cial features of Newtonian theory that allows it to be explanatory is that ‘. . . the false
content of the explanation, first, concerns something explanatorily irrelevant and, sec-
ond, represents a relatively simple or default assumption about that irrelevant factor’
[112, p 329].
According to Strevens, the irrelevance of the false content in this case is relative
to a framework. If the false content is made part of the explanatory framework it is
by fiat explanatory irrelevant (since the framework acts by framing the explanatory
request with a ‘given that . . . ’ clause anything in the explanatory framework is fixed
by stipulation and cannot be a difference maker). We can understand how it is that
Newton’s theory of gravity strikes us as explanatory, at least with respect to certain
phenomena like the motion of the planets, by understanding how it is related to
what would be able to explain that motion canonically, namely the post-Newtonian
explanation that remains silent on the mechanism, or, makes the mechanism part
of the explanatory framework. That is, what is being explained is why ‘. . . given an
inverse-square dependence. . . ’ [112, p 329] the planets move in the way that they
do. Strevens’ basic idea is that the explanations that make use of Newton’s theory of
gravity are, almost, making the Newtonian theory part of the explanatory framework,
since they are nearly the canonical post-Newtonian explanations. Moreover, he thinks
that the false content that is postulated is a simple or default assumption to make
about what ought to have been left a as a black box in the explanation.
In order to get a grip on this way of accounting for the explanatoriness of Newto-
nian gravity we need to first see how it is that the post-Newtonian explanation, that
simply makes a reference to the form of the dependence, does explanatory work. The
idea here is that it is corrected about the fact that the arrangement of mass is causally
responsible for the motion due to gravity and that this relationship is approximately
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given by a = MG
r2
.
. . . [A]lthough Newtonian theory has false things to say about the under-
pinnings of the dependence — implicating as it does a force acting directly
between objects rather than by way of mass’s effect on the curvature of
space-time — what it says about the form of the dependence relation and
the properties so related is correct. Strevens [112, p 328]
As I argued in section 4.2.3, the key claim that Strevens relies on, namely that
the mass (or better matter in general) causes the spacetime curvature which in turns
causes the motion is far from straightforward. However, I will set this aside and grant
for the purposes of this discussion that — even if we cannot easily extract a causal
story from the general relativistic explanation — the claim that the mass distribution
is a causal influence on the motion of the planets is true.
If this is all that we can claim, however, the explanatory power of Newton’s theory
of gravity still seems puzzling. After all, merely including a causal influence and
being correct about the form of the underlying causal relationships is not in general
anywhere near enough for to make for a good explanation. Of course, Strevens is
aware that merely including a causal influence is not enough to have an explanation,
after all his project can be seen as one that provides an account for selecting the
causal influences that can do explanatory work in certain set of circumstances.26 It
seems like most of the work will have to be done by the claim that the form of the
(causal) dependence is right.
Merely getting the form of the dependence right does not, however, seem to be
strong enough a condition to account for the explanatory force of the kind of New-
tonian explanations that Strevens has in mind. To see this consider for example the
following toy situation. Imagine that the universe consists of four different kind of
particles, let’s call them red, blue, yellow, and green particles. Moreover the laws and
initial conditions that are in operation are;
26The general account that Strevens develops also allows for some distortion of the causal influ-
ences.
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1. Red particles spontaneously decay into green and blue particles with a certain
half-life (say 80 years).
2. Blue particles spontaneously decay into yellow particles with a certain half-life
(say 50 years).
3. The initial condition of the universe contains only red particles.
Figure 4.1: The particle decay diagram following the toy fundamental laws
Let us say that we are attempting to explain the existence of a blue particle and
that in analogy to the Newtonian case that Strevens considers we have correctly iden-
tified a cause of the existence of blue particles, but have otherwise radically mistaken
the causal mechanism at play. Our explanation might go as follows, the presence of
a red particle at a time shortly before the appearance of a green particle in around
the same location caused there to be an interaction between the red particles trace
aura that contaminated that location and the green particles aura that is currently
presented there. This interaction generated a yellow particle which in its turn decayed
spontaneously into a blue particle.
Figure 4.2: The alternative interaction hypothesis
Based on this theory of the underlying mechanism we correctly identify the fol-
lowing form of the underlying causal mechanism;
117
• A blue particle is created if and only if a red particle was present at a location
where a green particle shortly afterwards was present too.
Now, according to the laws, it is true that the existence of red particles are a cause of
the existence of blue particles, which our story correctly identifies, but not because
they interact with green particles to produce yellow ones. Rather they decay to
produce such particles. Moreover it is also the case that the form of the underlying
causal dependence relations identified above holds of the real causal mechanisms
underlying the production of blue particles. Yet, in this case, we do not seem to have
a very good explanation at all. We seem to have an explanation with, if any at all,
only very limited explanatory value.
Now, Strevens is not claiming to offer, in the section that I cite above, a completely
general account of how it is that an explanation that radically distorts the causal
mechanism, in a way that makes a difference, can nonetheless be explanatory. What
I take this example to show is that the account that he gives in the case of Newtonian
gravity is not sufficiently precise to allow us to straightforwardly generalise it and to
thereby see what it is about Newtonian gravity, unlike the toy example, that allows
it to do explanatory work.
One way of addressing this objection would be to impose some conditions on
what kind of information about the form of the underlying causal influences counts.
However it cannot simply be that there there are casual influences between all of the
factors mentioned or that what is said about the form of these influences is approx-
imately true, since all of the above hold in the example above (moreover, we cannot
demand that the form of the influences is approximately true in all circumstances
since that will not be the case for Newtonian gravity either).
We could of course demand that the form both includes only the true causal in-
fluences and that it gives the correct story not only about the relationships that they
stand in but how the target phenomena causally depends on the various contribu-
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tions. This however would seem to undermine the goal of introducing the notion that
merely identifying a causal influence and giving the correct form of it, even when
radically mistaken about what the underlying causal mechanism is, can make for a
good explanation.
This makes it very difficult to see how we could regard explanations using New-
ton’s theory of gravity as explanatory while having very good reason to regard the
causal explanation to be radically mistaken, as we seem to do, while also holding a
causal account of explanation. By dropping Strevens assumption that the relevant
dependence has to be causal this is no longer a problem. Moreover, this allows us
to explain what it is about the toy examples that precludes it from being a good
explanation while the Newtonian explanation can be a good one. What makes the
difference is that the Newtonian theory of gravity is both approximately true and
lawlike, unlike the the, approximately true, but non-lawlike statement about the toy
example. This is what makes Newtonian gravity capable of providing a relation of
dependence between the particular facts in the explanans and the target phenomenon
in the explanandum, while the form described for the toy example above is unable
to provide such a relationship of dependence. Of course, none of this is surprising
or new. We have long known that deductions from any old true statement, even if
it is one that is a true universal generalisation, are not in general explanatory. The
difficulty encountered by focusing only on causal dependence is just that the straight-
forward use of the lawlikeness of Newtonian gravity is not available in accounting for
its explanatory power and the availability of a full causal history is what is called in
question.
Even though Strevens goes on to develop an explicitly causal account of explana-
tion (both for explanations of particular facts and regularities), some of his comments
are suggestive of the kind of change that I have been advocating. In particular when
first discussing Railton’s example of explaining the stop of gravitational collapse by
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appeal to the Pauli exclusion principle27 he suggests that what allows the Pauli ex-
clusion principle to explain is a relation that is ‘... like causal influence, some kind of
metaphysical dependence relation’ [112, p 178]. In the end, however, he argues that
the explanation of the Pauli exclusion principle (as well as the stop of the collapse)
is a mathematical one.
The explanation of the exclusion principle (or rather, a part thereof) . . . is
much like the explanation of more positive physical principles such as the
conservation of energy and momentum: it is in essence a mathematical
explanation, showing that trajectories that conform to the fundamental
laws will have certain mathematical properties. Strevens [112, p 281]
So even though Strevens earlier raises the possibility of there being non-causal forms
of dependence, here it seems as if these other kinds of dependence are primarily (and
maybe exclusively) mathematical dependence.28
The view that Strevens seems to settle on is one that, though it does not deny
that there could be relations of dependence that are not causal, still demands that
27This example is often taken to be troubling to causal accounts since the explanation of the stop
seems to be simply that there are no further states that are allowed by the Pauli exclusion principle
rather than some causal influence.
28I think that the kind of explanation that Strevens has in mind here comes with its own set of
difficulties. Of course, some of these problems might go away altogether, or be given a plausible
debunking story given an account of mathematical explanation. However, it is often claimed that
conservation laws are explained by symmetries and this kind of explanation fits Strevens account
much less well than explanations of conservation laws by deducing them from the allowed trajectories.
Perhaps what is intended here is that derivation of conservation laws from symmetry considerations
counts as showing that the trajectories that conform to the fundamental laws will have a certain
mathematical property. However, it seems rather unnatural to think of this type of explanation as
a round about way of codifying information about the trajectories of particles and then deriving a
new mathematical constraint from this, rather than to think of the trajectories of particles having
the features that they do because of the features of the laws. Moreover we often take conservation
laws and the Pauli exclusion principle to be able to explain the motion of particular particles. If
these laws are merely the codification of the behaviour of particles, or if these laws are explained
by the trajectories of particles, it is hard to see how they could in turn explain features of these
trajectories.
Strevens is aware of a version of this problem, but does not propose a direct solution to it.
‘. . . you might consider it strange that, on the causal-mechanical thesis, a law is explained by its
own constituents, so that it in effect explains itself’ [112, p 290]. Rather, Strevens seems to hold
that to explain a law is simply nothing more than making this clear and, so to speak, show that the
law does not wear its nature on its sleeve. ‘Explaining the law, then, is a matter of abandoning this
coyness. . . ; it is an act of metaphysical revelation, in which the basing patterns and aspects of the
fundamental laws that constitute the explanandum are made plain’ [112, p 292].
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what qualifies, for example, mathematical relations of dependence to do explanatory
work is ultimately their relationship to causal relations of dependence.
In summary, it is by grasping mathematical dependences and indepen-
dences that you grasp causal dependences and independences. The ability
of mathematics to represent relations of causal dependence – wherever it
comes from – is what qualifies it as an explanatory tool. Strevens [112, p
331]
I am suggesting that the first alternative put forward by Strevens is a more promis-
ing route to follow than the one he eventually heads down.
4.2.5 A short digression into ontology
In the literature on explanations of motion in general relativity the blame of the
situation noted in 4.2.3 is not typically laid at the feet of the causal account of
explanation.
To summarise, it seems as if general relativity does explain inertial motion whereas
previous theories have not. However, it is far from clear that we have a causal ex-
planation and the question now arises how this is to be accounted for. As I noted in
section 4.2.3, Brown gives an answer to the question of whether ‘. . . space-time expla-
nations of inertia is not an exercise in redundancy’ [14, p 24] that seems tailored to
the causal account, namely that the relevant difference between spacetime in general
relativity and previous theories is that here spacetime is a dynamical agent.
Do we want to say that the non-commutivity of velocity transformations in
SR, and the Thomas precession are caused, or explained by the existence
of curvature in relativistic velocity space? Do we likewise want to say
that the curvature of the configuration space is causing the motion of the
N-body system in mechanics to be what it is? Note a crucial difference
between these cases and general relativity: the geometry here is not a
dynamical agent, there are no non-trivial equations of motion which couple
it with matter. It is absolute. Brown [14, p 135]
The claim Brown seems to be making is that while absolute spacetime does not
explain, spacetime as a dynamical agent might. While I agree that general relativity
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really does explain inertial motion,29 I do not think that the crucial difference between
general relativity and earlier theories lies in the distinction between kinematics and
dynamics. As long as we hold that being ‘explained by’ is tied to being ‘caused by’
the fact that spacetime is a dynamical agent in general relativity does not, in and of
itself, make it explain where absolute spacetime did not. While being a dynamical
agent might be required for being even a candidate cause for the motion of particles,
the worry raised earlier, namely that the field equations do not give us a causal story
and, as Brown argues, without the derivation from them we do not have good reason
to think that the motion of particles is caused by the spacetime structure at all,
remains.
There is tension between what I take to be Brown’s tacit acceptance of a causal
account of explanation, his denial that we can take the structure of spacetime to
explain inertial motion of particles by default,30 and his claim that general relativity
explains intertial motion. Brown does not address this directly, but I think that
these considerations are what pushes him, if only tentatively, towards regarding guv
as a physical field rather than the metric of spacetime. Regarding guv as a physical
field allows it to at least be a candidate for playing the kind of causal role that is
required in order to have an (albeit partial) causal explanation of this motion.31 As
Brown discusses, Rovelli [93] relies on a similar distinction when he draws out the
difference between the situation in general relativity and earlier theories and argues,
29Other passages makes it clear that Brown does think that general relativity explains inertial
motion.
Inertia, in GR, is just as much a consequence of the field equations as gravitational
waves. For the first time since Aristotle introduced the fundamental distinction be-
tween natural and forced motions, inertial motion is part of the dynamics. It is no
longer a miracle. Brown [14, p 163]
30That is by taking inertial motion to be, by definition, motion along timelike geodesics of the
spacetime.
31Note in particular that this move addresses the objection that spacetime is not the kind of
entity that can enter into causal relationships and the objection that spacetime (in general) is a
mere codification of the motions of particles.
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again tentatively, for thinking of guv as representing a physical field (the second of
the two options that he outlines).
Einstein’s identification between gravitational field and geometry can be
read in two different alternative ways:
i. as the discovery that the gravitational field is nothing but a local
distortion of spacetime geometry; or
ii. as the discovery that spacetime geometry is nothing but a manifestation
of a particular physical field, the gravitational field. Rovelli [93, p 193]
One of the considerations that Rovelli relies on in arguing in favour of the second
option is the notion that taking guv to represent a physical field fits well with it
being responsible for the motion of objects, which is the kind of phenomena, as I
noted earlier, where we take causal explanations to be possible. If we think that
explanation has to be given in these terms and that spacetime geometry is unable to
provide such an explanation we have compelling reason to adopt the second option
that he presents.
However, as I argued in 4.2.3 we have reason to think that we cannot construe
the explanation of the equations of motion from the field equations as fully causal.
If we accept that it is conceptually possible to be convinced by these arguments and
to simultaneously accept that the field equations do explanatory work then we have
been forced to accept that it is at least not conceptually incoherent to hold that some
explanations are not fully causal. Given this the move from the claim that we have
an explanation to the claim that we have a causal relation seems to be on shaky
ground.32
None of this is to deny that there is a difference in the explanatory nature of
absolute and dynamical spacetime, but for the explanation of the motion of particles
it is not that the latter can cause motion while the former cannot that is the important
32I am not here trying to argue that we should take Rovelli’s first option rather than the second
one. There are other considerations that will bear on this choice that I have not discussed at all
in this section. I simply mean to argue that one kind of argument for the second option is not
convincing.
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difference. On the account I have proposed in this paper the difference is rather that
the field equations, together with an assumption about the limit on the speed of the
propagation of energy, give us a relation of dependence between motion of particles
and the structure of spacetime where before we had none and this consideration
remains silent on the ontological question of whether general relativity ought to be
interpreted as, speaking loosely, a reduction of gravity to spacetime geometry or as a
reduction of spacetime geometry to gravity.
4.3 Quantum Mechanics
Quantum mechanics offers an example of a third kind of case where, even though
the domain is one where we would expect a causal explanation to be available and we
have reasons to doubt whether or not a causal explanation is available, it nonetheless
seems as if we have an explanation. This case is made somewhat less straightforward
as an example since depending on what interpretation of quantum mechanics one
adopts (or perhaps better which broadly quantum mechanical theory one adopts)
what one takes the fundamental laws to be differs. I will stick to what I take to
be the standard presentation, with behaviour under measurements singled out as
falling under different laws, and I will not discuss the situation in Everettian quantum
mechanics, or de Broglie-Bohm’s pilot wave theory.
In order to get a grasp on the case that I want to discuss in this section we do
not need to establish a whole lot of quantum mechanics, but a few things will turn
out to be important. Within the orthodox interpretation the state of the system is
described by a vector |φ >. Moreover there are operators associated with physical
quantities of the state and the possible outcomes of measurements of these physical
quantities are known as the eigenvalues of the operator. A vector representing the
state of the system that is such that the only effect of being acted upon by one of
the operators associated with a physical quantity is to be multiplied by a constant
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is said to be in an eigenstate of that operator and the constant is the associated
eigenvalue. We will also assume that a system is in a definite state with respect to a
physical quantity, that is in a state corresponding to one of the possible outcomes of
a measurement of the physical quantity, if and only if the system is in an eigenstate
of the operator associated with that observable. Finally, |φ > evolves in accordance
with two different kinds of laws
1. Schrödinger’s equation which describes the time evolution of |φ > in a linear
way and applies most of the time, apart from when
2. the collapse law governs the behaviour of the system. This occurs when a
measurement takes place and forces the system into one of the eigenstates of
the quantity measured (regardless whether the system was previously in such
an eigenstate).
4.3.1 A very brief introduction to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen style thought
experiments
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [28] proposed a famous thought experiment intended
to challenge the completeness of quantum mechanics. That is, the thought experiment
was taken to challenge the idea that ‘. . . every element of the physical reality . . . [has]
a counterpart in the physical theory ’ [28, p 777]. Here I will not focus on the their
discussion directly since much of it is centred around their criterion of reality,33 but I
will instead focus on Bell’s argument that the assumption of local interaction in the
EPR argument is what ‘. . . creates the essential difficulty’ [6, p 14].
33They provide what they take to be a sufficient condition physical reality
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element




The kind of EPR style set-up that Bell considers is one suggested by Bohm and
Aharonov [8]. Here we consider two spin one half particles (such as electrons) prepared
in a state known as the singlet spin state.
1√
2
(| ↑>1 | ↓>2 −| ↓>1 | ↑>2) (4.1)
In the notation that I will use here | ↑> signifies spin +1
2
(along the relevant axis)
and | ↓> signifies spin −1
2
(along the relevant axis). In general | ↑>1 | ↓>2 will be
used to indicate that particle 1 is in spin state +1
2
and particle 2 is in spin state −1
2
.
The singlet spin state has some features that are strange from a classical mechanical
perspective. The singlet spin state is an example of two particles in what is called
an entangled state. Much like in classical mechanics it is possible to have a situation
in quantum mechanics where we describe the joint state of two separate systems,
but where the two systems are nonetheless such that it is possible to individually
specify their states (with respect to some physical quantity). In the EPR style set-
up, however, the two particles, in spite of intuitively being two different systems, do
not have independently characterisable states. In this set-up the particles are not
individually in an eigenstate of spin along any axis and they do not have a definite
value of spin. This state has another unusual feature. We have not had to be very
careful in specifying along which axis the spin that we are talking of is. This is not
mere carelessness, but rather the spin singlet state as characterised in (4.1) holds for
the spin along any axis.
We can now consider sending these particles as far away from another as we like
and performing a measurement of spin, say along the z-axis, on one of the particles
and a little later performing a similar measurement on the other particle. What we
expect to see by applying the laws governing evolution of φ (in this case the law
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governing the behaviour during a measurement) is that the measurement of the first
particle will detect it to be in either state | ↑> or state | ↓> (with equal probability).
However, we also know that if the first particle is found to be in state | ↑> the other
particle will be in state | ↑> and vice versa. Somehow the particles move from an
entangled state where neither has definite z-spin to a state where they both do and
their respective spins along the z-axis are anti-correlated.
So far their anti-correlation is not (that) much of a mystery. After all we could
imagine that there were factors not mentioned in the description of the state (so
that the quantum mechanical description was not complete) that would, if they were
spelled out, specify the common cause of the measurement results to track back to
the period when the two particles were interacting. Alternatively, the description
could be incomplete at the stage of measurement and perhaps there is some pro-
cess by which the measurement on particle one affects the outcome of the second
measurement. The difficulty with the second option is that we can take these two
measurements to be separated by as large a distance as we like (at least in theory)
and in particular we could send the particles far enough away such that we could not
expect the measurement one particle one to be able to causally affect particle two
and the outcome of that measurement unless the influence propagated faster than the
speed of light.34
The general moral from Bell’s theorem is that, under certain plausible assump-
tions, there can be no local physically realistic theory that captures all the phenom-
ena of quantum mechanics (see for example Shimony [103]).35 Bell’s theorem is often
spelled out in terms of a conflict about the probability of certain outcomes, but here I
will follow Mermin [81] in order to show the conflict in a single run of the experiment.
34Theoretically the change in state of the second particle should be instantaneous.
35The caveat is important. For example we will suppose that there is a single measurement
outcome. We will also, tacitly, suppose that the at the time of the production of the particles their
states can not be influence by what future measurements they will encounter. In section 4.3.3 I will
discuss another way in which to avoid the worry of superluminal causation, though this solution still
makes use of a kind of non-locality.
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Instead of considering two spin half particles we consider three spin half particles
in the following state.36
1√
2
(| ↑z>1 | ↑z>2 | ↑z>3 −| ↓z>1 | ↓z>2 | ↓z>3) (4.2)
As before we consider sending these three particles off to (three) separate measure-
ment apparatuses. Furthermore we specify that these measurement apparatuses have
two different settings, one that measures spin in the x-direction and one that measures
spin in the y-direction. We can also make sure that the measurement events are at
spacelike separation.37 Mermin points out that for this kind of set-up the following
two statements hold:
1. If one detector is set to measure spin along the x-axis and the other two are set
to measure spin along the y-axis then the outcomes of the three measurements
will contain either
(a) three spin up results
or
(b) one spin up result and two spin down results.
2. If all detectors are set to measure spin along the x-axis then the outcomes of
the three measurements will contain either
(a) two spin up results and one spin down result
or
(b) three spin down results.
We can see that statement 1 is true by considering the case where the apparatus
that measures the spin of particle one is set to measure spin along the x-axis and the
other two are measuring spin along the y-axis. We can rewrite the entangled spin
36I will be following Mermin’s general presentation, but I should note that his presentation of the
set-up in terms of quantum mechanics is more abstract than what I will do here.
37We can also make sure that the decision as to which measurement will be made is not settled





(| ↑x>1 | ↑y>2 | ↑y>3 +| ↑x>1 | ↓y>2 | ↓y>3 +| ↓x>1 | ↑y>2 | ↓y>3 +| ↓x>1 | ↓y>2 | ↑y>3)
Here we can see that there are four different sets of possible measurement outcomes
(all equally probable). One has three spin up results and the other three have one
spin up result and two spin down results, so statement 1 is borne out.38
For statement 2 we can see that it too is true by considering the case where all
detectors are set to measure spin along the x-axis. For this case we can rewrite the
spin state (4.2) as
1√
4
(| ↑x>1 | ↓x>2 | ↑x>3 +| ↓x>1 | ↑x>2 | ↑x>3 +| ↑x>1 | ↑x>2 | ↓x>3 +| ↓x>1 | ↓x>2 | ↓x>3)
Here there are again four different sets of possible measurement outcomes (also, again
all equally probable). One possibility has three spin down results and the other three
have two spin up results and one spin down result. So statement 2 is also true.
We can now see if a local common cause could have fixed the values of spin of
the various particles in such a way as to give rise to the generalisations described
in statement 1 and 2. Whatever the common cause turns out to look like in order
to be able to determine the outcomes of the measurements it will need to set how
the particles are going to respond to both an measurement along the x-axis and a
measurement along the y-axis (since we can specify that the settings are changed
during flight). Following Mermin [81, p 732] the eight instructions that would lead
to the generalisation expressed in 1 can be summarised as in table 4.1.
So for example, if the state is the fifth possible way of satisfying statement 1 we
38We really need to check this for setting the second detector to measure spin along the x-axis and
the other two to measure spin along the y-axis, but the same reasoning applies (mutatis mutandis).
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Table 4.1: Instructions that satisfy statement 1
Possibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Measurement
x-axis ↑1↑2↑3 ↑1↓2↓3 ↓1↑2↓3 ↓1↓2↑3 ↑1↓2↓3 ↑1↑2↑3 ↓1↓2↑3 ↓1↑2↓3
y-axis ↑1↑2↑3 ↑1↓2↓3 ↓1↑2↓3 ↓1↓2↑3 ↓1↑2↑3 ↓1↓2↓3 ↑1↑2↓3 ↑1↓2↑3
know that if the detector that particle one encounters is set to measure spin in the
x-direction then the measurement will result in a verdict of spin up and if the detector
is set to measure spin in the y-direction then the result will be spin down.39
Let us now see if any of the possibilities that satisfy statement 1 also satisfy
statement 2. After all, the quantum mechanical set-up that we started this discussion
with was one that gave rise to outcomes that satisfied both. Since in this scenario
all three detectors are set to measure spin along the x-axis we only have to consider
the top row of table 4.1 above. None of these give us three spin down results nor
two spin up and one spin down result. Now we have the result that we wanted; a
common cause that works by specifying how the various particles would act were they
to encounter a detector of spin along the x-axis or along the y-axis can not capture
the quantum mechanical situation described above.
So far, we were only considering a deterministic hidden variable case. However,
we can easily see how moving to the stochastic hidden variable case is not going to
39Spelling this out a bit more for a couple of other possibilities we find the following conditionals.
1. If the detector measures spin along the x-axis then particle one, two and three will report
spin up.
If the detector measures spin along the y-axis then particle one, two and three will report
spin up.
2. If the detector measures spin along the x-axis then particle one will report spin up, particle
two and three will report spin down.
If the detector measures spin along the y-axis then particle one will report spin up, particle
two and three will report spin down.
3. If the detector measures spin along the x-axis then particle one and three will report spin
down and particle two will report spin up.
If the detector measures spin along the y-axis then particle one and three will report spin
down and particle two will report spin up.
And so on for the other five possibilities.
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help here. After all, adding a stochastic element will simply mean that coordination
of the outcomes at the source of production will be impossible and unless we are
willing to accept that the truth of statements 1 and 2 is simply a matter of chance it
does not introduce a new possibility for coordination of the outcomes.
4.3.2 More causal doubts
Whether or not we take the Bell theorem to show that any physical theory that
captures the phenomena of quantum mechanics has to be non-local, we have very
good reason to be wary of thinking that we have a causal explanation of the spin
of one particle in an EPR set-up in terms of the spin of the other particle within
standard quantum mechanics. In particular, if the measurement of the two spins
are at spacelike separation from one another we have very good reason, in part from
special relativity,40 to think that there is no causal influence between the two events.
Let us consider a case where two spin half particles are prepared in an entangled
state 1√
2
(| ↑z>1 | ↓z>2 −| ↓z>1 | ↑z>2) and sent away to two detectors where the
spin along the z-axis is measured. Moreover we can stipulate that the detectors are
separated in such a way that at the time when the measurement is made on particle
one particle two is still in flight and far enough away that no influence that does not
propagate at superluminal speed could connected the two. For this kind of situation
we can consider explanation 19 below.
Putative Explanation 19
EIP If the measurement on particle 1 returns ↑ then the measurement on particle 2
returns ↓.
EIP If the measurement on particle 1 returns ↓ then the measurement on particle 2
returns ↑.
EPF The measurement on 1 returns ↑.
40I will be more specific later in this section about the various roles that I take special relativity
to be able to play in informing our theory of causal influences.
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M The measurement on 2 returns ↓.
Explanation 19 seems like a perfectly good explanation.41 In particular, it seems
possible to hold this to be an explanation of the measurement outcome on particle
2 in terms of the measurement outcome of particle 1 and to doubt that there is a
causal connection between the two measurement outcomes without being involved in
conceptual confusion.
Again, there seems to be several different lines of reasoning that could lead one to
doubt the existence of a causal connection between the two measurement outcomes.
There are again the option of purely conceptual or a priori objections to the existence
of action at a distance. However there are also a number of empirically based worries
that are based on, or at least motivated by, considerations from special relativity.
The first worry of this kind comes from taking special relativity to forbid the accel-
eration of subluminal particles to superluminal speeds.42 This already gives us good
reason to be wary of postulating a causal interaction between the two measurement
outcomes since causal interactions in terms of energy or matter transmission of any
41Some of the issues that I discussed in section 3.1.1 are relevant here. On a common conception
of the nature of time it is important in order for the EIPs described in explanation 19 to seem
lawlike, and hence to be able to provide a connection between the two measurement outcomes,
that particle 1 is measured before particle 2. If particle 1 is not measured before particle 2, the
statements will (typically) be mere true generalisations. Of course, it is not surprising that the
temporal order should be important in these kind of quantum mechanical explanations. After all,
in general our theories of quantum mechanics are postulated under the assumption of a preferred
frame of reference, a notion of simultaneity, and an assumed direction of time. This is clearly needed
in order to be able to apply a collapse law (or a stochastic law acting as a substitute for the collapse
law) as well as in order to be able to formulate de Broglie-Bohm’s pilot wave theory. The many
worlds theory might be an exception. Here when there is a measurement there will be branching. In
this kind of situation putative explanation 19 might simply cease to be explanatory. I can see two
different ways of thinking of the situation in this case. On the one hand we could think of ourselves
as asking whether or not it is the case that the measurement result on particle 1 explains the result
on particle two and judging them to be mere epiphenomena and so judge there to be a common
explanation (the branching) explaining both of the states, but no connection allowing the EIPs in
19 to genuinely be lawlike. Here the inference looks like one of merely locating which branch we are
concerned with. On the other hand we could imagine that the branching is only responsible for the
occurrence of some splitting or other and that the explanation of the particular pairing of, say, a
measurement that returns ↑ on particle 1 with a result of ↓ on particle 2 is still to be attributed to
a lawlike connection between them. In this case we seem to be back to the kind of situation that
holds for the other theories, though now applied only within a branch.
42We need to add the plausible assumption that there are only finite amounts of energy available
for such acceleration.
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kind that we know of is ruled out. Maudlin points out that this does not make the
influence in explanation 19 incompatible with special relativity.
. . . [A]ll the usual matter we are familiar with . . . cannot travel faster than
light. And all massless particles are constrained to travel at light speed.
If the only means of . . . causal influence employ such particles, we would
already have a fundamental conflict between the predictions of quantum
mechanics and Relativity. It is true that the only means of causal in-
fluence we know of employ . . . particles . . . which cannot break the light
barrier. But all we can infer from this is that the photons43, however they
communicate, do not do so by sending electrons or other normal matter
between them. Maudlin [76, p 70]
I think that Maudlin’s point is exactly right, however, being unlike any causal in-
fluence we know of is already a very good reason to doubt the existence of a causal
connection, even though it is a defeasible one. Moreover, here we have theoretical
reasons to think that the kind of transmission of matter that would be compatible
with special relativity would not only have to be of a kind that we have not yet
discovered, but it would have to be radically different from the matter that we know
of since it would have to be travelling at superluminal speeds and impossible to slow
down to subluminal speeds.44
The second worry also arises partly from within a relativistic framework. After
all if we postulate superluminal causation within a relativistic setting we seem to
open the door to paradoxes associated with causal loops. This worry is a mix of
empirically driven concerns and a priori ones. The unacceptability of causal loops is
argued for on a priori grounds, but the worry that superluminal causes could give rise
to such loops is argued for on empirical (theoretical) grounds. I should note that it
is not clearly the case that the mere existence of superluminal causal influences gives
rise to causal loops. Maudlin [76, p 154 – 158] argues that even in the cases where
superluminal causation does not pick out a prefered frame of reference the possibility
43My comment; this would be the spin half particles in our example.
44Again under an assumption of finite energy.
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of causal loops that can create paradoxes is not guaranteed since superluminal cau-
sation (unlike superluminal signalling) does not have to involve controllable events.
Since the loops that create the paradoxes involve at least two superluminal causes,
the idea is that the coordination needed between the two of them is not guaranteed
in the causal case. There is still a worry that remains here, though. It seems right
that transmission of signals requires both controllability and observability and that
the quantum mechanical connection is not controllable. However, we could imagine
a weaker version of the worry. The worry might not be that allowing superluminal
causation has to allow for the creation of paradoxical causal loops, but merely that it
could allow the existence of such loops since the theory itself does not preclude them.
Maudlin also points to another ground to reject that the mere existence of super-
luminal causation allows for paradoxes due to Wheeler and Feynman [122]. Wheeler
and Feynman argue, in quite a different context, that demanding that physical pro-
cesses are continuous can allow for resolution to the paradox. The resulting causal
loops are surprising, but as Wheeler and Feynman argue, if we can be assured that
those loops are limited to cases that we do not expect to encounter (at all, or perhaps
at least not in the kind of settings where we have experience), the mere fact that
the solution involves there being unusual causal loops does not rule out a solution
that postulates them. It is hard to judge whether or not a similar solution could
allow harmless, if strange, causal loops also in the case of EPR style set-ups, since it
requires looking closely at the measurement process itself. However, in the standard
theory of quantum mechanics the wavefunction collapse is not a continuous process.
On the account of explanation that I have been advocating it is not surprising that
we can doubt the existence of a causal connection without thereby denying that the
quantum mechanical story has explanatory power. After all, it is perfectly possible
to hold that the measurement outcomes nomologically depend on each other without
also taking that dependence to be a causal one.
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Yet again we are in a situation where it seems perfectly sensible to hold that we
have an explanation, but to also hold that we lack something explanatory, namely a
causal explanation. The situation here is in many ways analogous to the one related
to Newtonian gravity discussed in section 4.1. Here too there are a priori objection
to the the kind of causal interaction that the theory would seem to require, but
importantly there are also empirical and methodological objections to postulating
the required kind of causal influence.
4.3.3 Woodward’s solution
Woodward argues for an interventionist account of explanations of particular facts.
His account is a causal one and he is careful to delineate the domain of application of
the view that he puts forward. In particular he claims that causal explanations have
the ‘. . . distinguishing feature . . . that they show how what is explained depends on
other, distinct factors, where the dependence in question has to do with some rela-
tionship that holds as a matter of empirical fact, rather than for logical or conceptual
reasons’ [126, p 4 – 5].
To be able to provide a non-arbitrary delineation of this kind is of course very
important if the causal account is to be able to retain its simple and elegant solution
to the problems the deductive-nomological account faces. After all, once we allow for
explanations that are not causal we have to address the question why this non-causal,
but explanatory, relationship could not hold between, say, the length of the shadow
and the height of the flagpole. Providing a clear delineation between the domains
where explanations are the provision of causal information and the domains where
explanations are not causal is a way of addressing this problem.
At first blush however the explanations like 19 above seem to pose a problem for
Woodward’s demarcation.45 It is clearly a case where the dependence in question has
45I think that the examples from Newtonian gravity and general relativity also pose challenges
for Woodward’s account, albeit ones of a slightly different kind. There I take Woodward to take
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to do with some relationship that holds as a matter of empirical fact and not one
that is conceptual or logical in nature, and yet, the dependence does not seem to be
causal. Though he does not say much about quantum mechanics in ‘Making Things
Happen’ [126] he does address this case in a paper with Hausman [41]. Woodward
and Hausman outline two different ways in which one can avoid attributing a causal
relation between the outcomes of the two experiments in an EPR set-up.
In principle there seem to be two possible ways in which independent dis-
ruptability might fail. One is that X and Y are not distinct events. . . . A
second possibility, which some would argue is illustrated by the EPR phe-
nomenon, is that X and Y are distinct events, but they are not proba-
bilistically dependent on one another in virtue of being cause and effect or
effects of a common cause. Instead they bear a different kind of non-causal
(but non-accidental) relation to one another. Woodward and Hausman
[41, p 564 – 565]
In the end Woodward ends up arguing for the first of the two options. Woodward’s
idea is that since the notion of an intervention with respect to one of the measurement
event with respect to the other is not well defined it is inappropriate to attribute a
causal relationship between the two measurements. The reason that the notion of an
intervention is ill-defined is that ‘. . . the distinction between intervening with respect
to X and acting directly on both X and Y cannot be drawn . . . , the two particles
constitute a single composite object . . . ’ [41, p 566].
If we agree with Woodward that there is really only one event, we can account for
why there is no causal relationship. However, this does not seem to completely solve
the puzzle that I am concerned with here. After all, the puzzle that I introduced at
the start of this section was that of understanding how we could seem to have an
explanation while doubting whether there is a causal dependence between the two
measurement outcomes. Hausman and Woodward are not directly concerned with
explanation in their paper, but we can nonetheless see how Woodward’s solution
there to be a causal relationship and to provide a debunking account of why some nonetheless doubt
there being such a relationship (as discussed in section 4.1.1.1). In the case under consideration here
Woodward does not take there to be a causal relationship.
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allows him to demarcate a non-arbitrary domain for causal explanations. It is now
not the case that all that is required for there to be a distinctly causal explanation is
that the relationship is one that holds as an empirical matter of fact, rather it has to
be the case the relationship is one that holds as an empirical matter of fact between
events. This provides Woodward with a nice way to keep the elegant causal solutions
to the counter-examples faced by the deductive-nomological account, since the relata
there plausibly are separate events. On this solution the situation in the the EPR
set-up is simply no longer within the purview of a causal account.
However, it does not seem to successfully solve the explanatory challenge itself,
since it now no longer addresses it (nor is it one of the goals of Woodward’s and
Hausman’s paper to address this challenge). One option is, of course, to deny that
one of the measurement outcomes can explain the other and that once we come to
recognise that there is no causal relationship we also come to recognise that there
is no explanatory relationship. This however is just to deny the phenomenon that I
started this section with and some account of how it seems perfectly coherent to deny
the existence of a causal relationship while not denying the explanatory relationship
is called for. Even if we accept that the two measurement outcomes are not two
separate events and that this precludes there being a causal relations since the relata
of the causation relation is two distinct events, it does not follow that there could be no
explanatory relationship between two aspects of the same event. For example, we may
think the particular atomic configuration of a certain sample explains its propensity
to shatter under pressure. However, it is not clear that the atomic configuration
of the particular sample and its brittleness are two events. Indeed it is not clear
that the relata in the explanation are events at all, but in so far as they are related
to events they seem to be related to the same event. While Woodward’s argument
might convince us that there is no causal relationship between the two measurement
outcomes, it should not convince us that there is no explanatory relationship.
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Finally, I am not sure that Woodward’s argument against the possibility of a
causal connection is successful. The argument seems to run as follows;
Premise 1 The two particles constitute a single composite object.
Premise 2 If we have a single, but composite, object, then a measurement result on
one part of the composite does not constitute a separate event from a measure-
ment result on the other part of the composite.46
Conclusion There is one single measurement result event.
My worry is that I do not see why we should accept premise 2. After all, there are
plenty of cases where measurements on two different parts of a composite object seem
to constitute separate events. For example, the event of measuring my temperature in
my ear and receiving the answer 37.5 ◦ and the event of measuring my temperature in
my mouth and receiving the answer 37.5 ◦ seem to be distinct events in spite of being
measurements on the same object of the same property. Moreover, even if we imagine
that I am a quantum like system so that before the measurement it is undetermined
whether or not my temperature is 37.5 ◦ or 36.5 ◦, the two measurement events still
seem to be distinct events. Merely establishing that the two particles constitute a
single composite object does not seem to be enough to allow us to conclude that the
two measurement results are one and the same event.
This leaves the motivation that comes from appealing directly to the idea that
one cannot distinguish intervening on one of the events directly and on the second
only indirectly, through the first. This kind of reasoning will, of course, carry less
weight if we do not accept an interventionist analysis of causation, but even if we do,
it is not clear that we can hold the EPR case to be a case where intervention is ruled
out. After all, what we are concerned with is a mere logically or conceptually possible
46This is a reconstruction of what I think that the suppressed premise in Woodward’s argument
is.
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intervention.47 In the EPR set-up we can divide the process into six different stages
(not necessarily in the following order);
1. The two particles are in an entangled state.
2. There is a measurement process on particle one.
3. There is a measurement process on particle two.
4. The wavefunction collapses.
5. The particles are in definite states of spin.
6. There is a measurement outcome for the first measurement.
7. There is a measurement outcome for the second measurement.
What we are ultimately interested in is the relationship between the measurement
outcomes. Now the reason that Hausman and Woodward give when they argue that
we should consider the two measurement outcomes as one single event is that ‘. . . it
is wrong to think of the measurement process performed on one particle as directly
affecting only the state of that particle and affecting the other particle if at all only
through the change it produces in the first particle’ [41, p 566]. There is a way of
understanding this which I take to be uncontroversial, namely that the measurement
process (on either particle) is responsible for the wavefunction collapse, which changes
47Woodward points out how we need to take the notion this way in order to avoid ruling out the
existence of causal relations where there is simply no available intervention that would allow us to
intervene on X with respect to Y (and so affect Y, if at all, only through changes in X).
Although it might be true that any actual physical process that changes the position
of the moon will also directly influence the tides, Newtonian theory . . . tell[s] us how
to subtract out any direct influence from such a process . . . In other words, Newtonian
theory itself delivers a determinate answer to questions about what would happen to
the tides under an intervention that doubles the moon’s orbit, and that is enough
for counterfactual claims about what would happen under such interventions to be
legitimate and to allow us to assess their truth. Woodward [126, p 131]
In light of this I take the comment that ‘. . . once the measurement apparatus is determined, there
is no physically possible way to alter or fix the value of either measurement result . . . ’ [41, p 565]
to not be an argument against the possibility of causal structure in and of itself, but to push us to
have to consider their second point, namely the problem of defining an intervention with respect to
one of the measurement events.
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the states of both particles.48 We could think of the process as one where there
is a measurement on particle one (which is in an entangled state) and where this
measurement is responsible for a wavefunction collapse so that the particles are now in
definite states of spin, which are then finally recorded by the measurement outcomes.
However, we can also think of the process as one where there is a measurement on the
spin of particle one such that this brings about a determinate measurement outcome
and concomitantly a determinate spin of the particles and a wavefunction collapse.
In the first case it would seem tempting to see the two measurement outcomes as
having a common cause49, namely the collapse of the wavefunction which in its turn
can be taken to be caused by the measurement process on the first particle. In the
second case it would be tempting to see the measurement outcomes as being related
as cause and effect. The determinate measurement outcome is responsible for, or
perhaps better constitutive of, the wavefunction collapse and for the determinate
measurement outcome of the distant measurement.50 While I take Hausman and
Woodward to be right to say that there is no intervention that we could actually make
on the outcome of the measurement process on particle one all that is demanded is
that the theory itself provides the answer to what would have happened were we able
to make such an intervention. Moreover, both of the ways of understanding the EPR
set-up above allows that the wavefunction collapse directly affects the state of both
particles. However, even if it is the case that measurement process responsible for the
wavefunction collapse affects both particles it does not follow that the measurement
outcomes cannot be taken to be separate events related by a common cause or as cause
and effect as I hope that have illustrated by the two interpretations above.51 This
48As long as we are staying within this interpretation. It is, of course, up for debate whether
or not wavefunction collapse takes place at all and if so if measurement processes ought to have a
privileged status in bringing collapse about.
49Though not a deterministic cause.
50I do not think that either way is a very satisfying way of understanding what goes on during
a measurement. However, I take this to be an aspect of the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics and the problems that the theory faces in accounting for measurement processes.
51I do not take this to give us particularly strong reason to think that the two measurement
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does not rule out Woodward’s and Hausman’s interpretation of the two measurement
outcomes as constituting a single event, but I think that it would have to be argued
for independently of concerns about manipulability (understood as counterfactuals
under merely logically possible interventions that are upheld by the theory).
Ultimately, this means that I do not think that this strategy to put EPR set-ups
outside the purview of causal explanations is successful. However, if complemented by
an account of non-causal explanations then this strategy could, if successful, provide
the basis of a plausible debunking account of the phenomenon that I started this
section with. After all, with an account of non-causal explanations in place and an
account of why explanations like 19 are not contenders for being within the domain of
application of causal accounts of explanation, we can explain the conceptual coherence
of holding putative explanation 19 to be explanatory while holding that we lack
something explanatory, namely a causal explanation. We would, on this account, be
wrong to think that a causal explanation was even a possibility, but since the reason
would be quite sophisticated and involve a highly unusual kind of event, it would not
be implausible that we would fail to realise this.
outcomes are causally connected. Rather I take it to be an argument that they might be.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion, confession, and future work
The account of explanation that I have proposed does not fit neatly as a devel-
opment of any of the traditional accounts. It is broader than the causal account
in that not only causal relations but laws too are allowed as principles of inference.
It is narrower than the deductive-nomological account in that it is not sufficient for
explanation that the phenomenon to be explained is subsumed under some law.
It is yet again different from interventionist accounts, even though it shares the
importance placed on counterfactual scenarios. What matters on the account I have
described is not counterfactual evaluations to do with interventions, rather it is coun-
terfactual evaluations supported by empirical principles of inference. The intuition
behind emphasizing not counterfactual dependence alone, but counterfactual depen-
dence as guaranteed by a principle of inference is that the target of our explanations
is uncovering dependence between some actual events or aspects of events. While
counterfactual dependence can be informative as to whether or not there is a relation
of actual dependence between two events (or aspects of events), this is so only if the
relationship we take to hold between them that allow us to make the judgement in
support of counterfactual dependence is one that also holds in the actual world and
one that has something to say about the relationship between the events or aspects
of events that actually do occur.
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If I am right in arguing that causal explanations are a distinct kind of explanation
and that we have good reasons for, at least sometimes, pursuing such explanations,
the problem for theories of explanation that I discussed earlier can arise. If we can
have a situation where we have a lawlike explanation and where we reasonably would
like to have, but think that we lack, a causal explanation, then we have a puzzle for
the standard theories of explanation.
On the deductive-nomological account as well as causal accounts of explanation
such theories turn out to be either paradigmatically explanatory or not explanatory
at all. It was the hope of being able to account for an ambivalent attitude, where we
both have (in the sense of a lawlike explanation) and lack (in the sense of a causal
explanation) an explanatory theory, while keeping a unified account of what it is that
makes something explanatory, that prompted me to attempt to modify the existing
accounts of explanation. I hope to have illustrated how the account of explanation
that I propose in chapter II can account for this ambivalent attitude by showing
how, for example in the case of Newtonian gravity, the lawlike principles of inference
guarantee dependence and do so independently of whether or not there also are causal
principles of inference that guarantee the same dependence relation. Similarly, in EPR
style set-ups we can have an explanation of the outcome of the measurement of the
spin of one particle in terms of the outcome of the measurement of the spin of the
other as long as we hold the relevant principles to be lawlike (though in the case
of quantum mechanics the suitability of the principles as laws has very much been
up for debate) and we can do so independently of worries about the existence of a
causal relationship between the two measurement outcomes. In both of these cases
there is a real conflict here, but I have tried to argue that it is not one that stems
from conceptual confusions as to the nature of cause or the nature of explanation.
The conflict arises since these are cases where we would expect a causal explanation
to be available and while we find one kind of explanation to also take there to be a
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causal explanation is in conflict with our best theory of how causal influences behave.
Moreover, in both of these cases, the lawlike explanation does nothing to dissolve this
conflict. The situation in general relativity is similar in that we both have a kind
of explanation (a lawlike one) but can seem to lack another kind of explanation (a
causal one). Here, however, the reason that we seem to lack a causal explanation
give us reasons for why it is inappropriate to expect the theory to supply one. The
concerns raised in this case do not have to do with a conflict with our best theory
of the nature of causal influences, but rather with the possibility of having a causal
reconstruction of the explanation offered by the theory.
Taking explanations to provide information about relations of actual dependence
has consequences for other debates in philosophy. For example, rejecting that only
causal relations can explain particular matters of fact means that certain arguments
in favour of regarding general relativity as involving a gravitational field in spacetime
that is acting (rather than viewing spacetime itself as acting) lose their force.1 It also
shows why the use of action at a distance in Newtonian gravity and the non-locality
in quantum mechanics was thought to be especially troubling. Though I think that
these cases too are simply ones where we have a lawlike explanation but lack a causal
one, the lawlike explanation given does not show us why the search for a causal one
is misguided (in contrast to the way that the lawlike explanation of inertial motion
in general relativity does).
Lastly, the dependence account of explanation gives us a framework for how to
settle disputes about explanatory status. In addition to denying the truth of the
law itself, or its status as a law rather than a mere true generalisation, one could
now also challenge the claim that law supports dependence, either by showing that
the deduction to the phenomena from the law fails or by showing that it is possible
for the law to hold while the particular fact in the explanans fails to hold but the
1For a presentation of such arguments (though not taken to be decisive), see, for example Brown
[14] and Rovelli [93].
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particular fact in the explanandum does not.2
5.1 Extending the actual dependence account
In the preceding chapters I have been concerned with developing an account of
canonical, or ideal, non-probabilistic explanations of particular matters of fact. For
explanations that invoke laws what is being explained is typically why an event has
a certain feature and typically the identity of the particular event in question is
arbitrary. This means that there is a straightforward and easy extension of the
account to account for how laws explain regularities. The mention of the particular
event can simply be supplement with a claim that that the identity of the event is
arbitrary and that the conclusion reached about this particular event hold for all
events that share the salient features.
In accounting for how laws explain other laws we can see how the extension will
work, but we will often encounter the additional difficulty that what is explained in
these cases is often not why the explanandum is true, but rather why it holds as
well as it does under certain conditions. When this complication is not present the
extension is straightforward and it solves the difficulty that the deductive-nomological
account encounters when considering laws explaining other laws. The problem here
is that that the account only demands that the derivation make essential use of one
law of nature. Even if we rule out obvious cases of deriving the law from just itself,
Hempel and Oppenheim [43, footnote 33, p 273] argue that we end up allowing for a
kind of self-explanation by simply deriving the law from its conjunction with another
law. On the account that I have proposed we have to identify which law we take to
act as a principle of inference and this law then has to be able to guarantee that the
target phenomenon, in this case a law, depends on some other phenomena, which in
2For an example of a debate about explanatory status that seems to involve both of these lines
of attack, see Smith [108].
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this case may also be one or more laws. This requirement means that it is not the
case that the derivation can, in general, exchange which laws are taken to be doing
the explaining and which are being explained.
This account also gives us a notion of how it is that certain laws can act as
higher-level laws or principles that does not involve introducing a new notion, or a
multilayered notion, of nomological necessity. Here what introduces the hierarchy is
rather that some nomological necessities depend on others (but not vice versa), in
the sense that there are relations that can act as empirical principles of inference
that guarantee that one law obtaining depends on another law (or collection of laws,
or perhaps collection of laws and particular facts) obtaining. While this gives us a
(partial) hierarchy in terms of explanatory priority, it does not require us to introduce
any new metaphysical notions of nomological necessity.
5.1.1 Statistical and probabilistic explanation
The final natural extension to look for is one that covers statistical and proba-
bilistic explanation. I think that there is good reason to start with non-probabilistic
explanation since I am optimistic about the possibility of accounting for probabilistic
and statistical explanation in the way that Railton [89] [90] has outlined. When it
comes to genuinely probabilistic explanations that draw on indeterministic processes
(such as the ones found in many quantum mechanical theories), it strikes me as ex-
actly right to claim, as Railton does, that all we can do is to deductively account for
the probability of the occurrence of a certain type of event and to then note whether
or not it in fact occurs.3
The situation is different with respect to statistical explanation where we may
assume that there is some deterministic explanation to be given, but it is not one
3Though to remain deductivists we would have to claim that we cannot explain why, for example,
a particular uranium atom decayed. All that we can explain is what the likelihood of it decaying
within a given timeframe is.
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that we have access too. Here I think that Kitcher’s [60, pp 448-459] defence of
deductivism or, unflatteringly dubbed, deductive chauvinism is exactly right. Let
me give a brief example to illustrate how I understand Kitcher’s defence. Consider
Bridget who is a lifelong heavy smoker and who has developed lung cancer. We cannot
explain why Bridget, in particular, got lung cancer by citing the fact that Bridget
smokes and that smoking increases the likelihood of developing lung cancer (by some
amount). In order to do that we would have to resort to the token causal claim that
her smoking caused her cancer. However, we can explain why Bridget, as opposed to
non-smokers, was at a higher risk of developing lung cancer. None of this however,
demands denying the existence of there being a range of ideal explanations that do
account for why Bridget, in particular (and compared to other smokers) developed
lung cancer.4 We can then understand the type causal explanation where we cite the
fact that smoking causes cancer in terms of information about the general features
of the ideal explanations that we take to exist. To actually execute this project and
to specify what kind of information is provided is by no means trivial and all that
I hope to have done here is to argue that the objections raised against this kind of
project do not show it to be impossible.
5.2 Final confessions of a non-Humean
There is a fundamental source of conflict in the literature of explanation that
I have, so far, not addressed. For many any talk of causes and laws of nature as
providing connections between events or aspects of events will be met with deep
scepticism. On such a view to take such connections as given in order to account
for scientific explanations is to account for the less objectionable in terms of the
4Neither does it mandate thinking that there are such explanations, of course. However if we
think that there is no such explanation to give as to why Bridget, in particular and compared to
other smokers, developed lung cancer we would seem to be committed to indeterminism and to be
back to a case like the quantum mechanical one where I would argue that it is plausible that there
simply is no explanation of why Bridget, in particular, got lung cancer.
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more objectionable. Here I have only two arguments to defend my strategy. First,
the goal is to understand what an ideal scientific explanation would look like and
what we should take such an explanation to look like. Moreover, one of the goals in
providing such an account is to be able to understand debates over the explanatory
status of putative explanations. Now, I think that some attacks on the explanatory
status of, for example quantum mechanics, are usefully understood as questioning the
lawlike nature of the principles invoked and whether or not they do, in fact, give us
a connection between events or aspects of event. Here, the account can at least serve
to illuminate what is at stake in these debates.
Second, I do not think that we have reason to be so worried about causal relations
or laws as to feel the need to try to account for them in Humean terms. Causal claims
have typically come in for the most scepticism. Famously, Russell went so far as to
consider the exclusion of causal talk altogether desirable.
All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fun-
damental axioms of postulates of science, yet oddly enough, in advanced
sciences, such as gravitational astronomy, the word “cause” never occurs.
. . . The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only
because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. Russell [96, p 193]
What I have said here is in agreement with Russell as to laws in general having an
advantage over causes when it comes to doing explanatory work, namely that they
show exactly how an aspect of an event depends on other aspects of events. However,
as I have already argued in section 1.2 I think that very few of our sciences can do
explanatory work without relying on causal claims or causal laws. Moreover I think
that we can view our causal claims as involving a theory of what causal influences
are like. As such, this theory is not in and of itself on different footing than our
theories about what the laws of nature are. Both are open to revision in light of
the observations and it is possible in both cases for us to be systematically mislead








In this appendix I will work through the proof from Geroch and Jang [35] in order
to fill out the details for a more philosophically inclined audience and for the sake of
convenience of having the crucial pieces of information collected in the same place. I
am heavily indebted to Malament’s [72] and [73] notes on this topic. Since I will be
following Malament’s proofs closely I will adopt the Penrose index notation. Nearly
all of the formal work that follows here can be found in a more condensed form in
Malament’s notes.
The first, and crucial part if the derivation of geodesic motion is to have much
to do with general relativity in particular at all, is to note that local energy and
momentum conservation is a consequence of Einstein’s field equations. We take Tab
to represent a matter field, and in particular, the energy and moment present at a





Now, it follows that
∇aT ab = 0
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.
To see this I will first make use of Malament’s proposition 1.8.2 [72, p 59 – 60]
and simply expand on the proof of the Bianchi identity that he offers there. Rabcd
is the Riemann curvature tensor field. It records the noncummutativity of ∇a and
∇b. By Malament’s 1.8.1 [72, p 59] we have an existence proof of a unique smooth
Riemann curvature tensor field associated with the derivative operator∇ that satisfies
Rabcdβ
b = −2(∇c∇d −∇d∇c)βa.1 With this in place we can work through the details
of Malament’s proof at 1.8.2.
His starting point is to note that we have
2∇r∇[c∇d]βb = ∇rRabcdβa
So far this just requires us to make use of the definition of the Riemann curvature
tensor field. He then goes on to note that
∇rRabcdβa = βa∇rRabcd +Rabcd∇rβa
by making use of the way that ∇ acts on products, so that we end up with
2∇r∇[c∇d]βb = βa∇rRabcd +Rabcd∇rβa (A.1)
Next Malament notes that
2∇[r∇c]∇dβb = Rndrc∇nβb +Rnbrc∇dβn (A.2)
Following Malament, but filling out some of the details, we then anti-symmetrize
1Hereafter I will write ∇c∇d −∇d∇c as ∇[c∇d].
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the two equations. In order to do so for (A.1) we have
2∇r∇[c∇d]βb+2∇c∇[d∇r]βb+2∇d∇[r∇c]βb−2∇r∇[d∇c]βb−2∇c∇[r∇d]βb−2∇d∇[c∇r]βb =
βa(∇rRabcd −∇rRabdc +∇cRabdr −∇cRabrd +∇dRabrc −∇dRabcr)+
(Rabcd∇r −Rabdc∇r +Rabdr∇c −Rabrd∇c +Rabrc∇d −Rabcr∇d)βa
This can be written more elegantly as
2∇[r∇c∇d]βb − 2∇[r∇d∇c]βb =
4∇[r∇c∇d]βb = βa∇[rRa|b|cd] +Rab[cd∇r]βa
For (A.2) we have
(2∇[r∇c]∇d + 2∇[c∇d]∇r + 2∇[d∇r]∇c − 2∇[c∇r]∇d − 2∇[d∇c]∇r − 2∇[r∇d]∇c)βb =
(Rndrc∇n −Rndcr∇n +Rnrcd∇n −Rnrdc∇n +Rncdr∇n −Rncrd∇n)βb+
(Rnbrc∇d −Rnbcr∇d +Rnbcd∇r −Rnbdc∇r +Rnbdr∇c −Rnbrd∇c)βn
Which again we can write more elegantly as
2∇[r∇c∇d]βb − 2∇[r∇d∇c]βb =
4∇[r∇c∇d]βb = Rn[drc]∇nβb +Rnb[rc∇d]βn
Since the two left hand sides of (A.1) and (A.2) are equal we get
βa∇[rRa|b|cd] +Rab[cd∇r]βa = Rn[drc]∇nβb +Rnb[rc∇d]βn
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We see that Rab[cd∇r]βa = Rnb[rc∇d]βn. Moreover, Rn[drc]=0 so Rn[drc]∇nβb = 0.2 This
means that βa∇[rRa|b|cd] = 0. Since βa is an arbitrary vector field, we have that
∇[rRa|b|cd] = 0
This is the Bianchi identity.
With this in place we can turn our attention to the Ricci tensor field and the scalar
curvature field. These are defined when ∇ is determined by a metric gab.3 Again I
will make use of Malament’s definitions in [72, p 72]. The Ricci tensor Rab is given
by Rcabc. The scalar curvature field is given by g
arRra.
With this in place we are finally in a position to show that ∇a(Rab − 12g
abR) = 0.
To see this we start with the Bianchi identity.4.
∇[rRa|b|cd] = 0




Expanding this out we get
∇rRabca +∇cRabar +∇aRabrc −∇rRabac −∇cRabra −∇aRabcr = 0
Using the definition of the Ricci tensor field and the fact that Rabcd = −Rabdc we get
2Malament gives a proof of this too in 1.8.2 [72]. We can see why this is if we start by noting
that 2∇[c∇d]∇bβ = Rabcd∇aβ. From this we have that Ra[bcd]∇aβ = 4∇[c∇d∇b]β = 0. Since ∇aβ is
a way to express an arbitrary vector, we have that Ra[bcd] = 0.
3So, ∇agcb = 0.
4This proof is not in Malament [72].
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that 5
∇rRbc −∇cRbr +∇aRabrc +∇rRbc −∇cRbr −∇aRabcr = 0
Which simplifies to
2∇rRbc − 2∇cRbr + 2∇aRabrc = 0
We can now contract this with grb and use the definition of the scalar curvature
to get6
∇rRrc −∇cRrr +∇aRarrc = ∇rRrc −∇cR +∇aRac = 2∇aRac −∇cR = 0
This is just











So from Einstein’s field equation we have that ∇aT ab = 0.
With this in place we can set out to tackle Geroch and Jang’s proof [35]. Here I
am again indebted to Malament’s [72] [73] discussion of the Geroch and Jang paper.
Since Malament does not go into details of the proof I will do so here. Geroch and
Jang start by considering the motion of a body in special relativity. They first take
the body of interest to be represented by T ab, a smooth symmetric tensor field, on
Minkowski spacetime M. Moreover they assume that ∇aT ab = 0. It is important that
this is an assumption. Above we derived this from the assumption that Einstein’s
5It is easy to see this by remembering that Rabcdβ
b = ∇[c∇d]βa and that ∇[c∇d] = −∇[d∇c].
6I am also dividing by 2.
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field equation was satisfied, but this is, of course, not a condition appropriate to a
special relativistic setting. Next Geroch and Jang [35, p 2] define two tensor fields Pa
and Jab on M (representing momentum and angular momentum respectively) to be
those fields that are such that for any Killing field7 on M κa




Here we are to understand S as a space-like surface that cuts the world tube of the
body. Here we find another important assumption. In order to make sense of the
idea that the body has a world tube (or to think that there is a body that can be
modelled by T ab in the first place) we are committed to thinking that there is some
region of spacetime where T ab is non-zero and we take T ab to be zero elsewhere.
We know that T ab is locally conserved and using this together with the fact that
κb is a Killing field (and that T
ab is symmetric) we have that ∇a(T abκb) = 0. We can
see this by first noting that
2∇aT abκb = ∇aT abκb +∇bT baκa
by index substitution. Since T ab is symmetric we have
2∇aT abκb = ∇aT abκb +∇bT abκa = T ab(∇aκb +∇bκa) + κb∇aT ab + κa∇bT ab
By conservation of T ab and Killing’s equation we have
2∇aT abκb = 0
and so we see that ∇a(T abκb) = 0. This means that we expect the integral on the
7Using Malament’s discussion after proposition 1.9.7 [72, p 73] a Killing field κ with respect to
gab is a smooth vector field that satisfies Killing’s equation ∇(aκb) = 0.
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right hand side of (A.3) to be a constant and independent of the choice of S.
Given that the left hand side of the equation (A.3) has to be independent of
position it follow that ∇nPa = 0. Moreover given that Jab is the angular momentum
so that Jab = XaPb −XbPa and that ∇aXb = δba8 we have that
∇nJab = ∇n(XaPb −XbPa) = Pb∇nXa − Pa∇nXb
since ∇nPa = 0. Making use of ∇aXb = δba and ∇agbc = 0 we have that
∇nJab = Pb∇ngmaXm − Pa∇ngkbXk = Pbgmaδmn − Pagkbδkn = Pbgna − Pagnb
The two crucial parts of the rest of the proof for the case in special relativity are
1. The centre of mass worldline of the body defined by P aJab = 0 is a time-like
geodesic.
2. This wordline is close to the worldtube of the body (in the sense of lying within
the convex hull of T ab).
Let us start by looking at 1 first. Following Malament’s discussion [73] of Geroch
and Jang [35] we assume that T abβaβb ≥ 0 for any timelike βb and that if T ab 6= 0 then
T abβ
b is timelike, so that Pa is also time like.
9 From this we have that the set of points
that satisfy P aJab = 0 gives the image of a curve γ that is time-like and a geodesic.
10
Let us start by considering a point p on S (one of the space-like surfaces in (A.3))
where P aJab = 0 and let us assume that P
n is tangent to a curve ∆ passing through
this point. Now ∆ is a time-like geodesic since P a∇aP n = 0 and P n is time-like.
8The existence of such a position vector field for flat derivative operators is proved by Malament
[72, proposition 1.7.11, p 55–56].
9Malament adds an explicit requirement that T abβaβb ≥ 0 for all time-like βb to the formulation
that Geroch and Jang make use of.
10What follows in the rest of this paragraph is my work.
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Moreover we can see that
P n∇nP aJab = P nP a(Pbgna − Pagnb) = P a(PaPb − PaPb) = 0
so we have that P aJab is constant in the direction of P
n. Since P aJab = 0 at p we
have that P aJab = 0 at all points in the image of ∆. Since we defined the image of γ
as the set of points that satisfy P aJab = 0 we have that the image of γ is identical to
the image of ∆. So γ is a time-like geodesic.
Claim 2 is spelled out in terms of the notion of a convex hull. Geroch and Jang
[35, p 2] define the convex hull of T ab to be the union of all the segments of spacelike
geodesics that have both their endpoints within the worldtube of the body. Geroch
and Jang go on to show that the set of points that satisfy P aJab = 0 lie within the
convex hull of T ab. The way that they go about establishing this they consider eval-
uating the equation relating the momentum and angular momentum to the integral
at a specific point p on γ at a spacelike surface S orthogonal to P a choosing for the
killing field a boost at p around P a. Geroch and Jang notes how this allows the left
hand side of (A.3) to vanish.11 In order for the integral to vanish too it must be that
p is within the convex hull of T ab.
Once we are dealing with a situation where we have curvature, we are no longer
assured that the reasoning above from special relativity applies. Geroch and Jang
show how to make use of the result from special relativity. If we have a curve Γ such
that for any neighbourhood of Γ there is a smooth symmetric field Tab such that Tab
is non-zero somewhere in that neighbourhood and is zero elsewhere and, moreover,
that ∇aT ab = 0 and that T abβaβb ≥ 0 for any timelike βb and that if T ab 6= 0 then
T abβ
b is timelike, then Γ is a timelike geodesic.
The strategy is realise that if the freely moving body can be surrounded by an
11We can see this by constructing the position field according to Malament [72, proposition 1.7.11,
p 55 – 56] and set it to vanish at p.
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arbitrarily small worldtube, the result of special relativity will be applicable. First
we introduce a flat metric gabflat and the associated derivative ∇aflat that is set to
coincide with gab and ∇a on Γ. With respect to gabflat the same argument as the
one in special relativity can be carried out. So we would like to conclude that within
the region of support of T ab there is a timelike geodesic with respect to gabflat and
the associated derivative ∇aflat . However, we have stipulated only that ∇aT ab = 0
not that ∇aflatT ab = 0. We do however know that ∇aflat and ∇a coincide on Γ. If
we make that the neighbourhood of Γ where Tab is non-zero arbitrarily small we can
make the difference between ∇aflatT ab and ∇aT ab arbitrarily small too. So now we
can reason as in the special relativistic case and find that within the worldtube of
the body there is a time-like geodesic. However, we also know that Γ is within the
worldtube of the body. Now we have everything that we need to notice that Γ is
arbitrarily close to some timelike geodesic with respect to gabflat , but this can be the
case only if Γ is a geodesic with respect to gabflat .
12 However, gabflat and gab and their
associated derivatives coincide on Γ so Γ is also a geodesic with respect to gab.
It is clear that there is a kind of idealisation built into this argument. The way that
the argument proceeds allows us to conclude that a body that can be modelled by a
T ab that can be made to have support in an arbitrarily small neighbourhood of Γ will
move along a geodesic. Moreover, it is also clear where the theory of general relativity
in particular and Einstein’s field equations play an explanatory role. Namely, in
establishing ∇aT ab = 0. This gives us a way of understanding more closely how the
status of inertial motion has changed from Newtonian theories to general relativity.
One difference is the approximation involved in the claim that free bodies travel
geodesics of the spacetime and a second important difference is the role that the
fundamental laws of the theory can play in explaining why it is that free motion is




so that the difference in the integrals can be made arbitrarily small. For integration in general
relativity see for example DeBenedictis [22].
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motion along a geodesic. In both cases we can derive such motion from, something
like13, a conservation assumption like ∇aT ab = 0.14 However, in the situation in
general relativity this conservation condition is a consequence of the fundamental
laws of the theory and this is the way in which we can understand the quote below
from Misner, Thorne and Wheeler.
. . . [I]s it not a pretensious parade of pomposity to say it [the derivation of
the equations of motion15] comes “from Einstein’s field equation” . . . when
it really comes from a principle so elementary and long established as
the law of conservation of 4-momentum? . . . However, in no theory but
Einstein’s is this principle incorporated as an identity . . . The Maxwell field
equations are so constructed that they automatically fulfil and demand
the conservation of charge; but not everything has charge. The Einstein
field equation is so constructed that it automatically fulfils and demands
the conservation of momentum-energy; and everything does have energy.
Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler [82, p 475]
13The meaning of the conservation condition will not be the same in Newtonian and relativistic
theories.
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